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The rules and concepts which govern "international taxation" among the
major trading nations derive from work in the 1920s by the League of
Nations.' The principles first enunciated there are widely seen as having
generated a remarkably durable and stable regime, lasting nearly a century to
the present day.2 In the first half of this second decade of the twenty-first
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academic year.
The authors are grateful to the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for their
generous support to the preparation of this article.
1. The major documents in this initiative are collected in 4 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TAX
CONVENTIONS 3997, 4151-94 (1962) [hereinafter Conventions Legislative History]. For early
literature describing or discussing this work, see H. David Rosenbloom & Stanley I. Langbein,
United States Tax Treaty Polity: An Overview, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359 (1981) (See Part
II for discussion of the work of the League in the 1920s and 1930s); Stanley I. Langbein, The
Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm's Length, 30 TAX NOTES 625 (1986); see also Michael J.
Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The 'OriginalIntent' of U.S. InternationalTaxation, 46 DUKE L. J.
1021, 1022-28 (1997).
At the current time the rules and concepts that undergird such international "system" as exists
are embodied in "model conventions" of international organisations, principally that of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an organisation
comprising of mostly developed countries and headquartered in Paris. Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (2014) [hereinafter
OECD Model Convention]. That Model is largely designed for use between two developed
countries. There is also a model convention designed by the United Nations for use between
one developed country and one developing country. U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS,
U.N. MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING

(2011) [hereinafter UN Model Convention].
These Model Conventions are advisory only, although they are quite influential. What actually
governs the taxation of transnational enterprises (TNEs), as of all taxpayers, are bilateral
conventions executed between the nations of the world. In all but unusual cases, these
conventions include clauses that closely follow, if indeed they do not literally incorporate, the
provisions set forth in the Models.
2. See, e.g., Victor Zonana, International Tax Policy in the New Millennium: Developing an
Agenda, 26 BROOKL. J. INT'L L. 1253, 1255 (2001) (system a "flawed miracle"); Reuven S. AviYonah, The Structure oflInternationalTaxation: A Proposalfor Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301
COUNTRIES
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century, the major economic powers of the world undertook an initiative
widely seen as aimed at, or having the potential to, substantially revise this
existing but aging regime.3 The initiative was called the Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting project, or, by its acronym, BEPS.4
Undoubtedly the most significant single facet of the historic regime are
the rules governing "transfer pricing," which allocate the tax base generated
by the profits of transnational enterprises (TNEs) among the national
5
jurisdictions within which those enterprises operate. And despite the
stability of the overall system, the "transfer pricing" rules have always proved
neither durable nor satisfactory. The rules operate under the so-called
"arm's length" principle-the idea that allocation of profits among countries
should be accomplished by treating the TNEs as if the enterprises in
different jurisdictions were separate enterprises engaged in transactions at
prices that would be charged between independent enterprises.6 However,
this standard, though constant over decades, has undergone three formative
or transformative changes in eighty years.7 The first was when it emerged in
the 1930s;s the second, when the United States issued the first detailed
interpretation of the standard in the 1960s;9 and the third, finalized in the
1990s, when the regime of the 1960s encountered difficulties and
engendered controversy in the late 1980s and early 1990s.1o
However, the regime of the 1990s, at least by about 2010, had proved at
least as problematical as its predecessors. Central to its difficulties was a
practice among TNEs, which became widespread in the early twentieth
century, of concentrating "functions" risk and asset ownership, which under
the 1990s rules underlie the right of jurisdictions to tax corporate profits, in
subsidiaries organized in low-tax jurisdictions (or "tax havens"), resulting in
(1996); H. David Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: InternationalTax Arbitrage and
the "InternationalTax System", 53 TAx L. REv. 137 (2000).
3. See infra Part L.A and note 17. The initiative was undertaken by the Group of 20 ("G20"),
the membership, but the technical work was assigned to and borne by the OECD, all as
discussed therein.
4. Itai Grinberg, The New InternationalTax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L. J. 1137, 1138 (2016).
5. Article 9 of both Model Conventions referred to in note 1 concerns the allocation among
the state signatories to a convention of the profits of an integrated group of companies
operating in both jurisdictions, the "transfer pricing" problem. The application of Article 9 is
the subject of comprehensive "Guidelines" which are an important element of the extant
international system. OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2014)
[hereinafter 2010 OECD Guidelines]. As in the case of the models themselves, these
Guidelines are subject to a separate set of principles as applied to a convention between a
developed and a developing country, promulgated by the UN. U.N. DEP'T OF EcON. & Soc.
AFFAIRS, U.N. PRACTICAL MANUAL ON TRANSFER PRICING FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(2013) [hereinafter cited as UN Transfer Pricing Manual].
6. This standard is mandated by Article of both the UN and OECD Model Conventions.
7. See infra notes 8-10.
8. See infra Part II-C.
9. See infra Part Ill-A and III-B.
10. See infra Part IV.
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the disproportionate allocation of taxable profits to those low-tax countries."
The income so protected from major-country taxation came to be called
"stateless" income.12 And this core problem of the existing international
system lay at the heart of the decision by the major economic powers to
undertake the BEPS initiative-and accordingly lies at the core of the BEPS
initiative itself. Thus, just as transfer pricing is the most significant facet of
the historic overall system, it is also the key element of the contemporary
BEPS initiative.13
The BEPS initiative was undertaken through fifteen so-called "Action
items" (or "Actions"), four of which directly involve "transfer pricing."1
The Actions were effected largely through "final reports" which were
finalized for the most part during 2015,1 and which were based on various
"discussion drafts" and preliminary "deliverables" issued for the most part in
2014.16 The final reports under Actions 8 through 10 have stirred both
confusion and controversy in the United States and elsewhere.
The principal point of both confusion and controversy in the transfer
pricing reports concern the relationship of their key concept-"value
11. Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 722-724 (2011).
12. The phrase was coined in two articles by Professor Edward Kleinbard, which articles are
among the most useful descriptions of the legal basis of the process. See Edward D. Kleinbard,
Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 (2011); Edward D. Kleinbard, Lessons of Stateless Income,
65 TAx L. REV. 99 (2011).
13. The authors are in general agreement with the position of Professor Richard Vann that
"transfer pricing is the dominant international issue as compared to" the congeries of other
issues addressed by the Model Conventions. Richard J. Vann, Taxing InternationalBusiness
Income: Hard-Boiled Wonderland and the End of the World, 2 WORLD TAX J. 291 (2010)
[hereinafter Vann Hard-Boiled WonderWorld].
14. See infra app. at 349-50. These are Actions 8 through 10 and 13. As many as six of the
other Actions involved areas not strictly part of transfer pricing, but which significantly overlap
it. These include Action 1 (addresses the challenges of the digital economy); Action 4 (limits
base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments), Action 5 (counters harmful
tax practices more effectively, taking into account transparency and substance), Action 7
(prevents the artificial avoidance of PE status); Action 11 (establishes methodologies to collect
and analyze data on BEPS and the actions taken to address it), and Action 14 (makes dispute
resolution mechanisms more effective).
15. The Final Reports governing Actions 8 through 10 are set forth in OECD, Aligning
Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, Actions 8-10 - 2015 Final Reports, (2015)
[hereinafter Final Actions 8-10 Reports]. Those governing Action 13 are set forth at OECD,
Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, Action 13 - 2015 FinalReport,
(2015) [hereinafter Final Action 13 Report]. See infra Part V.B. The Final Actions 8-10
Reports is discussed in detail at Part V.B. We sometimes use the singular because, although the
documents are styled "Final Reports," and discuss matters that were discussed separately in
seven separate preliminary deliverables or discussions drafts, it was issued as a single document.
The Final Reports are for the most part set forth as amendments to what had been the 2010
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which with the amendments were reissued as the 2017
Guidelines.
16. See infra Part V.B. (discussing the relevant preliminary deliverables and discussion drafts).
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creation"'7-to the practice of creating "central" subsidiaries, and the impact
of that concept on a key element of the regime adopted in the 1990s, that of
generally respecting "contractual allocations" made by the TNEs
themselves. The BEPS Final Reports plainly represent a tense compromise
between two views, one of which would have largely preserved the 1990s
regime, with its emphasis on contractual allocations and asset ownership,
and its broad tolerance of the inability of the arm's-length standard to solve
the "central-party"/stateless income practice, on the one hand; and the other
of which would have gone farther in overriding taxpayer-devised allocations
and establishing international norms determining where value is created.
This compromise results in rules that are both highly complex and
frequently ambiguous, and most observers regard the rules devised as in all
likelihood unstable and in need of further work and refinement.
The controversy about the final rules concerns their consistency with the
norms of the international systems inherited from the 1920s. Some believe
the BEPS reports and the "value creation" paradigm represent a departure
from those norms, and are, therefore, to some extent either objectionable or
impermissible. These observers generally see honoring "contractual
allocations" as an essential aspect of the "arm's length" principle, and tend to
view that principle as exhaustively defining international norms for
allocating taxing rights. Some others do not necessarily deny that the "value
creation" paradigm represents some departure from pre-existing norms,
including particularly the "arm's length" principle, but advocate such a
departure as a desirable development in light of emerging patterns of
international economic activity.
This paper advocates a middle view, which sees the "value creation"
paradigm not as a departure from international norms but as a useful, if not
profound, elaboration of it. In our view, the fundamental principle of the
international system is that the right to tax income is allocated in the first
instance to the state to which that income bears the greatest degree of
"economic allegiance." We perceive the "arm's length" principle not as an
end in itself, or an exhaustive definition of how taxing rights should be
allocated, but rather as a subordinate principle implementing the
supervening idea of economic allegiance. We believe the historical record
supports this view. In this light, we see the value creation paradigm as
effectuating, and indeed, paralleling the "economic allegiance" idea. Insofar
as the central party/stateless income result is concerned, we believe such
17. Final Actions 8-10 Reports, supra note 15, at 9. The term "value creation" was first set
forth in Action 8, which refers to the income from intangible property as being allocated in
accordance with "value creation." Despite this initial limitation, the Final Actions 8-10 Reports
established "value creation" as the overarching objective of the transfer pricing items of the
project as a whole. See infra Part III.C and Part IV.A. However, even in literal terms, this did
not differ substantially from the terms and implications of Action 8 because it is widely
conceded that income from intangible property presents the greatest area of difficulty in
transfer pricing, indeed even some tendency, which we regard as fallacious, to equate all
"residual" income, which is not facilely allocable, to income from intangible property.
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results reveal that the underlying complex of rules that permit it, including
contractual allocations, "developer/assister" rules, deviate from the general
principle of "economic allegiance," if not indeed as well from the
subordinate "arm's length" principle.
The primary purpose of this paper is to explain this middle view, and to
document the basis for seeing what we call the "value creation" paradigm as
continuous with, rather than at odds with, the system which originated a
near century ago and which prevails today. Interwoven with, and indeed
essential to, this position is a view of the third incarnation of the "arm's
length" system introduced in the early 1990s as considerably less consistent
not only with the principle of "economic allegiance" but with the (what we
deem as) subsidiary "arm's length" principle itself. We, thus, detail grounds
for holding it was on account of this circumstance that the system fostered
the phenomena of "central" parties/developers and "stateless income." A
secondary but important purpose of the paper is to document the content of
the "value creation" paradigm as that paradigm emerged in the work of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the
period between the completion of work on the 1990s system (1995) and the
institution of the BEPS initiative (2013); as that work informed the BEPS
process; and as the paradigm is implemented in BEPS final reports
themselves. Emphasis is placed on how the "value creation" paradigm
throughout its evolution and in the BEPS reports, addresses the problems of
"central" or "developer" subsidiaries, and on how defences of the 1990s
system and its conceptions of "contractual allocations" and intangibles
"ownership" influenced the BEPS process, and ultimately limited the degree
of innovation effected by the BEPS Final Reports.
Much of the work of the OECD in the 1995-2013 remains unfamiliar to
United States tax practitioners, and indeed, to a considerable extent to the
academic tax community in the United States. A tertiary purpose of the
paper is to enhance the familiarity of these communities with these matters,
to elevate the ongoing dialogue, and to debate with the BEPS transfer
pricing principles that are certain to generate. Also, even if the United
States remains slow to incorporate those principles into its own transfer
pricing rules, United States practitioners will need enhanced familiarity with
the rules as other countries take seriously and incorporate those principles
into their own enforcement practices as they affect United States-based
TNEs and other taxpayers.
This article proceeds in six parts. The emphasis of the earlier parts is on
demonstrating that the emergent "value creation" idea has ancient roots and
is consonant with long accepted ideals. The emphasis of the later parts is on
demonstrating the deviation of the pre-BEPS transfer pricing ideas from
those ideals, and on showing how those rules gave rise to the "stateless
income" abuses. As well, the Article emphasizes on elaborating the manner
in which the "value creation" ideal, both in its nascent form in the pre-BEPS
work of the OECD, and its more mature form in the BEPS Reports, and
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how to deal with the difficulties of the immediate predecessor system and of
the "central party" problem that system spawned.
Part I describes the emergence of the BEPS project and the value creation
paradigm. It describes first (I-A) the changing roles of international
institutions in with respect to tax policy in the wake of the 2007-08 global
financial crisis, particularly the advent of the active participation by the
Group of 20 ("G20") in formulating international policy.s The G20 enjoys
participation by a far greater diversity of nations than did institutions which
previously dominated international policy, like the Group of Seven and the
OECD, and this predictably influences substantive policy. Part I-B
describes what we call the dual "negative" aspect of the "value creation" idea:
on the one hand, to combat "profit shifting" which concentrated the crossborder tax "base" of TNE taxpayers in low-tax jurisdiction; but on the other,
to avoid resorting to "formula apportionment," an allocation method which
it is thought would require a change in the terms of the Model Convention,
and thus, a cumbersome process of amendment to the network of bilateral
tax conventions which actually govern taxation in the various nations of the
world.19
Parts II through IV trace the historical development of transfer pricing
concepts, with the objectives of demonstrating (1) that there are governing
theoretical principles of the international system which are consistent over a
long period of time; and (2) that the value creation paradigm is not only
consistent with those principles, but implicit in them in each and every phase
of their development. The three parts correspond to the three formative/
transformative epochs of the "arm's length" standard.20 Part II surveys the
origin of the international system, and demonstrates that its overarching
goal was the allocation of tax base according to the "economic allegiance" of
the tax base involved (Part II-A).21 We show, in substantial part based on
some sources which have been obscured over time, that the "value creation"
idea is a key aspect of those governing conceptions, as they relate to the
taxation of business income at source (Part II-B).22 We show further that the
idea of value creation is fully consistent with if not integral to the work
which is the origin of the "arm's length" standard (Part II-C-1),23 as well as
the final synthesis of the work of the League of Nations, the Model
Conventions accepted at the end of World War II (Part II-C-2).24
Part III concerns the relation of the value creation paradigm to the
changes in the conception of the "arm's length" principle during the second
epoch, the regime of the United States regulations finalized in 1968 (Part
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra Part I.A.
infra Part I.B.
supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
infra Part II.A.
infra Part II.B.
infra Part II.C.1.
infra Part II.C.2.
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III-A),25 as well as the original OECD guidelines issued in 1979 (Part III-

B).26 Part III-B details how the 1979 Guidelines reflect the beginning of a
confusion about the "arm's length" standard, treating the standard as
determinative of what constitutes a proper allocation, rather than a principle
that aids a larger and precedent idea about allocation.27 Part III-C describes
the crisis of the United States regulations encountered in the mid-1980s and
the in the wake of the historic Tax Reform Act of 1986, including the
issuance of the White Paper mandated by the legislative history of the 1986
Act (Part III-C-1); the series of proposed and temporary regulations which
led to amendment of the United States regulation (Part III-C-2), and the
final United States regulations (Part III-C-3).28 Part III-C-3 shows the
manner in which the final United States regulations laid the groundwork for
the profit shifting problem of central parties, "developers/assisters," and
stateless income.29 Part III-D describes the synthesis of work of the 1985-95
period, the period of the "transfer pricing wars" in the 1995 revision of the
OECD Guidelines.30 This Part shows that even during the period of the
formulation of the United States regulations, and in the 1995 Guidelines as
well, there were fissures developing between the United States and OECD
approaches (Part III-D-1), divisions which were in contrast to the original
situation under the 1968 regulations, the terms of which the OECD had
followed quite closely.3' Part III-D-2 shows the extent to which the 1995
Guidelines still reflected, though they at times distorted, a governing ideal
that congruent with the BEPS concept of value creation.32
Part IV concerns the evolution of OECD thought during the regime of
the 1995 regulations, with an emphasis upon the OECD's growing concerns
with-an inclination to depart from-aspects of those regulations which
create tension with the ideal of value creation. The evolution takes place in
three sets of studies33 The first, discussed in Part IV-A, involved the
OECD's formulation of principles to govern allocations under Article 7 of
the Model Conventions, which concern profits allocations among (not
separately incorporated) branches of a multijurisdictional enterprise, where
the OECD declined to permit any form of taxpayer-determined "starting
point" like that authorized for inter-corporate "contractual allocations" by
the 1995 Guidelines34 This became the "authorized OECD approach"
(AOA) to allocations among permanent establishments. 3 The second,
discussed in Part IV-B, was the OECD's study of "restructuring"
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
Id.
See infra Part III.C.1-3.
See infra Part III.C.3.
See infra Part III.D.
See infra Part III.D.1.
See infra Part III.D.2.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.A.
2010 OECD Guidelines, supra note 5, at 237.
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transactions-principally transactions by which TNEs "centralized" assets
and operations in a "central" entity or "developer." This study led to the
addition of a chapter to the Guidelines when the Guidelines were revised in
2010. In these two documents, many of the conceptual devices by which the
BEPS Reports would effectuate the "value creation" paradigm were first
articulated. The third, discussed in Part IV-C, was the OECD study on
intangibles, which study was not finalized but became the foundation of a
substantial portion of what done under BEPS.36
Part V concerns BEPS itself. Part V-A concerns the preliminary BEPS
deliverables and discussion drafts; Part V-B concerns the final BEPS
Reports. The focus is upon (1) the relationship between the concepts of
these documents and the prior OECD work in the AOA, and the
restructuring report; and (2) the relationship of the rules to the central
party/stateless income problem. We show that the progress of the BEPS
process was steadily away from an early reform impulse, which would have
greatly enhanced the emphasis of rules based upon objective criteria of
business operations and diminished the role of circumstances within the
control of the taxpayers, and back toward rules that preserved elements of
the pre-existing system inherited from 1995, particularly "contractual
allocations."
Part VI discusses what we call the "positive" programme of the value
creation paradigm. This Part argues that the paradigm offers the best basis
for the near and intermediate future for a system that protects the ability of
the nations of the world to subject the profits of TNEs to corporate income
taxation, and to provide for a fair division of the corporate tax base.37 It
counsels against resorting to more radical reformulations of the system,
particularly formula apportionment, even as a distant and ultimate goal, on
the basis of a variety of both practical and theoretical considerations.
Part VI recognizes, at the same time, that there remain great difficulties
with the regime instituted by BEPS and with the coherence of the value
creation paradigm. There are sharp underlying policy differences among
the nations of the G20, and disagreements over policy among differing
constituencies within many of those member nations. Different interest
groups and constituencies exert differing degrees of influence over the
OECD, either directly or through the member states. Perhaps most
seriously, however, is that the conceptual devices employed by the BEPS
Final Reports to "locate" the situs of "value creation" are both weak and
controversial. All of these circumstances conspire to make the Reports at
issue long, complex, abstruse, and ambiguous, which makes further study of
the area, though imperative, imposingly difficult.
We as authors of this article have sought to be comprehensive, owing to
the newness of the subject matter, its sweeping importance, and what we
conceive as the deficiency of knowledge of the materials in at least much of
36. See infra Part. IV.C.
37. See infra Part. IV.C.
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the English-speaking world. We recognize that the result is an inordinately
long piece, covering an extensive but turgid range of material, with
conclusions susceptible to challenge in light of developments likely to occur
within a short time. It is hoped, however, that this will illumine the current
state of affairs and provide a basis for some consensus on a path forward. It
should be clear that this essay is only a beginning and a platform for further
research. The focus of such research should be, of course, on clarifying and
hardening the value creation paradigm, mostly by developing concrete and
acceptable grounds for identifying the locus of "value creation" in a wide
range of business circumstances.
I. The OECD/G20 BEPS-Project: "Value Creation" Enters the
International Tax Nomenclature
A.

SETTING THE AGENDA: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE TAx POLICY GOALS
AT THE G20 LEADERS LEVEL

Prior to the 2007-08 "global financial crisis," an informal group of the
largest Free World economies met periodically as a forum for the discussion

and management of global economic and financial issues, primarily the
maintenance of international financial stability. The group, initially the
Group of Seven (G7), convened for the first time in 1975, following the
abrogation of the Bretton Woods Agreement by the United States in 1971
and 1973, and institution of a regime of floating exchange rates worldwide.38
Initially it comprised six nations (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States); in 1976, the group added Canada.39
These Group of Seven nations today account for about 14 percent of the
world's population, and about 60 percent of its accumulated wealth and

aggregate gross domestic product.40 In 1997, the group expanded to include
Russia, which was expelled in 2014 in connection with economic sanctions
imposed in the wake of the annexation of neighboring Crimea.4'
During the "global financial crisis" of 2007-08, the role and ascendancy of
the Group of Seven waned. In the late 1990s, principally under the auspices
of two of the G7 members, Germany and the United States, a larger group
had been formed for the discussion of financial stability issues. After a
couple groups were briefly formed in 1997 and 1998, a Group of 20 was
38. The History of the G7, G7 GERMANY, https://www.g7germany.de/Content/EN/Statische
Seiten/G7 elmau en/texte en/2014-11-05-geschichte-g8.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2017).
3 9. Id.
40. Daniel O'Donnell, G7 in Figures, FEDERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE OF GERMANY
(Statistisches Bundesamt) (May 2015), https://www.destatis.de/EN/Publications/Specialized/
InternationalData/G7InFigures0000155159004.pdfblob=publicationFile.; Michael Wilson,
G7 this, G7 that. . . but what is the G7? GLOBAL CITIZEN (May 22, 2015), https://www
.globalcitizen.org/en/content/g7-this-g7-that-but-what-is-the-g7/.
41. The expulsion was at the time expected to be temporary, but it has not been reversed in
the time since.
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formed, comprising the G-8 members, and twelve others, most of them socalled "emerging" nations.42 Until 2008, meetings of the G20 were only at
the finance minister or central bank governor level, but in November 2008,
the Group of 20 held its first "Leaders' summit"-meeting of the heads of
state or government-in Washington,

D.C.43

In September 2009, the

Group of 20 at its third summit in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, announced that
thenceforth the Group of 20 would constitute the "premier forum" for
"international cooperation" among its twenty nations.44 The G20 nations
comprise about 60 percent of the world's population, and about 85 percent
of its aggregate gross domestic product.
At the initial G20 summit in Washington, D.C. in November 2008, at the
very apex of the financial crisis, the Leaders of the G20 convened
determined to enhance cooperation to reestablish the stability of and to
institutionalize procedures to reform the global financial system.45 By the
42. See G8 Gleneagles Summit, Joint Declaration of the Heads of State and/or Government of
Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa participatingin the GS Gleneagles Summit, (July 7,
2005) http://www.combusto.net/includes/JointDeclaration.pdf.
Five of these countries began partly participating in Group of Eight deliberations as a "Group
of Five" in 2005. These included three of the four nations which later came to be termed the
"BRIC" countries-Brazil, India, China (the fourth, Russia, was already a member of the Group
of Eight)-and Mexico and South Africa. The Group of 20 as formed in 1999 added six other
countries, Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, South Korea, and Australia. The
European Union as a unit was the twentieth member.
43. See G20 Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Washington, D.C., U.S.,
Nov. 15, 2008, Declaration of the Summit on FinancialMarkets and the World Economy, (Nov. 15,
2008).
44. G20 Pittsburgh Summit 2009, Pittsburgh, Pa., U.S., Sept. 24-25, 2009, Leaders Statement:
The Pittsburgh Summit, T 19, at 3 (Sept. 25, 2009) [hereinafter G20 Pittsburgh Summit, Leaders
Statement].
45. See G20 Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Washington, D.C., U.S.,
Nov. 15, 2008, Declaration of the Summit on FinancialMarkets and the World Economy, ¶ 1 (Nov.
15, 2008). Further, the Leaders agreed to "[p]romoting Integrity in Financial Markets: We
commit to protect the integrity of the world's financial markets by bolstering investor and
consumer protection, avoiding conflicts of interest, preventing illegal market manipulation,
fraudulent activities and abuse, and protecting against illicit finance risks arising from noncooperative jurisdictions. We will also promote information sharing, including with respect to
jurisdictions that have yet to commit to international standards with respect to bank secrecy and
transparency." As "[m]edium-term actions" the Leaders envisioned that:
* "National and regional authorities should implement national and international measures
that protect the global financial system from uncooperative and non-transparentjurisdictions
that pose risks of illicit financial activity."
* "The Financial Action Task Force should continue its important work against money
laundering and terrorist financing, and we support the efforts of the World Bank - UN
Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative."
* "Tax authorities, drawing upon the work of relevant bodies such as the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), should continue efforts to promote tax
information exchange. Lack of transparency and a failure to exchange tax information should be
vigorously addressed."
Id. at 3, 8. (Action Plan to Implement Principles for Reform, Promoting Integrity in Financial
Markets) (emphasis added).
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time of the second Leaders' summit in April 2009 in London, the crisis had
resulted in losses in stock market values of some estimated U.S. $4 trillion,46
had spread into the real economy and affected public treasuries.47 A global
recession ensued, and a Euro currency crisis had begun, which had made
necessary the institution of a European Financial Stability Facility.4s That
Facility had to bail-out several states, among them was Ireland.49 Hence, in
London, the Leaders of the G20 perceived "the greatest challenge to the
world economy in modern times."50 To them, an important part of the
"global solution"51 was "strengthening financial supervision and
regulation"52 which entailed "tak[ing] action against non-cooperative
jurisdictions, including tax havens."53 In a concurrent Declaration, the G20
Leaders specified their determination to "protect public finances .

.

. against

the risks posed by non-cooperative jurisdictions."54 To this end, they
considered and identified a possible "toolbox of effective counter
measures"55 against jurisdictions that do not adhere to "the international
standards in the . . . tax area"56 that contained measures such as:
* increased disclosure requirements on the part of taxpayers and
financial institutions to report transactions involving noncooperative jurisdictions;
* withholding taxes in respect of a wide variety of payments;
* denying deductions in respect of expense payments to payees
resident in a non-cooperative jurisdiction;
* reviewing tax treaty policy;
46. See International Monetary Fund [IMF], Responding to the Financial Crisis and Measuring
Systemic Risks, ch. 1 (Apr. 2009) (on Stabilizing the Global Financial System and Mitigating
Spillover Risks).
47. See, e.g., OECD, Fiscal Consolidation: Targets, Plans, and Measures, 11 OECD J. ON
BUDGETING 16 (2011), finding "government's fiscal deficits soared due to stimulus measures"
and overall a "dire fiscal situation" that has led to "fiscal solvency concerns" manifested in
"interest rate hikes on sovereign bonds and downgrading by rating agencies." See also Offshore
Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code: Hearing Before the PermanentSubcommittee on Investigations
of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, 112th Cong. 1-8 (2012) (statement of Sen.
Carl Levin, S. Comm. On Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs).
48. History, EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM, https://www.esm.europa.eu/about-us/history
(last visited Oct. 28, 2017).
49. The bail-out of Ireland might be particularly important to the dynamic within European
Finance Ministries since typical tax reduction structures for the European market use incentives
the Irish tax law offers; the state-aid cases against Ireland pursued by the EU-Commission still
seem to echo these commotions.
50. G20 London Summit 2009, Apr. 2, 2009, The Global Planfor Recovery and Reform, T 2, at 1
(Apr. 2, 2009) [hereinafter G20 London Summit, Leaders' Statement].
5 1. Id.
52. Id. T 4 and fn 13.
53. Id. T 15, point 7.
54. G20 London Summit 2009, Apr. 2, 2009, Declarationon Strengthening the Financial System,
at 4 (Apr. 2, 2009) [hereinafter G20 London Summit, Declaration on Strengthening the
Financial System].
5 5. Id.
56. Id.
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*

asking international institutions and regional development banks to
review their investment policies; and,
* giving extra weight to the principles of tax transparency and
information exchange when designing bilateral aid programs.57
As an immediate response, the G20 called on the "appropriate bodies" to
conduct "objective peer reviews."58 The OECD's Global Forum on Tax
Transparency and Exchange of Information was designated to be the
institutional "enabler"59 of the G20 and was restructured60 to perform the
"peer reviews" aimed at evaluating and enforcing the implementation of "the
international standard for transparency and exchange of information upon
request. "61
The G20 Leaders met twice in each of 2009 and 2010, then annually in
each year thereafter. At the third meeting, in 2009 in Pittsburgh, the G20
Leaders' Declaration increased the pressure on member states to pursue
global tax transparency. 62
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 4.
59. For terminology, see Itai Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.

J.

1137 (2016).
60. See Global Forum on Transparency & Exch. Of Info. For Tax Purposes, OECD,

Information Brief (2013) (Nov. 2013).
The Global Forum was restructured in September 2009 in response to the G20 call to
strengthen implementation of the standard. The Global Forum now has 121 members and is
the premier international body for ensuring the implementation of the internationally agreed
standards of transparency and exchange of information on request in the tax area. The
restructured Global Forum ensures that all its members are on an equal footing and will fully
implement the standard on exchange of information they have committed to implement. It also
works to establish a level playing field, even among countries that have not joined the Global
Forum.
61. G20 London Summit, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, supra note 54,
at 4. "The international standard" then contemplated is that embodied in Article 26 of both the
OECD and United Nations Model Conventions, although the G20 London Declaration
mentioned only the UN standard. But, it also noted that the OECD had "today published a list
of countries assessed by the Global Forum against the international standard for exchange of
information."
62. Thus, the Leaders stated that "[t]he main focus of the Forum's work will be to implement
tax transparency and exchange of information so that countries can fully enforce their tax laws
to protect their tax base," G20 Pittsburgh Summit, Leaders Statement, supra note 44, at 10, and
later "strengthened our ...
pledge to support robust and transparent peer reviews," and to
continue "addressing non-cooperative jurisdictions based on comprehensive, consistent, and
transparent assessment with respect to tax havens." G20 Toronto Summit 2010, June 27, 2010,
G20 Toronto Summit Declaration, T 22, at 5 (June 27, 2010) [hereinafter G20 Toronto Summit
Declaration]. At the Seoul summit, the Leaders "reiterated our commitment to preventing noncooperative jurisdictions from posing risks to the global financial system and welcomed the
ongoing efforts by the FSB, Global Forum on Tax Transparency and Exchange of Information
(Global Forum), and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), based on comprehensive,
consistent and transparent assessment," and urged "jurisdictions identified as not having the
elements in place to achieve an effective exchange of information should promptly address the
weaknesses," and "all jurisdictions to stand ready to conclude Tax Information Exchange
Agreements where requested by a relevant partner." G20 Seoul Summit 2010, Nov. 12, 2010,
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In March 2010, the United States adopted the Foreign Accounts Tax
Compliance Act (FATCA), conceived as a minor revenue raising measure to
offset certain stimulus spending measures in the Hiring Incentives to
Restore Employment Act of 2010.63 FATCA imposed new withholding and

reporting requirements aimed at curbing offshore tax evasion by United
States persons. Principally, the statute imposed a 30 percent withholding tax
on all payments to "foreign financial institutions" (FFIs) unless those
institutions entered into agreements with the United States Treasury to
provide information concerning the customers of these FFIs who were
United States persons.64 The core of this statute reflected an effort
suggested by the first two bullet points set forth in the London 2009
Declaration, and set out above.65
FATCA raised questions concerning the possible extraterritorial (and thus
illegal) application of United States reporting requirements. In response to
foreign concerns, in February 2012, the United States and certain of its
trading partners issued joint statements announcing that the United States
and each of the other countries would enter into two "intergovernmental
agreements" (IGAs) under which the potentially extraterritorial aspects of
FATCA would be eased.66 The agreements would ease the application of
many FATCA requirements, including the withholding requirement and the
requirement that financial institutions enter into agreements with the
Internal Revenue Service on condition of "automatic" government-togovernment exchanges of information.67 These agreements applied to
nations which had legal authority (or which agreed to adopt legislation
creating the authority) to collect the information subject to the FATCA
requirements.68
The United States subsequently issued "model
agreements," one providing for reciprocal automatic exchange of
information, the other not imposing reciprocal sharing obligations on the
United States. The model agreements are updated periodically.69
The G20 Seoul Summit Leaders' Declaration, at 13 (Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter G20 Seoul
Summit Leaders' Declaration].
63. FATCA was enacted as Title V of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71.
64. Id. at 97.
65. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
66. The Treasury announced that it was considering such agreements as "an alternative
approach to implementation" of FATCA, in the preamble to the first set of FATCA regulations
issued in February 2012. 77 Fed. Reg. 9022, 9023 (Feb. 15, 2012). The Joint Statement from
the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom regarding an
Intergovernmental Approach to Improving International Tax Compliance and Implementing
FATCA is reproduced at Treasury Announces Intergovernmental Framework for FATCA
Implementation, 2012 TNT 27-28 (Feb. 9, 2012); see generally Stanley I. Langbein, Fed. Inc. Tax.
Banks & Financial Inst., T 14.10[2][a] at 5-6 (7th ed. 2017).
67. See 77 Fed. Reg. at 9081.
68. Id. at 9025.
69. In June 2012, the United States, Japan, and Switzerland issued comparable joint
statements announcing a different species of IGAs applicable to nations which did not have legal
authority to collect the information demanded by FATCA from their own institutions. These
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At the November 2010 Seoul summit, the Leaders started to exhibit some
shift in emphasis from enforcing existing international tax rules through
transparency and exchange of information, to an extension of the G20 tax
agenda to encompass the substantive overhaul of international tax rules.70 At
the 2011 Cannes summit, the Leaders, while continuing to stress
international exchange of information and condemnation of "non-cooperative" tax havens, reflected a cognizance of the incipient impact of
FATCA, as well as a growing concern with the substantive aspects of
taxation.] As to the latter, the Leaders declared themselves "committed to
protect our public finances and the global financial system from the risk
posed by tax havens and non-cooperative jurisdictions."72 As to the former,
the Leaders for the first time-and some four months prior to the United
States' public announcement of the first IGAs-expressed support for
"automatic" exchange of information, as opposed to the former call for
improvements in mechanisms for exchange of information "upon request":
In the tax area, the Global Forum has now 105 members. More than
700 information exchange agreements have been signed and the Global
Forum is leading an extensive peer review process of the legal
framework (phase 1) and implementation of standards (phase 2). We
ask the Global Forum to complete the first round of phase 1 reviews
and substantially advance the phase 2 reviews by the end of next year ...
We underline in particular the importance of comprehensive tax
information exchange and encourage competent authorities to continue
their work in the Global Forum to assess and better define the means to
improve it. We welcome the commitment made by all of us to sign the
Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax
Matters and strongly encourage other jurisdictions to join this
Convention. In this context, we will consider exchanging information
automatically on a voluntary basis as appropriateand as provided for in the
convention.73

IGAs provided for direct provision of most information by the state's financial institutions to
the Internal Revenue Service. The United States subsequently issued "model agreements"
applicable to nations in these circumstance, again some reciprocal and some non-reciprocal, and
some applicable to countries with which the United States had a prior double taxation or
information exchange agreement, and another model applicable to countries with no such
agreement. In the period since, the United States has developed a wide network of IGAs with
foreign countries in both categories.
70. The Leaders pledged to "build sustainable revenue bases for inclusive growth and social
equity by improving developing country tax administration systems and policies and
highlighting the relationship between non-cooperative jurisdictions and development," G20
Seoul Summit Leaders' Declaration, supra note 62, at 17.
71. G20 Cannes Summit 2011, Nov. 4,2011, Cannes Summit FinalDeclaration, (Nov. 4,2011)
[hereinafter G20 Cannes Summit Final Declaration].
72. Id. at 8.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
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By the June 2012 meeting in Los Cabos, the G20 edged away from its
ongoing emphasis on transparency and exchange of information, and toward
embracing the twin pillars of automatic exchange of information, and
preventing "base erosion and profit shifting" (BEPS) through substantive
reform:
In the tax area, we reiterate our commitment to strengthen
transparency and comprehensive exchange of information. We
commend the progress made as reported by the Global Forum and urge
all countries to fully comply with the standard and implement the
recommendations identified in the course of the reviews, in particular
the 13 jurisdictions whose framework does not allow them to qualify to
phase 2 at this stage. We expect the Global Forum to quickly start
examining the effectiveness of information exchange practices and to
report to us and our finance ministers. We welcome the OECD Report on
the practice of automatic information exchange, where we will continue to lead
by example in implementing this practice. We call on countries to join this
growing practice as appropriateand strongly encourage all jurisdictions to

sign the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance.
We also welcome the efforts to enhance interagency cooperation to
tackle illicit flows including the outcomes of the Rome meeting of the
Oslo Dialogue. We reiterate the need to prevent base erosion and profit
shifting and we will follow with attention the ongoing work of the OECD in
this area.74

This trajectory was responsive, on the one hand, to a growing concern
within G20 governments about the substantive rules behind the tax
structures that were, during that time of fiscal austerity, unanimously seen as
being "unacceptable," and that commenced to stir an uptick in unilateral
actions, and increasingly "creative" tax audit positions in the BRICS states,
especially in the People's Republic of China and India.75 Outside
74. G20 Los Cabos, Mexico Summit, June 18-19, 2012, G20 Leaders Declaration, ¶ 48, at 8
(June 18-19, 2012) [hereinafter G20 Los Cabos Summit Leaders' Declaration]. Here, it is the
G20 suggesting that it was "follow[ing]" the work of the OECD, not that the G20 itself that was
pursuing the BEPS initiative. Later, pronouncements would reveal that it was the G20 itself
that was the primary driver of the initiative.
75. U.N. DEP'T OF EcON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, U.N. PRACTICAL MANUAL ON TRANSFER
PRICING FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ch. 10.3 (2013). Concerning Chinese attempts to
address this issue in the 2008-2014 period, cf, e.g. Dongmei Qiu, Collecting UnpaidTax Offshore:
Caribbean Tax Havens and Foreign Direct Investment in China, IBFD BULLETIN FOR
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, Vol. 68 (Dec. 2014).
Also germane is the six-part series Revenge of the Source Countries, published in 2005-2006 in
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL. See Lee Sheppard, Revenge of The Source Countries? 37 TAX
NOTES INT'L 1127 (Mar. 28, 2005); Lee Sheppard, Revenge of The Source Countwris, Part 2:
Royalties, 2005 TNT 191-7 (Oct. 5, 2005); Lee Sheppard, Revenge of The Source Countries, Part
3: Royalties, 40 TAX NOTES INT'L 219 (Oct. 17, 2005); Lee Sheppard, Revenge of The Source
Countries, Part 4: Who Gets The Bill? 40 TAX NOTES INT'L 411 (Oct. 31, 2005); Lee Sheppard,
Revenge of The Source Countries, Part 5: Throwing BRICs, 111 TAX NOTES 1455 (June 26, 2006);
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governments, on the other hand, in the general public, mainstream media
coverage, rhetoric against tax avoidance, and "letter box companies" gained
widespread attention.76 These led to extensive congressional hearings on the

tax strategies of large U.S. enterprises, including Apple, GE, Google, HP,
Starbucks, Microsoft, and Caterpillar.77 Importantly, too, academia
provided the technical insights into the workings of global tax structures 78 as
well as a buzzword ("stateless income")79 to capture the substantive structural
problems of the international tax system.
In such circumstances, politicians of the G20o and the delegates within
the OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration (CTPA), especially the
Lee Sheppard, Revenge of The Source Countries, Part 6: Subsidiary As PE, 44 TAx NOTES INT'L
164 (Oct. 16, 2006).
76. The press reports involved initially came from a Bloomberg.com reporter named Jesse
Drucker, who became somewhat famous on account of the reports, and in 2016 moved to The
New York Times. The initial reports were made in 2010. Jesse Drucker, U.S. Companies Dodge
$60 Billion in Taxes With Global Odyssey, BLOOMBERG, May 13, 2010, http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2010-05-13/american-companies-dodge-60-billion -in-taxes-even-tea-party-wouldcondemn.html (tax activities of Forest Laboratories); Jesse Drucker, Google 2.4% Rate Shows
How $60 Billion Lost to Tax Loopholes, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 21, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/
u-s-revenue-lost-to-tax-loopholes
news/2010-10-2 1/google-2-4-rate-shows-how-60-billion.html. The press reports after that were largely outside the United States, and indeed were
most prevalent in Ireland, which had a deep interest in them as its law was the basis of many of
the avoidance structures used, and Australia, which has some leanings in conflict with OECD
official policy advocating the "arm's length" standard, as well as in Japan, France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom. See, e.g., Richard Waters, Tax Drives US Tech Groups to Tap Debt,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 6, 2011, p. 15 Col. 6 (activities of Microsoft Corporation). The first
major news report in the United States, in print, appears to have been in April 2012 in the
Sunday New York Times. Charles Duhigg and David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in
Taxes, THE NEW YORK TIMES, p. 1, Apr. 29, 2012.
77. Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code - Part 2 (Apple Inc.): Hearing Before the
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Govt Affairs, 113th
Cong (2013); Caterpillar's Offshore Tax Strategy, Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Govt Affairs, 113th Cong, (2014).
78. See, e.g., Vann Hard-BoiledWonderWorld.
79. See Kleinhard, supra note 11.
80. The finance ministers and central bank governors of the G20 met in Mexico City in early
November 2012, and at that meeting, the ministers of the United Kingdom and Germany
agreed on a plan to finance an effort to curb "base erosion and profit sharing." See Patrick
Wintour & Dan Milmo, UK and Germany Agree Crackdown on Tax Loopholes for Multinationals:
Osborne and Schauble Tackle "Profit Shifting" Changes in E-Commerce Leave Governments Trailing,
THE GUARDIAN, p. 2. (Nov. 6, 2012). Later that month, joined by the finance ministry of
France, the ministers of the three nations sent a letter to the OECD, pledging funds for an
effort against "profit shifting," and asking for "concrete results" by the time of the next G20
ministerial level meeting, scheduled for Moscow in February 2013. The OECD produced the
report February 13, 2013, and the ministerial meeting in Moscow approved the report and
directed the OECD to produce a detailed "action plan" by July 2013. See OECD, Addressing
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013), [hereinafter Addressing Base Erosion]. The OECD
produced the Action Plan on schedule, and it was this document that first identified the fifteen
areas for study that would comprise the BEPS initiative. OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (2013) [hereinafter 2013 OECD Action Plan]. The finance ministers approved
the Action Plan at a ministerial meeting in Moscow July 20, 2013. See OECD Announces Action
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Global Forum, stirred the tax agenda.81 In February 2013, in response to the
broadened G20 tax agenda, the OECD CFA issued the Addressing Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting report, a theoretical and empirical analysis of the
structural shortcomings of the international tax regime as embodied in the
OECD Model Tax Convention,82 and in June 2013, a follow-up Action Plan
on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting that translated the findings of the

Addressing BEPS Report into concrete, yet still vague policy goals.83 This
Action Plan was approved by the G20 Leaders at the September 2013
summit in Saint Petersburg and became an integral part of the G20 tax
agenda.84 It is that communique which also formalized the two-pillar
programme of the G20 in the international tax area of BEPS and "automatic
exchange of information," adumbrated by earlier Leaders' declarations; it
was first made explicit in the February 2013 communiqu6 of the ministerial
level meeting.85 The Leaders explicitly approved the 15-point Action Plan,
but in doing so, they singled out only one of the fifteen, the precise content
of which they explicitly emphasized and generalized: this was "Action 8," as
to which the Leaders embraced the concept of aligning business taxation
with "value creation:"
In a context of severe fiscal consolidation and social hardship, in many
countries ensuring that all taxpayers pay their fair share of taxes is more

than ever a priority. Tax avoidance, harmful practices and aggressive tax
planning have to be tackled. The growth of the digital economy also
poses challenges for international taxation. We fully endorse the
ambitious and comprehensive Action Plan - originated in the OECD - aimed
at addressing base erosion and profit shifting with mechanism to enrich the

-

Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, Doc 2013-17513, 2013 TNT 140-52 (July 22, 2013).
The Action Plan called for deliverables on some of the areas by September 2014, others by
September 2015.
81. The OECD ascribes a "key role in the advancement of the OECD tax transparency
agenda in the context of the G-20" to Frenchman Pascal Saint-Amans, Head of the Global
Forum since 2009. Saint-Amans was promoted in February 2012 to Director of the CTPA. In
hindsight, Saint-Amans admits that the "deliberate involvement" of the G-20 in the revision of
the international tax rules "appeared as a hazardous bet for many." It could be assumed that his
use of "deliberate" involvement describes the fact that powerful non-OECD countries have
already had their say within the OECD, especially in the discussions on transfer pricing issues
of business restructurings between 2005-10 under the auspices of Jeffrey Owens, the longtime
head of the OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA), as well as in the commenced process
of revising Chapter VI of the OECD transfer pricing guidelines. See Pascal Saint-Amans
Director, Centrefor Tax Policy and Administration, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/pascal-saintamans.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2017); Pascal Saint-Amans & Raffaele Russo, BEPS: The View
From the OECD, 1283 TAx JouMMAL (Oct. 29, 2015) https://www.taxjournal.com/articles/bepsview-oecd-29102015.
82. Addressing Base Erosion, supra note 80.
83. OECD 2013 Action Plan, supra note 80.
84. See G-20 Issues Declaration Supporting BEPS Action Plan, Automatic Information Exchange,
Doc 2013-21295, 2013 TNT 174-39 (Sept. 9, 2013).
85. G20, Communiqu6 ofMeeting of G20 Finance Ministersand CentralBank Governors, (Feb. 16,
2013).
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Plan as appropriate. We welcome the establishment of the G20/OECD
BEPS project and we encourage all interested countries to participate.
Profits should be taxed where economic activities deriving the profits are
performed and where value is created. In order to minimize BEPS, we call

on member countries to examine how our own domestic laws
contribute to BEPS and to ensure that international and our own tax
rules do not allow or encourage multinational enterprises to reduce overall
taxes paid by artificially shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions. We

acknowledge that effective taxation of mobile income is one of the key
challenges. We look forward to regular reporting on the development
of proposals and recommendations to tackle the 15 issues identified in
the Action Plan and commit to take the necessary individual and
collective action with the paradigm of sovereignty taken into
consideration.86
The 2013 Saint Petersburg Declaration paired this expression with
unequivocal endorsement of "automatic exchange" of information:
We commend the progress recently achieved in the area of tax
transparency and we fully endorse the OECD proposal for a truly global
model for multilateral and bilateral automatic exchange of information.

Calling on all other jurisdictions to join us by the earliest possible date,
we are committed to automatic exchange of information as the new global

standard, which must ensure confidentiality and the proper use of
information exchanged, and we fully support the OECD work with
G2 0 countries aimed at presenting such a new single global standardfor
automatic exchange of information by February 2014 and to finalizing

technical modalities of effective automatic exchange by mid-2014. In
parallel, we expect to begin to exchange information automatically on tax
matters among G20 members by the end of 2015. We call on all countries

to join the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative
Assistance in Tax Matters without further delay. We look forward to the
practicalandfull implementation of the new standard on a global scale. We

encourage the Global Forum to complete the allocation of
comprehensive country ratings regarding the effective implementation
of information exchange upon request and ensure that the
implementation of the standards are monitored on a continuous basis.
We urge all jurisdictions to address the Global Forum
recommendations in particular those 14 that have not yet moved to
Phase 2. We invite the Global Forum to draw on the work of the FATF
with respect to beneficial ownership. We also ask the Global Forum to
establish a mechanism to monitor and review the implementation of the new
global standard on automatic exchange of information.87
86. G20 Saint Petersburg Summit, Sept. 6, 2013, G20 Leaders' Declaration, ¶ 50 (Sept. 6, 2013)
[hereinafter G20 Saint Petersburg Summit Leaders' Declaration].
87. Id. T 51 (emphasis added).
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The Saint Petersburg Declaration adumbrated a third concern, with the
impact of adverse tax practices on developing countries, and with ensuring
those nations derive benefit from the new global standard of automatic
information exchange:
Developing countries should be able to reap the benefits of a more
transparent international tax system, and to enhance their revenue
capacity, as mobilizing domestic resources is critical to financing
development. We recognize the importance of all countries benefitting
from greater tax information exchange. We are committed to make
automatic exchange of information attainableby all countries, including LICs,
and will seek to provide capacity building support to them. We call on the

Development Working Group in conjunction with the Finance Track,
to work with the OECD, the Global Forum and other IOs to develop a
roadmap showing how developing countries can overcome obstacles to
participation in the emerging new standard in automatic exchange of

information, and to assist them in meeting the standard in accordance
with the action envisaged in the St Petersburg Development Outlook.
The Working Group should report back by our next meeting. Working
with international organisations, we will continue to share our expertise,
help build capacity, and engage in long-term partnership programmes
to secure success. In this respect, we welcome the OECD Tax
Inspectors without Borders initiative, which aims to share knowledge
and increase domestic capacities in developing countries in the tax area.
Finally, we are committed to continue to assist developing countries,
including through the IOs, in identifying individual country needs and
building capacity in the area of tax administration (in addition to
automatic exchange of information) and encourage such support to be
developing country led.88
At the 2014 summit in Brisbane, Australia, amidst ongoing technical work
on developing precise responses to the 15-point Action Plan within the
OECD CFA, the Leaders reiterated these three points, expressly endorsed
the value creation concept, and perhaps taking a swipe at the key procedural
adjunct of the arm's length standard, as implemented by an emphasis on
"contractual allocations,"89 viz., the advanced pricing agreement (APA)
practice:
We are taking actions to ensure the fairness of the international tax
system and to secure countries revenue bases. Profits should be taxed
where economic activitiesderiving the profits are performed and where value is

created. We welcome the significant progress on the G20/OECD Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan to modernise
international tax rules. We are committed to finalising this work in
2015, including transparency of taxpayer-specific rulings found to constitute
88. Id. T 52 (emphasis added).
89. See infra Part I.C.D.
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harmful tax practices. We welcome progress being made on taxation of
patent boxes. To prevent cross-border tax evasion, we endorse the
global Common Reporting Standard for the automatic exchange of tax
information (AEOI) on a reciprocal basis. We will begin to exchange
information automatically with each other and with other countries by
2017 or end-2018, subject to completing necessary legislative
procedures. We welcome financial centres' commitments to do the
same and call on all to join us. We welcome deeper engagement of
developing countries in the BEPS project to address their concerns.
We will work with them to build their tax administration capacity and
implement AEOL We welcome further collaboration by our tax
authorities on cross-border compliance activities.90
The 2015 communiqu6 from the summit in Ankara, Turkey, endorsed the
final BEPS reports and emphasized the importance of their implementation
as well as the involvement of non-G20 countries in this process, with
continuing stress on commitments to developing countries.91 It also
suggested a dubious view of the APA process, despite the fact that any such
view is hardly detectable in the BEPS Action Plan or the various final BEPS
reports:
To reach a globally fair and modern international tax system, we
endorse the package of measures developed under the ambitious G20/
OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. Widespread
and consistent implementation will be criticalin the effectiveness of the project,
in particular as regards the exchange of information on cross-border tax

rulings. We, therefore, strongly urge the timely implementation of the
project and encourage all countries and jurisdictions, including
developing ones, to participate. To monitor the implementation of the
BEPS project globally, we call on the OECD to develop an inclusive
framework by early 2016 with the involvement of interested non-G20
countries and jurisdictions which commit to implement the BEPS
project, including developing economies, on an equal footing. We
welcome the efforts by the IMF, OECD, UN and WBG to provide
appropriate technical assistance to interested developing economies in
tackling the domestic resource mobilization challenges they face,
including from BEPS. We acknowledge that interested non-G20
developing countries" timing of implementation may differ from other
countries and expect the OECD and other international organisations
to ensure that their circumstances are appropriately addressed in the
framework. We are progressing towards enhancing the transparency of
our tax systems and we reaffirm our previous commitments to
90. G20 Brisbane Summit, Nov. 16, 2014, G20 Leaders' Communiqui Brisbane Summit, T 48,
(Nov. 16, 2014) (emphasis added) [hereinafter G20 Brisbane Summit Leaders' Communique].
91. G20 Antalya Summit, Nov. 15-16, 2015, G20 Leaders' Communiqu, Antalya Summit,
15-16 November 2015, T 15, (Nov. 16, 2014) (emphasis added) [hereinafter G20 Antalya
Summit Leaders' Communique].

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
20181

THE OECD/G20-BEPS-PROJECT

279

information exchange on-request as well as to automatic exchange of
information by 2017 or end-2018. We invite other jurisdictions to join
us. We support the efforts for strengthening developing economies'
engagement in the international tax agenda.92
The 2016 communiqu6, from the summit in Hangzhou, China, reaffirmed
commitment to the twin pillars, calling emphatically for co-operative and
"consistent" BEPS implementation, at the same time recognizing newly
designed mechanisms for promoting co-operation, including administrative
assistance to developing countries.93 However, that declaration included
some new themes, especially the encouragement of "pro-growth" tax
policies, and identification of the relationship to such policy of the twin
pillars, as well as a new emphasis on the role of China:
We will continue our support for international tax cooperation to
achieve a globally fair and modern international tax system and to foster
growth, including advancing on-going cooperation on base erosion and
profits shifting (BEPS), exchange of tax information, tax capacitybuilding of developing countries and tax policies to promote growth
and tax certainty. We welcome the establishment of the G20/OECD
Inclusive Framework on BEPS, and its first meeting in Kyoto. We
support a timely, consistent and widespread implementation of the BEPS
package and call upon all relevant and interested countries and jurisdictions
that have not yet committed to the BEPS package to do so and join the
framework on an equalfooting. We also welcome the progress made on

effective and widespread implementation of the internationally agreed
standards on tax transparency and reiterate our call on all relevant
countries including all financial centers and jurisdictions, which have
not yet done so to commit without delay to implementing the standard of
automatic exchange of information by 2018 at the latest and to sign and ratify
the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax

Matters. We endorse the proposals made by the OECD working with
G20 members on the objective criteria to identify non-cooperative
jurisdictions with respect to tax transparency. We ask the OECD to
report back to the finance ministers and central bank governors by June
2017 on the progress made by jurisdictions on tax transparency, and on
how the Global Forum will manage the country review process in
response to supplementary review requests of countries, with a view for
the OECD to prepare a list by the July 2017 G20 Leaders" Summit of
those jurisdictions that have not yet sufficiently progressed toward a
satisfactory level of implementation of the agreed international
standards on tax transparency. Defensive measures will be considered
against listed jurisdictions. We encourage countries and international
92. G20 Antalya Summit, Nov. 15-16, 2015, G20 Leaders' Communiqu6, Antalya Summit, 1516 November 2015, (Nov. 16, 2015).
93. G20 Hangzhou Summit, Sept. 5, 2016, G20 Leaders' Communiqu6, Hangzhou Summit,
Hangzhou, China, September 5, 2016, (Sept. 5, 2016).
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organisations to assist developing economies in building their tax
capacity and acknowledge the establishment of the new Platform for
Collaboration on Taxation by the IMF, OECD, UN, and WBG. We
support the principles of the Addis Tax Initiative. We recognize the
significant negative impact of illicit financial flows on our economies
and we will advance the work of the G20 on this theme. We emphasize
the effectiveness of tax policy tools in supply-side structural reform for
promoting innovation-driven, inclusive growth, as well as the benefits
of tax certainty to promote investment and trade and ask the OECD
and IMF to continue working on the issues of pro-growth tax policies
and tax certainty. In this connection, China would make its own
contribution by establishing an international tax policy research center
for international tax policy design and research.94
The following year the Leaders met in Germany, and the communiqu6,
though recommitting the Leaders to the BEPS initiative, dropped the
language on "equal footing":
We will continue our work for a globally fair and modern international
tax system and welcome international cooperation on pro-growth tax
policies. We remain committed to the implementation of the Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) package and encourage all relevant
jurisdictions to join the Inclusive Framework. We look forward to the
first automatic exchange of financial account information under the
Common Reporting Standard (CRS) in September 2017. We call on all
relevant jurisdictions to begin exchanges by September 2018 at the
latest. We commend the recent progress made by jurisdictions to meet
a satisfactory level of implementation of the agreed international
standards on tax transparency and look forward to an updated list by the
OECD by our next Summit reflecting further progress made towards
implementation. Defensive measures will be considered against listed
jurisdictions. We continue to support assistance to developing
countries in building their tax capacity. We are also working on
enhancing tax certainty and with the OECD on the tax challenges
raised by digitalisation of the economy. As an important tool in our
fight against corruption, tax evasion, terrorist financing and money
laundering, we will advance the effective implementation of the
international standards on transparency and beneficial ownership of
legal persons and legal arrangements, including the availability of
information in the domestic and cross-border context. 95

94. G20 Hangzhou Summit, Sept. 5, 2016, G20 Leaders' Communiqu6, Hangzhou Summit,
Hangzhou, China, September 5, 2016, T 19, (Sept. 5, 2016) (emphasis added) [hereinafter G20
Hangzhou Summit Leaders' Communique].
95. G20 Hamburg Summit, July 8, 2017, G20 Leaders' Declaration, (July 8, 2017) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter G20 Hamburg Summit Declaration].
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Recapitulatory, tracing the dynamic at the G20 Leaders' Declarations
level, informs about the political impetus behind the spill-over from an
emphasis on transparency to overhauling the substantive allocation rules of
international tax coordination; and the advent of the "value creation
paradigm" into the international tax nomenclature. These communiques
exhibit the high level emphasis on two areas of policy: the problem of tax
havens and of "central" parties situated in them; and the emerging concept
of value creation. These two matters are the focus of this paper.
Yet, these communiqu6s, singly or as a whole, do not inform in detail
about the thrust of the value creation paradigm or of the anti-BEPS project
in general.96 This thrust and its implications can only be understood from
the OECD reports that coined the terms for initially setting the G20 tax
agenda in the 2012-13 period. Nonetheless, when the Group of 20 officially
ceded the task to work out concrete policy prescriptions to the OECD and
declared an intention to "follow with attention the ongoing work of the
OECD in this area,"97 Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Stack
testified in 2014 that "while [the OECD] has hosted this process . . . G20
governments, some of whom are not members of the OECD, are driving the
process."98

96. One might try to infer meaning into the phrase by taking its parts "base erosion" and
"profit shifting" literally. A tax base can only be "eroded" if one presupposes a principally
"correct" or at least a timely "prior" tax base that is diminished. Thus, "base erosion" could
either describe a decline in tax base over time or a mismatch between an a priori assumption of
any kind of a "true" national base and the actual amount of tax revenues. The latter is quite
problematic since "BEPS" describes tax structures that are legal, not fraudulent, and the
standard to the "true" tax base cannot be exclusively the present law. In the same vein, "profit
shifting" can only be meaningful if there is something like a "true origin" of profits, since
otherwise profits-in the semantic logic of the phrase-could not have been geographically
"shifted." Nevertheless, it has become common to refer to gradual decreases in businesses' tax
obligations as "income/profit shifting." In any event, connecting the result ("base erosion") and
the action ("profit shifting") with "and"-not "through"-does not seem convincing.
97. G20 Los Cabos Summit Leaders' Declaration, supra note 74.
98. See Testimony of Robert B. Stack, Deputy Assistant Secretary (InternationalTax Affairs), U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Before the S. Finance Comm., 113th Cong., (2014). Also, it was
insightful how the U.S. Congress' Joint Committee on Taxation summed up the political
dynamic leading to the BEPS project: As G-20 and various policymakers worked toward
greater transparency in tax administration, concerns about the operation of and effects of tax on
cross-border activities were voiced. These concerns related to the difficulty of taxing
corporations engaged in cross-border activities, a perceived increase in base erosion and profit
shifting, and a risk that double taxation may arise if governments acted unilaterally to protect
their respective corporate tax revenue bases, and resulting uncertainty for taxpayers with crossborder operations. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, SUMMARY, AND
IMPLICATION OF THE OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, JCX-13915 at 8 (2015) [hereinafter Joint Comm. OECD/G20 Background].
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THE TWOFOLD "NEGATIVE" CONNOTATION OF THE "VALUE
CREATION PARADIGM"

The foregoing detailed the trajectory of the Group of 20 Leaders'
pronouncements about the commitment of that group of nations to the
BEPS project and the related campaign for automatic exchange of
information. Both of these represented innovations of principle in the
interpretation of the provisions of the worldwide network of bilateral double
taxation conventions, most based structurally upon the OECD Model
Convention.
But, the core technical analysis of the OECD underlying this trajectory,
undertaken "in response to concerns raised by the G20,"99 and ultimately
expressed in the value creation paradigm is entailed in the Addressing Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting Report issued in February 2013.100 In this
Report, the OECD does not expressly define what it perceives as BEPSwhich, in fact, the OECD never didi01-but embarks on a descriptive
approach to capture a "phenomenon" that raises tax "policy concerns."102
The Report references "a growing perception that governments lose
substantial corporate tax revenue because of planning aimed at shifting away
profits in ways that erode the taxable base to locations where they are subject
to a more favorable tax treatment,"103 and sees "opportunities to eliminate or
significantly reduce taxation on income in a manner that is inconsistent with
the policy objectives of domestic rules and international standards."104
In searching for "indications" for the "existence and magnitude of
BEPS,"o5 the OECD finds exemplary low-tax jurisdictions that each,
although having miniscule gross domestic products, received (inbound) and
made (outbound) more foreign direct investments in a volume greater than
some of the largest economies in the world (including Germany). Turning
99. Id.
100. Addressing Base Erosion, supra note 80.
101. To the best of our knowledge, only the EU-Commission has ever defined "aggressive tax
planning." See Commission Recommendation of 6.12.2012 on Aggressive Tax Planning, at 2, COM
(2012) 8806 final (June 12, 2012) (emphasis added):
A key characteristic of the practices in question is that they reduce tax liability through strictly
legal arrangements which however contradict the intent of the law . . . Aggressive tax planning
consists in taking advantage of the technicalities of a tax system or mismatches between two or
more tax systems for the purpose of reducing tax liability.
102. The emphasis that the Joint Committee places on the "G20 concerns" refers also to the
UN Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing and to European concerns, e.g., such as voiced with
specific regard to "value creation" concerns by the French Government; see Task Force on the
Digital Economy, Report to the Ministerfor the Economy and Finance, the Ministerfor Industrial
Recovery, the MinisterDelegatefor the Budget and the Minister Delegatefor Small and Medium-Sized
Enterprises, Innovation and the Digital Economy, January 2013 (the so-called "Collin/ColinReport"), available at http://www.hldataprotection.com/files/2013/06/TaxationDigitalEcono
my.pdf. See Joint Comm. OECD/G20 Background, supra note 98, at 8.
103. Addressing Base Erosion, supra note 80, at 13.
104. Id. at 15.
105. Id.
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to the globe's largest recipient and distributor of foreign direct investment,
the Netherlands, the Report finds roughly 75 percent of the total amount of
foreign direct investment being channeled through "special purpose
entities," which are defined as every
[enterprise that] meets the following criteria: (i) The enterprise is a legal
entity, a. Formally registered with a national authority; and b. Subject
to fiscal and other legal obligations of the economy in which it is
resident. (ii) The enterprise is ultimately controlled by a non-resident
parent, directly or indirectly. (iii) The enterprise has no or few
employees, little or no production in the host economy and little or no
physical presence. (iv) Almost all the assets and liabilities of the
enterprise represent investments in or from other countries. (v) The
core business of the enterprise consists of group financing or holding
activities, that is - viewed from the perspective of the compiler in a
given country - the channeling of funds from non-residents to other
non-residents. However, in its daily activities, managing and directing
plays only a minor role.106
Taking these "indications" for "BEPS," the Report describes a tax policy
concern as "BEPS" that is composed of passive SPEs being employed to
channel foreign direct investments and, thus, having profits on those
investments technically accrue to entities in low-tax jurisdictions.107 The
Report finds its analysis supported by a number of studies and data
indicating that there is increased segregation between the location where
actual business activities and investment take place and the location where
profits are reported for tax purposes. Actual business activities are generally
identified through elements such as sales, workforce, payroll, and fixed
assets.1os
Concluding that "circumstantial evidence" for BEPS exists and having
roughly described its basic content, the Addressing BEPS Report continues
to analyze the legal mechanisms that lead to possibilities for "increased
segregation between the location where actual business activities and
investment take place and the location where profits are reported for tax
purposes."109 It finds that "current rules provide opportunities to associate
more profits with legal constructs and intangible rights and obligations, and
to legally shift risk intra-group, with the result of reducing the share of
profits associated with substantive operations."o10 The Report identifies the
"underlying assumptions of the arm's length [standard]""' as the cause of
106. Id. at 22, n.6.
107. Id. at 40. Again, while commonsense might call this BEPS off-the-cuff, in legal terms this
is "managed profit accrual" permitted by (flawed) operative laws, so that calling it "profit
shifting" shifts important parts of the blame.
108. Addressing Base Erosion, supra note 80, at 20.
109. Id. at 15.
110. Id. at 33.
111. Id. at 42.
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such "profit shifting" and finds it problematic to base the determination of
transfer prices on "contractual allocation of risks and intangibles."112
With regard to possible solutions to "BEPS," the Report sets forth "key
pressure areas" and announces the intention to develop a
"comprehensive action" plan, with the "main purpose""3 of providing
instruments for governments to use in "better aligning rights to tax with
real economic activity""4 (i.e., "elements such as sales, workforce,

payroll, and fixed assets"), and which would "realign international
standards with current global business environment."ns This "global
business environment" is, according to the Addressing BEPS report,
characterized by the rise of global value chains (GVCs) in which
"separate legal entities forming the group operate as a single integrated
enterprise following an overall business strategy. Management
personnel may be geographically dispersed rather than being located in
a single central location, with reporting lines and decision-making
processes going beyond the legal structure of the MNE."116
Within the GVCs, the Report discerns typological differences in the
importance of value contributions of stages of production, holding that
"[f]rom an economic point of view, most of the value of a good or service is
typically created in upstream activities where product design, R&D or
production of core components occur, or in the tail-end of downstream
activities where marketing or branding occurs."n1

The Report further states that achieving the goal of "better aligning rights
to tax with real economic activity" and "realign[ing] international standards
with current global business environment" requires revisiting "some of the
fundaments of the existing standards" and that "incremental approaches may
help curb the current trends, but will not respond to several of the
challenges.",1s Specifically in the realm of transfer pricing, the Report calls
for "improvements or clarifications"-without pledging allegiance to the
arm's length standard-in order to address "areas where current rules
produce undesirable results from a policy perspective",19 and that the ongoing discussions on intangibles were to be "included in a broader reflection
on transfer pricing."120
The potential solutions to "BEPS" were specified in the Action Plan On
BEPS issued in June 2013. The Action Plan again states that the arm's length
standard in many instances allocates the income of MNEs "effectively and
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.

at 42.
at 51.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

51 (emphasis added).
51.
25.
27.
51.
52.
10, 52.
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efficiently," but admits that it could be "used and/or misapplied" in a way
that results in "separat[ing] income from economic activity that produce that
income."121 But contrary to the Addressing BEPS Report, which had been
skeptical about "incremental approaches," the Action Plan stresses "the
importance of concerted action and the practical difficulties associated with
agreeing to and implementing the details of a new system" would compel
countries to refrain from "seeking to replace the current transfer pricing
system," and that "the best course is to directly address the flaws in the
current system, in particular with respect to returns related to intangible
assets, risk and over-capitalisation."122 Action Points 8-10,123 thus, set as its

objectives to "assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value
creation," which meant that "profits associated with the transfer and use of
intangibles are appropriately allocated in accordance with (rather than
divorced from) value creation,"124 and to "ensure that inappropriate returns
will not accrue to an entity solely because it has contractually assumed risks
or has provided capital."125
The Addressing BEPS Report and the Action Plan On BEPS, as we read
them, thus, established the goal of "aligning transfer pricing outcomes with
value creation" having two specific "negative" functions in mind:
* (i) to forestall excessive taxable profits being allocated to passive
SPEs; and
* (ii) to mitigate the prior language of the Addressing BEPS Report
that too strongly resembled outright formulary ideas.126
Clearly put, the tax policy impetus that was expressed by "aligning transfer
pricing outcomes with value creation" was directed at transfer pricing
structures that contractually allocated passive factors of the GVCs to SPEs

121. OECD 2013 Action Plan, supra note 80, at 19.
122. Id. at 20.
123. See infra app.
124. OECD 2013 Action Plan, supra note 80, at 20.
125. Id. at 20.
126. Indeed, Mayra Lucas, transfer pricing advisor at the OECD, told that a switch to
formulary apportionment was in fact openly considered at the outset of the BEPS project. Dana
L. Glenn, FormularyApportionment No Solution to BEPS, OECD Rep Says, 142 TAx NOTES INT.
800 (Feb. 24, 2014). Still, CbC-reporting might be a step further towards formulary
apportionment or a FA-close regime, tax administrations might use the data gained to
reconsider its feasibility. Robert Stack told Tax Analysts that "when he agreed to include the
concept of value creation in the tax paragraph of the 2013 G20 leaders' declaration, he did not
view the term as significantly different from the analysis of functions, assets, and risks." In the
same article, Stack is cited saying that "he understands criticism that the approach is not
consistent with the arm's length principle, but that it was necessary for a greater purpose," and
that a "single-entity approach to multinationals" would find its way into "some tax policies."
David D. Stewart, 'Value Creation' Understanding Key to Transfer Pricing's Future, 148 TAx
NOTES INT.

390 July 27, 2015).
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in tax havens, which entailed a problematical characterisation of such entities
as entrepreneurs and to which the residual income accrues.1 27
But again, the points to stress are that the BEPS project was (1) motivated
by concern about the accumulation of taxable profits in "central" subsidiaries
organized in low-tax jurisdictions; and (2) adopted the "value creation"
paradigm as the central tenet in approaching this problem. A subsidiary but
important point was that as early as the Action Plan-the second of four steps
in the evolution of the final reports-there was movement from a call for
more drastic reform (the rejection of incremental approaches in the
Addressing BEPS Report, and its emphasis on the factors (sales, payroll, fixed
assets) traditionally used in formula apportionment) to the greater tolerance
of received practices in the Action Plan.
II.

Background and Validity of the Paradigm: The Origins

A.

"EcoNoMIC ALLEGIANCE, ""ARM's LENGTH," AND THE VALIDITY
OF THE "VALUE CREATION PARADIGM"

The purpose of the previous section was to show how "aligning transfer
pricing outcomes with value creation" as a paradigm was introduced in
response to transfer pricing outcomes that were "unacceptable from a policy
perspective." We called this the "negative" prong of the value creation
paradigm because it pertains to excluding from the international tax system.
* (i) the unacceptable transfer pricing outcome of increased
segregation between the location where actual business activities
and investment take place and the location where profits are
reported for tax purposes;1 28 and
* (ii) open deviations from the arm's length standard (e.g., formula
apportionment).
Given the pivotal importance of the paradigm, the purpose of this section
is to trace the historic and theoretical background of "the idea of align[ing]
transfer pricing outcomes with value creation" in the evolution of the
international regime for allocating business income. A review of this
127. Hence, looking back in history, one may ask if Thomas Adams' critique of the theory of
"economic allegiance" developed by the Academic Experts in the 1920s does apply equally to
value creation paradigm:
This theory [is] little more than a generalized label covering a number of separate
judgments which the authors of the theory have reached about the expedient place
to tax certain persons or transactions . . . [b]ut their justification are practical not
'scientific,' and 'economic allegiance' is distinctly different in different states. The
theory leads many of its advocates to endorse exaggerated claims concerning the
rights of the jurisdiction of domicile. These exaggerated claims rest partly on the
fact that their advocates are citizens of creditor states.
Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "OriginalIntent" of U.S. InternationalTaxation, 46
DUKE L. J. 1021, 1092 (1997) (quoting T.S. Adams, Interstate and InternationalDouble Taxation,
Lectures on Taxation 101 (Roswell Magill ed., 1932)).
128. Id. at 20.
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background shows that it is a theoretically valid paradigm and is implicit in
the "classification and assignment approach" recognized to be the central
tenet of the rules that have governed international tax relations since the
1920s. This approach treats active business income as having its
predominant economic allegiance to a source country. A further aim is to
demonstrate that as such, and as originally interpreted by the G20 and at
least the initial BEPS documents, it represents one strand in approaching the
arm's length standard, a recognized norm for interjurisdictional allocation of
the income of a transnational integrated group. We will argue that the arm's
length standard as interpreted for most of this period represents an
alternative strand, but that strand only partly and incoherently captures the
economic facts of value creation. Thus, we argue that the value creation
tradition-as opposed to a contractual allocation/one-sided method
tradition-better represents the core meaning of both the classification and
assignment economic allegiance approach, and of the arm's length standard
which is a major facet of that approach.
As such, this discussion seeks to contribute to the question whether the
paradigm constitutes a "substance rule" in interpreting existing treaty law or
if it constitutes a substantive change. This section does not yet address the
ultimate question where value is created from an economic perspective or
how a potential theoretical framework weighing the value creating activities
can be made operative, but it argues that value creation provides a valid
expression of the underlying purpose of the international transfer pricing
regime.
In this regard, this section argues, first, that because the original premises
of assigning the right to tax business income at source were ideas akin to
"aligning taxation with value creation" and because transfer pricing, though
technically assigning taxing rights to a "residence" country, in effect is an
economic "sourcing tool,"129 the international transfer pricing system should
be geared to produce outcomes that are aligned with rather divorced from
value creation. The original ideas also contain hints-even if scant-as to
how value creation is to be understood-i.e., from the taxpayer's perspective,
not from the perspective of the jurisdictions' burdens leading to the
comparability analysis and market analogies that eventually created the
opportunities for BEPS.
Second, this section argues that ante-BEPS, the arm's length standard has
been only partially devised to achieve this goal, and serves it only
imperfectly, if at all. Indeed, it is revealing that the reference to the "relative
economic contributions" to value creation has found its way into the
nomenclature of the transfer pricing system in connection with the profit
split method. United States courts developed this method in application of
unspecified methods under the United States regulations promulgated in the
1960s, which enabled those courts to manage, if not correct, the flaws of the
129. See Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational
CORNELL L. REv. 18, 46-47 (1993).

Enterprises, 79
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narrow arm's length system the 1960s regulations created. Still, the notion
of value creation in the profit split methodology has been part of an
incoherent system based on contractual assignments and of uncertain
characterisations of entities, activities, or functions as "non-routine" viz.
"entrepreneurial." As further discussed within, adjusting for or correcting
misalignments between economic value of functions and their
characterisation for tax transfer pricing purposes also underlay arguments
for more recent developments immediately predating the BEPS initiative,
especially the 2008 Authorized OECD Approach (AOA) concerning
determination of the profits attributable to permanent establishments;130 the
2010 OECD business restructurings Report;'3' and the 2012 OECD
intangibles draft.132
In summary, we argue in this section that from both a theoretical and a
policy perspective, "aligning taxation with value creation"-although clearly
developed with regard to practical concerns and not really convincingly
justified by the OECD/G20-is a valid paradigm that effectuates the
underlying principle of economic allegiance. This tells us that
* (i) the OECD/G20 initiative developed in principle the correct
measure to the transfer pricing system, and that
* (ii) the transfer pricing system as a sourcing tool should from both a
policy and a doctrinal perspective capture the true economic effect
of actual transactions undertaken.
This section, thus, implicitly takes a position on the underlying question
whether the profit allocation under the Article 9 arm's length principle
should be a mere anti-avoidance tool or a substantive tax base allocation
tool.
B.

VALUE CREATION AND THE EARLY CONCEPTION

OF

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAXATION AT SOURCE: THE

1923 ADDENDUM
The League of Nations' 1920 Brussels Financial Conference identified the
problems of double taxation and tax evasion33 as pressure areas in relation to
the reestablishment of post-war economic order, and in 1921 delegated to
the Financial Committee of the League of Nations the task of discovering
possible ways of solving this problem.134 The Financial Committee found it
130. See infra Section IV.A.
131. See infra Section JV.B.
132. See infra Section IV.C.
133. League of Nations: Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion,
Double Taxation and Tax Evasion: Report Document C. 216. M. 85, art., reprinted at
Conventions Legislative History 4111, at 4119 [hereinafter 1927 Technical Experts Report].
13 4. See the "extract" of Double Taxation and Tax Evasion Report and Resolutions Submitted by the
Technical Experts to the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, Document F.212 (Feb. 7,
1925), reprinted in Conventions Legislative History 4057, at 4107 [hereinafter 1925 Report of
First Technical Experts Committee]. The extract has no page number in the original, and is
dated June 8, 1925.
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expedient to first investigate the issue "from a purely general point of view"
and entrusted four "expert economists" with a study on the theoretical
aspects of the double taxation problem.35 The study was published by the
League in April 1923.136
While from a purely national perspective, the imposition of taxation has
always been merely based upon any "reasonable economic nexus" to the
jurisdiction that levies the tax. From an international perspective, additional
considerations were necessary to solve the conflict between overlapping
claims to tax the same income. In this regard, the Academic Experts Bruins,
Einaudi, Seligman, and Stamp, in fostering the foundations of today's
international tax regime, posited in their 1923 Report that this additional
consideration should be the economic allegiance the wealth subject to tax
displays and that:
The ideal solution [to the double taxation problem] is that the
individual's whole faculty should be taxed, but that it should be taxed
only once, and that the liability should be divided among the tax
districts according to his relative interests in each. The individual has

certain economic interests in the place of his permanent residence or
domicile, as well as in the place or places where his property is situated
or from which his income is derived.137

In unraveling the relative economic interests a taxpayer has in the country
of "his permanent residence" and "the place from which his income is
derived," i.e., the economic allegiance of his income derived, the Academic
Experts discerned "four elements of economic allegiance" to be considered
in assigning taxing rights between the competing source and the resident
country:
* (i) the production/origin of wealth,
* (ii) the location/situs of wealth,
* (iii) the enforceability of rights to wealth, and
* (iv) the consumption of wealth at the residence/domicile of the
taxpayer.'13
While (i) and (iv) are considered most important and the other two as
auxiliary measures 39 to reinforce the economic allegiance indicated by facts
pertinent to (i) and (iv), no single element had priority per se. Rather, the
Experts reasoned that:
Where all four factors are in agreement, no difficulty can arise; where
they are in disagreement a choice must be made between them or a
135. Id.
136. Report Submitted by Professors Brains, Einaudi, Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp on Double
Taxation and Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S.73 F.19 (1923) reprinted in Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Legislative History of United State Tax Conventions
4003 [hereinafter referred to as the 1923 Academic Experts Report].
137. Id. at 4024 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 4026-27.
139. Id. at 4029.
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compromise must be adopted. If the first three principles are of
overwhelming importance as compared with the fourth, i.e., if situs and
the place of enforcement re-enforce the place of origin to such an
extent as to make it far more important than domicile, the presumption
is clearly in favour of the composite principle of origin being
predominant.140
Thus, by weighing these elements with regard to different classifications
of wealth, the Experts concluded that the "origin of wealth" must be, in
theory, the decisive criterion for taxing international "business enterprises"
and, as such, the "place of origin" shall have the preponderant right to tax
income from "commercial establishments."14

The "place of origin" was

considered to be "the place where the earnings are created,"142 and used as a
synonym to the production of wealth, which was seen as "all the stages
which are involved up to the point when wealth is coming to fruition," or,
differently put, "the place where wealth is produced" as "the community the
economic life of which makes possible the yield or the acquisition of the
wealth."143 The Report also contained an "Addendum" on the question of
assigning taxing rights between a multitude of places of origin, viz. different
source states-a question the Experts saw as "becom[ing] of special
importance in all business taxation."144
This Addendum, which is quite difficult to locate and accordingly has not
attracted much scholarly attention, outlines the problems that may arise in
the "allocation of earnings where the whole of the economic stages are not
conducted in one area."145 In such a scenario, "different degrees of
economic allegiance .

.

. may attach to different stages of what is in the last

resort a single economic action" and continues to see the problem that arises
in such circumstances of "how the result of all these stages can be subdivided
in order to indicate the different degrees of claim that a State may have upon
each operation" when operations are backward or forward integrated across
borders. The Addendum sees a need to seek "criteria for assigning the profit
to [each] area in which the economic stages have been conducted." Without
being explicit-but insinuating/foreshadowing some kind of "arm's length"
test-the Report crudely assumes that "criteria of division" could perhaps be
more easily arrived at when the operations of one company are identical in
two countries. As such, the Addendum was uneasy with cases where no
identical operations were carried out in different states and loosely collected

140. Id. at 4030.
141.
142.
143.
144.

1923 Academic Experts Report, at 4033-43.
Id. at 4028.
Id. at 4027.
Id. at 4034.

145. See the title of the Addendum (Allocation ofEarnings 1here the Whole ofthe Economic Stages
Are not Conducted Within One Area).
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criteria that were generally adopted in practice146 but stressed that the
suitability of these criteria would depend "entirely on the nature of the
business" and had to be ad hoc taking into account the "actual economic
structure of the business under consideration."147 The Addendum points to

the income allocation systems of New York, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin
as illustrations. It closes without "any theoretical conclusions as to which are
the appropriate criteria for different classes of business." The Academic
Experts offer to research the issue in more detail "if it is desired by the
Financial Committee of the League"148-a desire the League Committee
seemingly never developed.
However, what was emphasized was that the process of "production of
wealth" was not considered as a mere automatism of owning/assuming
assets/risks by the enterprise but to different degrees contingent upon
"human agency"-i.e., "people functions" and "controlling power":
It is not pretended that every function falls easily into one of these four
classes [of economic allegiance]. For example, a manager of an estate in
Java may be said to be the directing brain living in Java, and some of the
legal rights relating to that estate may be enforceable in Java; on the
other hand, the final control and direction may be in the hands of
directors in Amsterdam; finally, the actual recipient of a part of the
profits may be a shareholder in London. It is not easy in the last analysis
to decide whether the production or origin stage can be said to end in ]ava or
whether the brainsin Amsterdam are not an essentialpart of all the operations
concerned in production.149

In what might correlate to Professor Knight's agency theory, the Report
assumes that part of the origin of wealth is a "human agency" performing
functions that are leading to the creation of wealth by "the whole
enterprise":
When we are speaking of the origin of the wealth, we refer naturally to
the place where the wealth is produced, that is, to the community the
economic life of which makes possible the yield or the acquisition of the
wealth. This yield or acquisition is due, however, not only to the
particular thing but to the human relations which may help in creating
the yield. The human agency may be:
(1) The superintendent or management of the labour and
organisation at the situs, e.g., the local manager of a tea plantation;

146. The Addendum mentions the value of sales, the total capital employed in a country, the
value of real estate in a country, the total salaries and establishment expenses, and the credits
arising in one country.
147. Id. at 53 [Addendum, p. 1].
148. Addendum p. 2 (1923 Academic Experts Report at 53).
149. 1923 Academic Experts Report at 4027 (emphasis added).
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(2) The agencies for transport over sea or land touching various
territorial jurisdictions, which assist in bringing worthless objects to
points at which they begin to be near their market;
(3) The seat and residence of the controlling power that decides the
whole policy upon which finally depends the question whether the
production of the wealth will ever be a profitable production or not.
It chooses the local management, decides the character of the
expenditure of capital and the times and methods of cultivation,
decides the markets that are to be utilized and the methods of sale
and, in short, acts as the coordinating brain of the whole enterprise;
(4) The selling end, that is, the place where the agents for selling ply
their calling and where the actual markets are to be found.150
Taken together, the Academic Experts Report posited
(i) that "economic allegiance" is the theoretical rationale for allocating
taxing rights as enshrined in the classification and assignment
approach, although they acknowledge that source taxation of
businesses is "inevitably so,"
(ii) that the "place of origin," being "the place where income is
produced," is the preponderant "element" in taxing international
business enterprises, and
(iii) that the "origin of wealth" viz. the "production of wealth" is to
be considered as "all stages bringing the wealth to fruition," which is
considered as we read the Report and the Addendum, from the
taxpayer's perspective viz. an "inside" perspective or say an "output"
perspective on business activities-a notion also expressed in using
the personalized assignment in the "ideal solution" of "his economic
interests in each jurisdiction" and in giving importance to the
"human agency" within the enterprise in defining the "origin of
wealth" and in weighting the "elements of economic allegiance."
We assume that the explicit reference to "his"-i.e., the taxpayer's
economic interest and income is the original endorsement of a transaction
cost logic to international tax allocation which seeks outcomes that captures
the taxpayer's output from his activities. We think that a "production cost"
logic would see the tax liability from the perspective of the respective
jurisdictions because the production cost logic (as an input logic) to profit
allocation is closer to a "benefit" logic, meaning that the jurisdiction's
infrastructure benefitting the taxpayer,1 5 an approach the Experts
rejected.152

150. Id. at 4027.
151. See Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., & Robert J. Peroni. The David R. Tillinghast
Lecture- What's Source Got to Do With It Source Rules and U.S. InternationalTaxation, 56 TAx
L. REv. 81 (2002) (in favor of a source taxation broader than "benefits" derived).

152. 1923 Academic Experts Report, at 4022.
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These ideas were endorsed by a Report which constituted the next step in
the evolution of the League's position, the 1925 Report of the Technical
Experts.153
The Technical Experts, who-based upon actual state practice and the fact
of imbalances in payment structures, and possibly their nations being largely
creditor nations-favored the classification-and-assignment approach and
agreed with the idea of source taxation of business profits posited in their
1925 Report that:
If the enterprise has its head office in one of the States and in another
has a branch, an agency, an establishment, a stable commercial or
industrial organisation, or a permanent representative, each one of the
contracting States shall tax that portion of the net income produced in its own

territory. Therefore, the financial authorities of the interested States
shall be able to request the taxpayer to hand in general balance-sheets,
special balance-sheets and all other relevant documents.
In the case of shipping enterprises, railway companies, trans-Atlantic
cables, aerial navigation companies and electrical power undertakings,
the principle of division is applicable, in proportion to the profits
originating in a particular country, provided that there exists in that

country a genuine organisation (office, agency or branch) in which
business is actually carried on and that it is not-as in the case of
shipping companies, for example-merely a question of vessels calling
at ports.1 54
The Academic Experts, all their qualifications notwithstanding, really
favored a system based exclusively on residence taxation to enable national
tax systems to operate according to the ability-to-pay principle. The
Academic Experts suggested that the classification-and-assignment option
might be made operable, if it were given priority, by the assignment of
taxing rights aligned to Option 2;155 this suggested that a narrowed
application of source taxation was a politically opportune option but not in
and by itself inherent in the "classification-and-assignment" approach based
on the theory of economic allegiance.
And indeed, theory notwithstanding, the United States had vital political
interests in keeping the source taxation American businesses were
increasingly facing at a minimum. Because:
By the end of 1918, the United States had another reason to favor relief
for Americans investing American capital be channeled to rebuild post153. 1925 Report of First Technical Experts Committee, at 4071.
154. Id. at 4091.
155. 1923 Academic Experts Report, at 4055 ("Where method 2 is repugnant owing to a
reluctance to abandon the principle of origin, method 4 as modified by method 3 may be the
subject of mutual conventions; but even then it is best carried out by an administrative system
similar to method 2, supplemented by a collective settlement on agreed lines between the two
Governments.").
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war Europe. The United States was owed eleven billion dollars by
allied governments for wartime loans somehow Europe would need
access to American dollars to pay off this debt. . . . [Given the

contemporaneous reluctances for government involvement,] if Europe
was going to get the dollars necessary for the repayment of its debts, the
purchase of American exports, and the economic stability necessary for
peace, the source would have to be private investment.156

One first decisive aspect of keeping source taxation low was to treat
subsidiary enterprises not as permanent establishments (PEs)-as a 1927
draft of the Model Convention had done'57-but as separate taxpayers. The
idea of treating subsidiaries as a PE had been employed-as is occasionally
done in contemporary times, e.g., under specific circumstances by India'sas Mitchell Carroll would later put it-"to reach out to the mother's
profits."159 Economic theory of dependence and control seem to have played
no decisive role in the adoption of the rule that subsidiaries should not be
treated as PEs, which of course survives into the model conventions to this
day.160

C.

"VALUE CREATION" UNDER ARTICLE

9

OF

OECD/UN

MODEL

TAx CONVENTIONS

1.

The 1933 CarrollReport

From 1928 through 1933, a subcommittee of the League's Fiscal
Committee conducted a study of the problem of the allocation of business
profits between associated but separately incorporated enterprises and
between home offices and foreign branches.161 The task of the 1933 Carroll
Reportl62 was to fill the void left by the 1928 Draft Treaties on the vital
156. Greatz & Hazard, supra note 127, at 1051.
157. 1927 Technical Experts Report, at 11 ("The real centres of management, affiliated
companies, branches, factories, agencies, warehouses, offices, and depots shall be regarded as
permanent establishments.").
158. U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, U.N. PRACTICAL MANUAL ON TRANSFER
PRICING FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, Chapter 10.4, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/347 (2013), http://
www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UNManualTransferPricing.pdf; See Lee Sheppard, Revenge
Of The Source Countries, Part 6: SubsidiaryAs PE, 2006 TNT 200-3 (Oct. 11, 2006).
159. Mitchell Carroll, Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises Methods of Allocating
Taxable Income, League of Nations Doc. C.425(b).M.217(b).1933.J.A. (1933) [hereinafter
1933 Carroll Report]; see Report to the Council on the Work of the Fourth Session of the
Committee, League of Nations Doc. No. C.399.M.204.1933.JJ (1933), reprinted in Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Legislative History of United States Tax
Conventions 4057, at 4242, 4243-47.
160. OECD Model Convention art. 5(5).
161. See generally Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm's Length, TAx
NOTES,

Feb. 17, 1986, at 625, 631.

162. Report to the Council on the Work of the Fourth Session of the Committee, League of
Nations Doc. No. C.399.M.204.1933.II (1933), reprinted in Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation, Legislative History of United States Tax Conventions 4057, at 4242.
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question of international profit allocation and, thus, to translate the basic
business taxation framework of the 1928 Treaties into an operable set of
rules for both of the investment alternatives of foreign branches and
subsidiaries.
Thereby, the Carroll Report was no apolitical deduction of rules from the
pure contemporary firm theory or actual firm operations, although they
played an important if not crucial part; but also it was a deliberate step of
narrowing the general output logic inherent in origin taxation of business
profits into an overly legalistic system of separated business functions being
taxed on a the basis of an input logic, deliberately leaving large residual
claims due to integration economies being taxable by capital exporting
nations on the basis of Carroll'sfirm theory.163 Carroll was, we can assume,

aware of the increasing source taxation U.S. businesses were facing on
overseas investments, the foreign tax credit exposure that was created, and
the necessities of private investments in post-war Europe-not yet with geopolitical aims in mind, as was the case with the Marshall Plan-but simply to
recover its war-loans without public expenditures. This background is
important because it is pertinent to the question if and to what extent value
creation is grounded in the system he devised-which found its way
ultimately into in Article 9 of OECD and UN Model Tax Convention. The
Carroll Report, as shall be shown hereinafter:
(i) is technically an extension of the basic structure established by the
Academic/Technical Experts' reports (1923 and 1925-27) and the 1928
Treaties and is as such principally based upon and revolves around
arguments pertinent to determining the "origin of income" viz. the
value creation, but
(ii) is thereby an attempt to impose a deliberately narrow source viz.
value creation concept on the basis of Carroll's firm theory,
(iii) introduced a strict legalistic view of international source taxation
and seems to encourage assigning a pivotal role to contracts in
determining the content of the transactions, partly denying "economic
arguments" of "firm value creation" to gain weight, but seems not to
163. See Vann Hard-Boiled WonderWorld, supra note 13, at 321; cf Langbein, supra note 1, at
63 7-3 8:
Thus, he inferred an international (legislative) rule from administrative practices; he
elided the difference between a separate accounting method and "independent
enterprise" rules; he recommended a convention solution to a double taxation
problem the existence of which was not evident. On substantive points, he favored
home states in ways which would have restricted the rights of a source state to
impose tax, and, correlatively, to gather information, to the point of derogating the
principles which underlay the overall effort made by the League during the 1920s.
In short, I believe that Carroll conceived his role to be one of developing an
international approach which would truncate any movement of the international
community to the development, on a general scale, of working rules of fractional
apportionment, rather than one of evaluating, in an unbiased way, alternative
approaches to the problem.
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have endorsed applying any hypothetical transfer pricing methods on
such a contractual basis,
(iv) created an imprecision/indeterminacy surrounding the arm's length
standard in cases were no comparables could be identified (heavily
intertwined functions should have been mere cost positions with no
income attributed, but costs shared among the group's establishments),
i.e., Carroll was hesitant to price transactions on a market basis if there
is no actual market;
(v) proliferated the imprecise conceptual dichotomy of arm's length vs.
formulary apportionment, i.e., Carroll seems to have misunderstood/
overplayed the difference between separate accounting and separate
entity ideas, yet, overall:
(vi) the report is not a mere "fiscal policy document" in the sense that it
would lack any sound theoretical reasoning or address practical
administrative concerns. But it created a system somewhat insincere to
the fundamental allocation decision inherent in the theoretical concept
derived from economic allegiance and over-responsive to the interests
of capital exporting countries.164 But these shortcomings of the report
were at their times less dramatic in terms of possibilities for
"dislocating" tax bases internationally from their substantial economic
source (i.e., for profit shifting), because he did work in a time of less
functional integration within groups, less global capital mobility, less
(although vital) importance of intangible property, less large residual
group returns, and a less pivotal importance of passive factors such as
intangibles and risks in allocating the residual within the system Carroll
devised. Additionally, the seemingly strict concept of "comparability,"
the indeterminacy in cases where such strict comparables could not be
identified, render the report's suggestion for a transfer pricing system
addressing only a narrow class of contemporary cases, and the openness
to firm-wide allocations of costs in some instances of economically
heavily-intertwined functions, hints at a system embodied in Art. 9 that
treats arm's length as a tool for, not the goal of, allocating income.
As to (i). Volume IV of the five-volume Report that develops the allocation
system is based on the principles of "origin taxation" of business income as
established by the three different 1928 Draft conventions. Carroll
reaffirmed that "they all contain the same fundamental criterion regarding
income from an industrial or commercial enterprise-namely, that the
primary right to tax belongs to the country in which is situated the
permanent establishment which produces the income" and that thus "a
regime of allocation for business income may be based upon this general
proposition regardless of the nature of a country's tax."165 Hence, the
Report describes the "problems in allocating taxable income" in terms of the
164. See Vann, Hard-Boiled WonderWorld, supra note 13, at 321, on Carroll's firm theory
"outsourcing approach."
165. 1933 Carroll Report, supra note 159, at 172.
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specific value creation settings that industries and industry structures display
and give rise to the necessity for differentiations. In structuring his Report
Carroll, thus, wrote that:
[S]ub-classifications must be made of the articles involved, because the
relative importance of sales activities compared with manufacturing differs

greatly. Whereas the profits of enterprises selling automobiles,
typewriters and similar articles in which there is keen competition, or
branded articles which must be brought to the attention of the public
through skillful [sic] advertising, depend, to a great extent, on the sales
efforts, other articles, such as scientific instruments, are purchased
largely because of their reputation for superior quality gained through
years of careful manufacturing. There are practically no two businesses
of exactly the same type, size or organisation. Each enterprise reflects
the brain and personality of its owner or its principal officers, and the
profits depend largely on their initiative, skill and wisdom. The factors
conducing to profits vary with each enterprise. It is extremely difficult

therefore to decide on the best methods of sub-classifying industrial and
commercial enterprises in order to consider in sufficient detail methods
of allocation or apportionment applicable to them.166
Moreover, in a description of possible value creating activities a local
establishment may perform in the profit generation of the enterprise,
Carroll reasons that:
Sometimes the foreign enterprise maintains, on an important
boulevard-for example, the Champs-Elys6es in Paris, or the Board
Walk in Atlantic City-imposing displays of its products in order that
they may catch the eye of the transient visitor, who may purchase the
product from the local sales branch when he returns to his own home.
In none of these casesjust describeddoes the establishment in question make any
sales or directly realise any profit. Yet all these activities constitute items of
expense, and contribute in one way or another to the realisation of profit
somewhere by the enterprise.167

Continuing to describe the actual profit generation of the enterprise,168
Carroll assumes that The central accounting of the enterprise should
show whether or not, as a whole, the enterprise has realised a profit or
loss, and it is probable that every well-run concern maintains accounts
for the various units which will enable it to determine whether or not
each is a 'paying proposition'. The tax official in each country where
there is an establishment has at his immediate disposal only the
accounts (if any) of the local establishment, and it is necessary for him
166. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
168. See id. at 11. The use of that term is a bit surprising since Carroll uses it without
distinguishing between branches and subsidiaries, indicating that also in case of subsidiaries he
sees but one "enterprise."
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to ascertain whether or not they reflect the true profit attributable to
that establishment.169
The Report is, thus, generally cognizant of the economic processes of
value/income creation within the entirety of the enterprise and the
determination of the economic origin of income as the goal for the
allocation system, and thereby assumes an intricate interplay of functions
and the valuation of these functions from an inside perspective, and
stresses-as the Academic Experts did-the importance of internal
controlling functions to the overall profit generation.
As to (ii). Based on that, Carroll made explicit that he was devising a
narrow source concept, assuming that the formulation of "a general regime
of allocation" presupposes that the rules governing fiscal domicile have to be
"uniformly defined" and that the "concept of source be defined and strictly
limited to sources obviously within the jurisdiction of the State" which would, as he

put it, "preclude the telescopic extension of the concept of source in order to
trace profits through corporations created under the laws of another
country."170

Carroll restricted the regime he was about to propose to a concept of
source taxation that would assign taxing rights "only in respect of income
from sources clearly within [the] territory" of the respective state in order to
"avoid transgressing the jurisdiction of another state over sources of income
definitely within its territory."171 This restriction creates a theoretically
wrong juxtaposition between "separate accounting" and the "organic unity"
of an enterprise, i.e., a system of formulary apportionment,172 as if there were
only the two options of too narrow an approach and too wide an approach,
with the latter violating the basic idea of source taxation.73 Moreover, from
the perspective of the tax administration Carroll assumed that there was a
natural tendency to "view the local establishment as exercising the most
important influence in the production of [the] profits and therefore ascribe
to it a commensurate share of income."74 For Carroll, this, too, inevitably
leads to an increased risk of double taxation, as he put it a "crushing burden
upon the very commerce which other Government departments and
business groups are endeavoring to encourage"75 and made necessary a
narrow concept of allocating income to its origin.
169. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). Remarkable, too, is that Carroll uses the term "true profit" in
this context. Later in his Report, Carroll refers to "shifted profits" and "diverted profits"
describing "inaccurate" transfer pricings.
170. Id. at 169.
171. Id. at 170.
172. Id. at 187.
173. See Stanley I. Langbein, Transaction Cost, Production Cost, and Tax Transfer Pricing, TAX
NOTES, Sept. 18, 1989, at 1391 (1989), on formula apportionment as a violation of the ideas of
source taxation.
174. 1933 Carroll Report, supra note 159, at 12 (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 13.
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This narrow source concept is expressed in the case of PEs in the
preference for the "remuneration of services approach" as the "fairest and
most generally practical criterion."176 Still, Carroll saw a need to justify the
residual profit allocation to capital exporting countries this concept entails
on the basis of a theory of the relative economic value of the functional

contributions77 made by the various parts of the enterprise to the firm's value
creation. Carroll wrote that:
If we recognise the fact that the real centre of management, especially if
it is situated at the principal productive establishment, is the most vital
part of the enterprise, the most practical approach to the problem is to
give it the residuum of profit or loss after allocating to each outlying
secondary establishment compensation for the services it has rendered
to the enterprise in accordance with what would be paid to an
independent enterprise rendering such services.178
Carroll, arguing in favor of the "remuneration for services" method,
weighs the restricted profit allocation that entails for source countries with
practical considerations:
The country of processing or sale may find it advantageous, because it
receives, as a basis for its tax, remuneration for the services rendered
regardless of whether the enterprise as a whole realises a loss. On the
contrary, either country may consider its tax basis as being arbitrarily
restricted, especially if the enterprise realises a large profit, which, if
apportioned, would throw to each country a largertax basis than that of the fee
or commission charged. This objection may be outweighed by the practical
advantage of not having to ascertain what part of the net income from joint
activities is attributable to the local establishment, as well as that of

collecting a tax on the commission (percentage of gross receipts) or fee
even when the enterprise itself realises no net income. The enterprise
has the advantage of knowing definitely that it will be taxed on the same
amount it would pay to an independent enterprise for rendering it the
same services, and of not having to submit the head-office accounts in
order to effect an allocation of net income.179
As to (iii). Because Carroll saw his task as "formulation of a scientific regime

of allocation,"'so the justification for the narrow concept of source allocation
could not be portrayed as mere political expedience or necessity in avoiding/
minimizing the risk of double taxation. The narrow source concept was,
thus, additionally justified through a legalistic view on the creation of
income and value creation, which the Report deducts from the "nature of
176. Id. at 192.
177. See Vann Hard-Boiled WonderWorld, supra note 13, at 325, for critique of Carroll view on
firm valuation creation.

178. Id. at 192.
179. Id. at 168.
180. Id. at 198.
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income taxation" in general and the "separate accounting approach" in
particular. Firstly, the Report argues that "[i]n economic fact, no profit
accrues to the enterprise consisting of the producing corporation and the
selling corporation, until the goods have been sold by the selling corporation
to outsiders,"181 but that "economic fact must inevitably give way to the
definite principles and provisions of law under which business is
conducted."182 Secondly, with regard to the income allocation to subsidiaries,
a question Carroll treated as generally to be handled in the same way as
income allocation to permanent establishments but taking their specific
differences into account, the Report assumes that the "fundamental legal
difference" between the two is that subsidiaries can enter into legally binding
contracts with other "component parts. "183

On this basis, the Report airily concludes that
As the conduct of business between a corporation and its subsidiaries on
the basis of dealings with an independent enterprise obviates all
problems of allocation, it is recommended that, in principle, subsidiaries
be not regarded as permanent establishments of an enterprise but
treated as independent legal entities; and if it is shown that intercompany transactions have been carried on in such a manner as to
divert profits from a subsidiary, the diverted income should be allocated
to the subsidiary on the basis of what it would have earned had it been
dealing with an independent enterprise.184
The allocation regime Carroll, thus, seemingly infers from the possibility of
concluding legally binding contracts that the functions the entities perform
are separable enough to reliably price them completely independently by
using market comparables. In other words, contracts to Carroll seem to
have been more of an expression of separable functions than the contract in
and by itself being the actual reason to analyze and price the functions
separately. Additionally, that no comparables could be found for such
separated functions was a scenario Carroll assumed did and would rarely
occur." 5

As to (iv). Therefore, evidently, less clear was the solution to the
allocation problem especially when (i) no comparables could be found in the
subsidiary case, and (ii) in the PE case, functions were heavily intertwined with

the effect that "the income of an establishment becomes dependent upon the
outcome of its relations with other establishments or subsidiaries of the
enterprise." I6 This is a situation we today call integrated value-chains, or as
the Carroll Reports describe it, interactions between "establishments which
create, add value to, or sell a product, the profit or loss of each of which awaits the
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 176.
at 177.
at 176.
at 177.
See id. at 191 (in context of profit allocations to PEs).
Id. at 178.
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eventual sale and depends to a greater or less degree upon the efficiency of the other

establishments involved."187 While the first question remained completely
unanswered,", the Report addresses the latter question displaying its logicl89
and finding solutions that show remarkably that Carroll was much more
inclined to perceive the joint value creation of firms as decisive in allocating
profits globally.190 This may be exemplified with regard to R&D functions:
When income is derived from the purchase of goods in one country and
their sale in another, or from the production, processing or
manufacture of goods in one country and their sale in another, the
theories under different systems of law conflict as to whether the place
of sale is the exclusive source of income or whether the other country in
which the goods have been bought or produced or their value increasedis
likewise to be considered as a source and, if so, how much of the total income
derived from the transaction should be ascribed to each. The problem is

complicated further when an enterprise has establishments which do
not produce or sell goods, but which contribute indirectly to the
creation or sale thereof-for example, research establishments, statistical
bureaux and display rooms. Moreover, no income may be actually received or
realised at the real centre of management, yet the financial management, the
determinationofpolicies and possibly the technical management are carriedout
there, and have a direct influence on the realisation of profits at the various
establishments.191
Research and Statistical Bureaux, Display Rooms, etc.-Large enterprises

often maintain establishments which do not produce, add value to, or
sell goods, or sell services and therefore contribute only indirectly to
the realisation of profits. For example, an enterprise may maintain a
187. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
188. See Stanley S. Surrey, Reflections on the Allocation ofIncome and Expenses Among National Tax
Jurisdictions, 10 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 409, 460 (1978).
189. Carroll poses questions that display how close to the idea of installing a "source" tax
geared to economic "value creation." He approached this by stating that:
In this connection, it is necessary to consider, inter alia, (a) where and when the
income actually arises or accrues to the enterprise as a whole; (b) which types of
establishments should be considered as productive of such income; (c) how is the
expense of the unproductive establishments to be absorbed; (d) if a productive
establishment in one country transfers goods to an establishment in another
country, should a taxable profit be said. to accrue to the first establishment,
regardless of whether the enterprise subsequently realises a loss; (e) should the net
profit of one establishment be set off against the net loss of the enterprise, and vice
versa; and (f) how is the profit of each establishment to be determined?
1933 Carroll Report, supra note 159, at 79.
190. The hierarchy of methods for business functions that warrant a "separate remuneration"
but are not solvable by reference to "uncontrolled prices" are described in the discussion of the
1943/46 Drafts below. See T II-C-2 infra.
191. Id. at 178-79.
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research establishment which develops new inventions or processes or
methods of production, which some day may or may not be used. They
work exclusively for the enterprise, and in themselves represent only
expense to the enterprise. The invention perfected in a given year may
represent years of effort, and more years may elapse before the article is
placed on the market, or the machine is installed in the factory, or the
process introduced. The value of the machine or the process, if successful,
may be difficult to measure in terms of income. It may prove valueless and

be scrapped almost at once. If the new invention sells, the results are
reflected at the sales establishments. It hardly seemsfeasible to ascribe any
profit to a research establishment, but its cost should be included in overhead
and distributed in some appropriatemanner. If a research establishment

renders services to outsiders for which it receives compensation, such
income should of course be taxable in the country of such
establishment.
What has been said of research establishments applies equally well to
offices that are sometimes installed in a central city for the purpose of
gathering statistics on the production or consumption of competing
articles, or probable sales in the local or neighbouring markets.
Obviously such an establishment is in itself only an item of expense, and
its services can hardly be evaluated in terms of income. If its services
are effectual, the results are shown at the sales establishments of the
enterprise. Sometimes manufacturers of automobiles, aeroplanes or
other products maintain displays on well-known avenues or at muchfrequented resorts, which merely display the products and possibly
distribute literature concerning them, but do not affect any sales or take
any orders. The interested passer-by either purchases from some local
sales establishment or at the selling establishment in his own country.
Such an establishment should therefore be regarded as only an item of
expense, and no profit should be ascribed to it. The effectiveness of the
display will be reflected in the sales within the same country or in the
other countries in which the traveller purchases the product. For all
such establishments, the rule should be that in principle no profit will be
ascribed to them but that their expense shall be included in the general
overhead of the enterprise which is apportionablein some appropriatemanner.
It is argued by some administrations that the same compensation should be
ascribed to such establishments as would be paid to an independent enterprise
rendering similar services. Such establishments are so closely tied up with the
enterprise, however, that it would be almost impossible to find an independent
enterprise which would serve as a basis of comparison. No exception to the
generalrule should therefore be made, unless the establishment actually renders
services to outsidersfor which compensation is received, or renders services to
the enterprisewhich have a determinable money value.192

192. Id. at 181-81.
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As to (v). As a general matter of concern, the Carroll Report introduces
into the global discourse the dichotomy between the "two underlying
theories of taxing foreign enterprises" that he saw.1 93 On the one hand,
there was the theory that "the local establishments should be taxed on the
basis of separate accounts and treated in so far as possible as if they were
independent enterprises."194 On the other hand, there was the idea that "the
enterprise is an organic unity and, consequently, the tax should be assessed
on that part of the enterprise's total net income (computed in accordance
with the law of the taxing country) which corresponds to the relative economic
importance of the local establishment."195 While on the surface only "fractional

apportionment" was geared to capture the internal value of functions
performed, the hierarchy of possible transfer pricing methods implicit in the
separate accounting method (which found its way into the 1943/46 London/
Mexico Models) in effect ensured that outcomes could not be completely
divorced from the economic value of the contributions to the firm.
As to (vi). In addition to that, and lastly, in arguing against fractional
apportionment, Carroll raised some convincing arguments but overlooked
or withheld that they were not equally convincing when employed to justify
his narrow view on separate accounting:
When the problem of taxing a foreign enterprise is viewed from the
general principle that a State has jurisdiction only over persons within,
property situated within, or transactions effected within its territory, it is

obvious that, if the taxpayer resides in a foreign country, the State's
jurisdiction over its income should be restricted to income from
property or other source within its territory. The principle of
permitting only the country of fiscal domicile to tax the total net income of
the taxpayer is so generally accepted that it would appear inconsistent to
incorporate in the regime a provision permitting any country in which
the enterprise has a branch establishment to take jurisdiction over the
total net income in order to determine what part thereof might be
attributable to the local establishment.196
Carroll slightly theatrically added:
Various Governments which apply the method of fractional
apportionment maintain that the total net income shall be computed in
accordance with their own legislation, even though only a very small
part thereof may be attributed to the local branch. This involves not
only determining gross income from sources in one or more foreign
countries, but also allowances for business expenses, bad debts,
depreciation, losses and other allowable deductions. Assuming that the
administration in question endeavored to make as accurate a
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 187.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 187-88 (emphasis added).
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computation of income as possible, how would it verify the claims for
deductions in respect of these items which pertain to establishments situated in
other countriesperhaps beyond the seas or on the other side of the world? Its

determination under its own law of income clearly arising in other
countries would usually be different from the amount determined under
such other countries' own laws. Perhaps many establishments of a large
foreign enterprise have no direct or even an indirect relationship to the
establishment within the taxing State. How then can its administration

demand information concerning income and related deductions derived
from sources which are obviously beyond their jurisdiction?197
Summary. The 1933 Report starts with confirming the origin of income
principle as the decisive idea behind devising an allocation system.1 98 In
making this theory operative, however, the Report sneaks away from this
intent and establishes a system that perceives value creation in a narrow
legalistic way in order to keep source taxation at a minimum.199 This means
that value creation-even if inherent in the theory of economic allegiancedid not in a pure way find its way into the operative system as Carroll
concocted. Nevertheless, his system does not abrogate but argues with the idea
that outcomes shall be aligned with value creation, even if his view on firm value

creation is disputable. The restrictions he introduces on establishing a
system true to value creation are largely practical or based on an overplayed
antinomy of separate accounting and unitary taxation. Furthermore, his
Report is not stringent in employing the one-sided "remuneration of
services method" that treats every outsourced function as economically
auxiliary in nature. 200 This system, too, placed little emphasis on contractual
allocations as a basis for constructing the internal transactions to be tested
for the correspondence of their pricing to that taking place among
independent enterprises.
Taken together, this means that his system as embodied in the proposed
1935 multilateral convention (which was never adopted)201 addressed only a
narrow class of possible transfer pricing cases which are solved by employing
a narrow and simplified theory of value creation. Still, value creation is at
the core of his arguments and goals, as is evident in the 1943/46 Model
Treaties, which were based on the Carroll Report.202 In sum, then, the arm's
length system he devised was, at its core, faithful to the concepts of
economic allegiance (and its equivalent, value creation), although it
narrowed the concept in questionable ways. Later developments, purported
based upon and faithful to Carroll's concepts, would entail further deviation
from the fundamental idea.
197. Id. at 188.
198. Id. at 28.
199. Id. at 181.
200. See Vann Hard-Boiled WonderWorld, supra note 13, at 321.
201. See Mitchell B. Carroll, InternationalTax Law: Benefits for American Investors and Enterprises
Abroad, 4 INT'L L. 558, 705-706 (1971).
202. Id. at 558, 705-706.
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Synthesis of Diverging Approaches: The 1943/46 Model Treaties

As noted, the 1935 multilateral convention drafted by Carroll was never
formally adopted,203 but its provisions became part of the 1943 Mexico and
1946 London Model Conventions,204 the intermediate precursors to the
modern UN and OECD Models, respectively.205 The 1940s Models, on the
one hand, reconfirm the basic idea that actual economic contributions to the
"production of income" by the enterprise ("value creation") is the reason and
justification for taxing international business profits at source. The
adherence to the idea of economic allegiance which is implicit in the
classification and assignment approach is expressed best in the discussion of
whether purchasing establishments should be recognized as PEs and, thus,
give rise to sharing in the profits of the enterprise of which the activity is
part. The Model Commentary pertaining to the Conventions reasons that:
From a general point of view, it is sometimes argued that, when goods
are bought in a country, the profits should be divided between the two
functions of purchase and sale just as they are divided between
manufacture and sale. It is added that to exempt purchasing
establishments of foreign enterprises would constitute a discrimination
against domestic exporters. On the other hand, it has been pointed out
that the act of purchasing in itself yields no profits. Indeed, unlike
producing, converting, processing, manufacturing, sorting, preserving,
assembling, packing and transporting, a purchase adds no value to the thing
bought. Consequently, it seems that the taxation of a so called purchasing
profit by the country where the purchasing establishment is situated, except

perhaps when income is attributed to a purchasing establishment on a
commission basis-i.e., as if that establishment were an independent
agent working for a foreign firm-would give an extraterritorialscope to its

income

2 06

tax.

On the other hand, while both model treaties set out a scheme said to be
ultimately aimed at "a fair allocation of income"207 of PEs, they are
principally based upon the fundamental procedure2os Of separate accounting,
and expressly embrace a rather narrow concept of source taxation of business
profits. Nonetheless, neither Model Convention excluded hypothetical,
(unlimited or limited) formulaic methods and unspecified approaches as
203. See Vann Hard-Boiled WonderWorld at 322, arguing that "the reason is likely to have been
debate over whether Carroll's outsourcing approach was correct."
204. See Carroll, supra note 159, at 558, 561, 563.
205. Id. at. 558, 561.
206. League of Nations, London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions-Commentary and Text,
League of Nations Document C.88.M.88.1946.11.A. (November 1946), reprinted in
Conventions Legislative History, at 4319-4437, at 15 (4335) [hereinafter London/Mexico
Models and Commentary].
207. See London/Mexican Models and Commentary at 82 (4402), 83 (4403) [Conventions
Protocol Art. VI, T 5].
208. See London/Mexico Models and Commentary at 18 (4338).
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secondary methods for all transactions if separate accounting was infeasible or
did "not result in a fair allocation of income," and installed apportionment as the
primary methodfor "items of expenses that must necessarily be apportioned."209 As

is the case with the Carroll Report, these Model Conventions did not specify
how profit shall be allocated between associated enterprises-possibly
assuming that the contractual basis of the transactions will allow for a
comparability analysis and thus application of a one-sided method-but treat
the question of profit attribution to PEs as relatively extensive, and relatively
pragmatic.
The allocation scheme rested in a first step on the exclusion of subsidiary
enterprises from the PE-definition, a concept which had already prevailed
since the 1928 Draft Convention. The purpose of excluding subsidiaries
from the PE-definition (art. V para. 8 of respective Protocol210) was said to
be (i) to negate entitlement of the state where the subsidiary is situated "to
tax the parent company" except on dividends it may receive; and (ii) to bar
the country where the parent is located from taking into account "the actual
profits made by the subsidiary."211 While this exclusion may be seen as
failure to internationalize the German Filialtheorie,212the commentary makes
no reference to any economic theory but references only the legal
separateness as causal "therefore"213 for the separate taxation. The system
for verifying "the correctness of the mutual relations between the parent and
the subsidiary companies" was indicated in art. VII of the protocol to the
1943/1946 Conventions,214 was taken almost verbatim from art. V of the
1935 Draft Convention.215 With regard to the profits to be attributed to
permanent establishments, art. IV and art. VI of the Protocol established a
system that was devised to ascertain that source state taxation "cannot exceed
the earnings that are the direct result of the activities of the establishment
concerned or the yield of the assets pertaining to it."216
209. See London/Mexico Models and Commentary at 21 (4341).
210. The fact that a parent company, the fiscal domicile of which is one of the contracting
States, has a subsidiary in the other State does not mean that the parent company has a
permanent establishment in that State, regardless of the fiscal obligations of the subsidiary
toward the State in which it is situated.
London/Mexico Models and Commentary at 76 (4396), 77 (4397) [Conventions Protocol Art.
V, q 8].
211. London/Mexico Models and Commentary at 17 (4337).
212. See Jens Wittendorff, Transfer Pricing and the Arm's Length Principle in InternationalTax
Law, (2010).
213. London/Mexico Models and Commentary at 17 (4337).
214. See London/Mexico Models and Commentary at 82 (4402), 83 (4403) [Conventions
Protocol Art. VII].
215. Fiscal Committee-Report to the Council on the Work of the Committee-Fourth
Session, League of Nations Document No. C.399.M.204.1933.II (June 26, 1933) at 2, 3-7,
reprintedin Conventions Legislative History, at 4245 [Draft Conventions T 5]. Conditions that
would have "been made" between independent enterprises (1935) was changed to conditions
that would have so "existed" (1943/46). The full text of the Protocol article is quoted at note
171 infra.
216. London/Mexico Models and Commentary at 4337-38.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
20181

THE OECD/G20-BEPS-PROJECT

307

The method of "separate accounting" was understood to have the
"intended result that each establishment or branch is taxed as if it constituted
a distinct independent enterprise and the profits of the establishment are
assessed independently of the results of the business done elsewhere by the
enterprise to which it belongs." Thereby, the model commentary is explicit
on the purposes the use of the "separate accounting" method as the
"fundamental procedure" should serve. It states that:
[F]irst, by treating a branch establishment not as part of an enterprise
but as a self-contained unit and thus generally avoiding reference to
results or data outside the country concerned, it gives the taxation of
branch establishments a strictly territorial scope not extending beyond the
boundaries of the countries concerned; secondly, the method helps to

enforce the principle of equality of treatment of foreigners by placing,
in principle, branches of foreign enterprises on the same footing as
similar establishments of domestic enterprises as regards the
computation of receipts and expenses, which, once they have been
allocated or apportioned by separate accounting, are to be treated in
accordance with the tax laws of the country to which they have been
attributed; thirdly, the use of separate accounting as a basis for the
assessment of income tax conforms to the usual practice among
concerns engaged in international business of keeping separate accounts
for each of their establishments; finally, separate accounting serves the
revenue interests of the country concerned, because, when it is properly
applied and supervised, it prevents the concealment of profits or their
diversion from one country to another.217
The Protocol to both Conventions contained a hierarchy of methods to
make the "separate accounting" procedure operable. The primary method
was to attribute to each PE the "net business income which it might be
expected to derive if it were an independent enterprise engaged in the same
or similar activities under the same or similar conditions."218 Such net
income, in principle, should have been determined on the basis of the
separate accounts pertaining to such establishment (Art. VI para. 1, lit. A of
respective Protocols).219 The commentary did not specify if that method
was-in terms of the Carroll Report-to be a "remuneration for services" or
a "sale between independents" like approach or both and, if so, in which
order. "If an establishment did not produce an accounting showing its own
operations, or if the accounting produced does not correspond to the normal
usages of the trade in the country where the establishment is situated, or if
the rectificationsprovided for in the preceding section cannot be effected, or if the

taxpayer agrees, the fiscal authorities may determine, in a presumptive
manner, the business income by applying a percentage to the gross receipts
217. Id. at 4338-39 (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 4338.
219. Id. at 4398.
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of that establishment."220 This percentage was to be fixed in accordance with
the nature of the transactions in which the establishment is engaged and by
comparison with the results obtained by similar enterprises operating in the
country (Art. VI T 1, lit. C of respective Protocol).221
This meant that in cases where uncontrolled prices could not be
determined, the application of "separate accounting," in a narrow sense,
collapsed. "If the methods of determination described in the preceding
sections are found to be inapplicable, the net business income of the
permanent establishment may be determined by a computation based on the
total income derived by the enterprise from the activities in which such
establishment has participated" (Art. VI para. 1, lit. D of respective
Protocol).222 This was considered typical for situations in which functions
were economically integrated and, thus, incomparable to market transactions
that a "comparison with the results obtained by similar enterprises operating
in that country" was not possible. With regard to the apportionment the
commentary, exposing its "value creation" foundation, specified that:
[A] situation [where apportionment of income will be necessary] arises
when a comparison between the nature of the activities and the
conditions of operation of the establishment of the foreign enterprise
cannot be made with those of full- fledged domestic enterprises. It is
provided that, in this case, the method of fractional apportionment may
be applied. Under this method, the earnings of each establishment are
computed as a proportion of the entire profits of the enterprise to
which the establishment belongs, on the basis of the general balance
sheet and profit-and-loss account of the enterprise. Such fractional
apportionment may be unlimited or limited. In the first case, it takes as
its starting-point the total income derived by the enterprise as a whole
from all sources. In the second case, reference is made only to that part
of the total profits of the enterprise which is derived from transactions
in which a part has been taken by the establishment whose share in the
total profits is to be determined. It is to this second form of fractional
apportionment that recourse may be had according to the Protocol.
The share of the total profits from joint transactions that is attributable
to the establishment concerned is to be determined by dividing these
profits according to the ratio that exists between certain factors
pertaining to the establishment concerned and the total of the same
factors for the entire enterprise.223
Furthermore, in cases where the foregoing rules-i.e., including (limited or
unlimited) fractional apportionment-did not result in a "fair allocation" of
income, the competent authorities could even consult to agree upon any
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
London/Mexico Models supra note 206, at 4398.
Id.
Id. at 4340.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2018]

THE OECD/G20-BEPS-PROJECT

309

method that will prevent double taxation (Art. VI para. 5 of respective
Protocol).224

Less clear was the allocation "procedure" in cases of legally-separate but
controlled-subsidiary enterprises, apart from their separate taxation. Article
VII of the Protocol to both Conventions-like their successor-norm Article
9 of the OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions-stated without further
explanation225 that:

When an enterprise of one contracting State has a dominant
participation in the management or capital of an enterprise of another
contracting State, or when both enterprises are owned or controlled by
the same interests, and, as the result of such situation, there exist in
their commercial or financial relations conditions different from those
which would have existed between independent enterprises, any item of
profit or loss which should normally have appeared in the accounts of
one enterprise, but which has been, in this manner, diverted to the
other enterprise, shall be entered in the accounts of such former
enterprise, subject to the rights of appeal allowed under the laws of the
State of such enterprise.226

Overall, the combined Commentary to the 1943 Mexico and the 1946
London Model Conventions-which became the blue-print for the OECD's
Model of 1963-displays the synthesis of the diverging approaches, taxation
at the "origin" of business income according to the internal relevance in
"value creation," and a scheme to make this idea operative that is based on a
narrow "source" concept that gives primacy to a "production cost" logic of
income allocation. But unlike later efforts, this system did not assume
"separate accounting" as the sole applicable method, but had a potentially
wide scope of application when CUPs or comparable "gross receipts" were
not identifiable or simply did "not result in a fair allocation of income."227
Most importantly, when a comparison between the "nature of the activities
and the conditions of operation of the establishment of the foreign
enterprise cannot be made with those of full-fledged domestic enterprises"
was not possible, the Commentary to both Conventions saw limited (i.e.,
transactional profit splits) or unlimited fractional apportionment as
appropriate methods.228 This methodology, although very elastic and
dependent upon the standards of "comparison" and how the "nature of
224. Id. at 4402.
225. Notoriously, the early OECD Commentaries found this Article so "evidently appropriate"
that it "seems to call for very little comment;" cf 1963 Commentary at 93, and 1977
Commentary at 88. Contrary to that, the German Federal Government in 1987 still saw "the
consensus on the actual application of the 'arm's length principle' [as] extremely vague and
precarious,"
cf Reservation to the OECD Thin Capitalisation Report (1987), 36, fn. 2.
226. See London/Mexico Models and Commentary, at 4402-03 [Conventions Protocol Art.

VII].
227. Id.
228. Id. at 4340.
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activities" would be interpreted, as well as the fallback methodology for a
"fair allocation," gave the origin/output logic of business taxation potentially
the most direct expression at any point in the evolution of transfer pricing
standards. And it is important to emphasize that the provisions of the
London/Mexico Models, the accompanying Protocols, and the Commentary
all received official League sanction and found their way into enforced
bilateral conventions in the ensuing era; in contrast to the Carroll Report,
which, with its narrow conception of source and near idiosyncratic theory of
value creation, was already a merely advisory document.
Efforts to decrease the weight of this origin/output logic is also potentially
inherent in the system underlying the wording of Art. VII of the Protocol
that later became Article 9 of the OECD and UN Models. Through
interpreting the treaty article as demanding the application of the "onesided" methods that do not need close actual comparables and that create
unallocated residual returns, started to emerge in the United States in the
1960s when the application of the primary CUP method increasingly
collapsed amidst changed economic and geopolitical circumstances.
III. Background and Validity of the Paradigm: The Era of the
United States Regulations (1962-1995)

A.

THE UNITED STATES REGULATIONS OF THE

1960s

Through the end of World War II, the principles of an international tax
"order," including the conceptions of transfer pricing, originated with the
League. After the war, as the London/Mexico Models signaled, the work
would proceed down two diverging roads taken by different international
organisations. Conventions among European "developed" countries would
be the work of a new organisation, the Organisation for European Economic
Co-operation (OEEC); those between developed and developing countries
of the United Nations

(UN).229

But in the postwar period, the international economy was undergoing
substantial change, the most salient feature of which was the dominant role
of the United States, which at the end of the war accounted for as much as
40 percent of the world gross domestic product. A signal feature of this
period was the international expansion of the TNE, particularly those based
in the United States. In previous times, most international expansion by
integrated groups involved backward vertical integration, principally
involving natural resource industries; the home country would own suppliers
involved in extractive or agricultural activities, principally in smaller, less
developed nations. The new American TNE, by contrast, involved forward
integration and often horizontal integration. The companies established
markets in foreign locations, and instead of exporting through local
distributors, would establish their own controlled distribution operations in
229. See generally Mitchell B. Carroll, InternationalTax Law: Benefits for American Investors and
EnterprisesAbroad, 4 Int'l L. 558 (1971).
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separately or locally incorporated bodies; and often they would establish fullfledged production operations, ordinarily separately incorporated, in the
foreign markets.
Under such circumstances, the OEEC expanded in 1961 to include the
developed economies of North America (Canada and the United States) and
the Pacific region (Japan, Australia, and New Zealand), and became the
OECD. The OECD revised the London Model, the first revision of the
postwar-era, in 1963. But as to the transfer pricing matter, the significant
work of the 1960s was unilaterally accomplished by the United States. The
manner in which the innovations of the period interact with the fundamental
principles descended from the 1920s-question of residence based taxation,
source based taxation, and "classification and assignment"-are best
understood in the context of more general economic difficulties confronted
by the United States during this period. These problems, and the policy
responses to them, were in important senses unique.
The immediate postwar period outside the United States was
characterized by circumstances that frequently posed serious threats to
private capital investment: the European colonial empires were in the
process of being dismantled, leading to the independence and emergence of
new nations; the Soviet Union, encouraged by the Yalta Conference,
imposed socialist systems on its Eastern European neighbors, and socialist or
communist movements took power in numerous places in this emerging
world, most notably in China; and postwar devastation throughout Europe
and Asia made capital formation difficult. In these circumstances, the
United States became a beacon, or haven, of free enterprise stability, and
foreign investors had substantial incentive to invest in the United States. At
the same time, United States enterprise found substantial opportunity for
investing in active business outside the United States. The result was that
the United States became a substantial importer of "portfolio" investment
capital,230 and a great exporter of "direct" investment capital. But the export
amounts consistently exceeded the import amounts, so that the United
States was a net capital exporter.
Beginning in the mid-1950s, the United States began running a balance of
trade deficit, importing more goods and services than it exported. This
condition has since persisted for the six-plus decades. Ordinarily, a nation in
a net-import trade position is also in a net-import capital position:
borrowing is necessary to sustain the trade deficit. But, the United States
was in the unusual position of running a balance of trade deficit concurrently
with running a surplus in its capital account. These circumstances were
made possible only because the dollar had become an international reserve
currency, which gave the United States what Charles de Gaulle would call
the "exorbitant privilege" of importing while still investing abroad in a
period of fixed exchange rates. Notwithstanding this privilege, however, the
230. See HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 90th Cong. 79-81, 84-86, 93-94
(1964) (testimony of Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury).
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United States' balance of payment deficits steadily grew, and, despite the
international standing of the dollar, led to a drain on the gold reserves,
which by the mid-1960s became quite threatening.231
Prior to this development, United States administrations viewed the
expansion of United States TNEs as a positive development from the
standpoint of United States foreign policy.232
The Eisenhower
Administration had, in keeping with this policy, advocated to reduce the rate
of tax on the foreign earnings of the United States TNEs. When the
Kennedy Administration came to power in 1961, it had quite different views,
in part because it held "center-left" viewpoints more sympathetic to labor,
and partly because of the increasing seriousness of the balance of payments
problem. The balance of payments problem could have been mitigated by
allowing domestic interest rates to rise in relation to foreign (primarily
European) interest rates. The Administration opposed such an approach
because rising rates could impede domestic growth and employment.233 The
administration was, thus, committed to keep domestic interest rates low in
relation to foreign rates-and the rates in question were after-tax rates. The
corresponding tax policy would be to tighten or raise the taxation of the
foreign income of United States persons (exported capital), and to relieve or
lower the taxation of the United States income of foreign persons (imported
capital). This is what the administration-sponsored legislation of the period
did: the Revenue Act of 1962234 enacted the "controlled foreign corporation"
provisions and its legislative history mandated revision of the transfer pricing
rules; the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966235 eliminated most of the "force
of attraction" aspects of the taxation of foreign-owned United States
businesses and reduced United States taxation of "inbound" investment.236

And this policy, translated into theory, exhibited an emphasis on residence
basis taxation generally, and de-emphasis of source basis taxation, as a general
matter (whether with respect to passive or active income).
The Johnson Administration proposed its new transfer pricing regulations
in 1965237 and 1966,238 and finalized them in 1968239 and 1969.240 The
231. See id. 79 - 81.
232. See generally Robert Gilpin, U.S.

POWER AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION:

POLITICAL ECONOMY oF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,

THE

115 (1975).

233. See, e.g., President's Special Message on the Balance of Payments I (July 18, 1963),
reprintedin House Comm. on Ways and Means, Legislative History ofH.R. 8000, 88th Cong. (1966),
quoted at Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth ofArm's Length, TAx NOTES,
625, 644 n.183 (1986).
234. See generally Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (1962).
235. See generally Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1555 (1966).
236. In this period of the ascendancy of "Keynesian" economics, the Administration's solution
to the balance of payments problem was through direct capital controls. The Congress enacted
the Interest Equalization Tax Act of 1964 to limit outflows of portfolio capital, and later, the
Johnson Administration imposed controls of foreign direct investment in 1968.
237. Allocation of Income and Deductions Among Taxpayers, 30 Fed. Reg. 4256 (proposed
Apr. 1, 1965).

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2018]

THE OECD/G20-BEPS-PROJECT

313

regulations were a radical departure from prior practice in a number of
respects.
First, the Carroll Report and the London/Mexico commentary seemed to
contemplate using "comparable" prices in circumstances where there was an
actual, tangible transaction, usually of an "intermediate" or semi-finished
good, between components of an integrated enterprise in different
countries. 24 1 For instance, a company extracting crude oil in an oilproducing country might be selling the crude to its parent in a developed
country, or an integrated petroleum company might sell refined product to
an entity where petroleum products are marketed either to be further
refined into gasoline or sold at retail. The new regulations went further and
required the "construction" of transactions among the enterprises where no
actual transaction took place.242 Thus, if a soft drink company were selling a
product to a bottling subsidiary, the transaction was not just the sale of
syrup, but also might entail a "license" of the formula for the product, and
possibly also a licensing of a trademark associated with the product. This
was not contemplated in the materials generated by the League.
Second, the regulations had separate rules for five categories of
transactions-loans, provision of services, leasing of tangible property,
licensing and transfer of intangible property, and transfers of tangible
property-which were novel categories, not mentioned as such in the work
of the League or prior documentation.243
Third, and most important, the regulations introduced a determinate
hierarchy of "methods" for "pricing" transfers of tangible property within
what, until then, had been the uniform yet rather vague category of
"separate accounting."244 These were the comparable uncontrolled, resale
price, and cost-plus methods. They were to be used in that order, and if
238. Allocation of Income and Deductions Among Taxpayers; Determination of Sources of
Income, 31 Fed. Reg. 10394 (proposed Aug. 2, 1966).
239. Allocation of Income and Deductions Among Taxpayers, 33 Fed. Reg. 5848 (Proposed
Apr. 16, 1968).
240. Allocation of Income and Deductions Among Taxpayers, 34 Fed. Reg 933 (proposed Jan.
22, 1969).
241. 1933 Carroll Report, at 177, 191-92.
242. 33 Fed. Reg. 5848.
243. The 1933 Carroll Report's discussion of the appropriate "methods of allocation" was
structured along broader functional categories of the entities under review and industry sectors;
these were: Industrial and Mercantile Enterprises (Selling Establishments, Local Establishments
selling abroad, Producing Establishments, Processing Establishments, Assembly Plants, Buying
Establishments, Establishments buying and processing, Research and Statistical Bureaux,
Display Rooms, etc., Warehouses, Real Centre of Management); Banking and Financial
Enterprises; Insurance Enterprises; Transport Enterprises; Power, Light and Gas Enterprises;
Telegraph, Telephone, Radio and Cable Enterprises; Mining and Agricultural Enterprises;
Other Kinds of Enterprises. See 1933 Carroll Report, Vol. IV, Chapter XII, 177-78.
244. The 1933 Carroll Report contained some rather disorderly deliberations on "methods of
allocation" pertaining to the categories he structured whereby Carroll mashed up the functional
analysis and the application of the transfer pricing methods he labeled as effecting "separate
accounting." See 1933 Carroll Report, Vol. IV, Chapter XII, 187-90.
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they all failed, a fourth, unspecified "other" methods could be used. The
second and third of these methods, resale price and cost-plus, were what
would come to be called "unilateral" or "one-sided" methods (or "singlecomponent" methods) because they were based on examining data from only
one component of the integrated group.
These methods, though they had no explicit antecedents in the League
work, had a certain primitive logic behind them. One first looked for
"comparable" uncontrolled prices. If these could be found, one used them,
as they could with, for instance, readily traded commodities: if an integrated
oil company was paying a producing arm a price in excess of readily
determinable prevailing market prices for crude, the parent was "shifting"
profits to the producing company, and an adjustment should be made.
Under the new regulations, if such prices could not be found, one should
look severally at the various components and ask: "What is the marginal
price that would induce this party, if it were a separate enterprise, to enter
the transaction?"245 This the new methods essayed to do.
These new methods, however, created the basis for concentrating the
residual profit in a single component of the enterprise at will. If the "onesided" method allocated only a "marginal" profit to the component which
was examined (the buyer-reseller in the case of resale price, the intra-group
seller in the case of cost plus), then the residual would principally be
allocated to the other party of the intra-group transaction. The 1960s
regulations, thus, created occasion for the concentration of the residual in
one other important respect, which prefigured the difficulties encountered
in this century at the heart of the "negative" justification for the "value
creation." With respect to intangible property developed by a group, the
regulations provided that the cost-bearing member of the group would be
deemed to be the "developer" of the property, and other members
participating in the development, and acquiring an interest in the intangible
on account of that participation, would be treated as routine "assisters." The
regulations provided that "no allocation with respect to such development
activity shall be made .

.

. until such time as any property developed, or any

interest therein, is transferred, sold, assigned, loaned or otherwise made
available in any manner by the developer to a related entity in a transfer"
subject to the regulations.246
Accompanying this concept was a provision of the regulations providing
for "cost sharing" agreements which effectively means sharing the
"developer" functions and consequently the tax transfer pricing "ownership"
of any resulting intangibles. A cost sharing agreement was defined as a
written agreement among the members of the group to share the "costs and
risks" of developing intangible property "in return for a specified interest in
any intangible property to be produced."247 If the costs and risks were
245. 33 Fed. Reg. 5848.
246. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2A(d)(1)(ii).
247. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2A(d)(4).
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shared on an "arm's length basis," there was to be no adjustment to reflect
the transfer of any interest to any member of the group (and no single party
was deemed to be the "developer" or "reseller"). The proposed regulations
issued in 1966 set forth articulate provisions governing such arrangements,
focused upon the manner in which "costs and risks" were to be shared.248
The final regulations eliminated most of these specific provisions, but
retained the provision permitting taxpayers to enter such agreements.
The approach of the regulations, though as noted reflected a primitive
logic, nevertheless represented a meaningful departure from the Carroll
Report and from prior treatments of the subject with respect to "residual"
profits. In the 1930s and 1940s, the contemplation was that the residual
profits would necessarily, if not automatically, be assigned to the "parent"
enterprise, on the theory that those profits were in some sense "produced"
by central corporate management. In the 1960s regulations, this was no
longer the case. If one took the one-sided methods seriously, and if there
were residual profits, the residuals would be assigned to whichever
component of the enterprise was not examined to determine the transfer
price, or, if one used a "fourth" method, they might be divided. Similarly, if
one enforced the "developer-assister" seriously, the profits would be
assigned to whichever component was determined to be the "developer" of
the intangible, which matter was not foreordained by any idea reflected by
the regulations, and which might be determined differently with respect to
different intangibles and different development projects. And if one used a
cost-sharing approach, the taxpayer could play a significant role in
determining ab initio how the residual would be divided and assigned.
This movement in the interpretation of the "separate enterprise" standard
is slightly paradoxical, in that it is a movement away from an ideal based on
the primacy of residence, but it was achieved as part of an effort to strengthen
residence basis taxation, and in an era that extolled the principle of residence
as the juridical touchstone of international taxation (and correspondingly
exalted "capital export neutrality" as its theoretical or economic touchstone).
But for our contemporary perspective, the shift was meaningful in a more
important respect. For although the Carroll position in some sense
undermined or backtracked on the "classification and assignment" approach,
according primacy to the source with respect to business profits, it did so in
a manner that reaffirmed the role of value creation in the formulation of
rules. This is because the justification for assigning the residual to the
parent was the assumed economic role of the parent in producing the residual

profit. The modification effected by the 1968 regulations-leaving the
residual indefinitely assigned, to be determined by essentially a discretionary
process-represented a redefinition of the "value creation" notions embedded in

the original system as developed by the League and expressed in Art. 9 of the
1963 OECD Model Tax Convention because the U.S. regulations
248. Allocation of Income and Deductions Among Taxpayers; Determination of Sources of
Income, 31 Fed. Reg. 10, 394 (proposed Aug. 2, 1966).
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emphasized the ownership of passive "entrepreneurial" assets and risks
rather than the performance of active "entrepreneurial" (managerial)
business functions. This move, it can be said, created the secondparadox of the

new regulations: while in an open market transaction the residual return may
generally accrue to the legal owner of non-routine intangibles, the
application of this market logic to controlled transactions rendered the
system only more arbitrary and less able to capture the true contributions to
the firm's value creation and coherently assign taxing rights to the
jurisdictions involved.
B.

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE 1960s RULES: THE 1979

OECD

GUIDELINES

The mid-1960s Treasury regulations eventually had a poor record of
success, and had many, now widely recognized failings. But those regulations
had teeth: they tightened tax enforcement. For one thing, the Treasury
made them retroactive-they were, after all, "interpretive" regulations,
another circumstance that gave rise to confusion about the real novelty of
their provisions. By 1971, United States businesses successfully lobbied the
new Nixon Administration to adopt the so-called Domestic International
Sales Corporation (DISC) provisions, a tax-based export subsidy that was
ultimately declared to violate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). But much of the impetus behind the DISC provisions was the
impact of Subpart F and the new regulations, which businesses felt it hurt
the competitive position of United States-based companies.
The fate of these regulations, like their background, needs to be
understood in light of more general economic developments and policies,
especially the outcome of the United States' balance of payments
conundrum. In the first place, whatever their ultimate implications, there is
little doubt that the most immediate effect of the regulations was on the
"outbound" situations, that is, on the foreign profits of United States TNEs.
The regulations were made retroactive, and the Internal Revenue Service
began examining years of the corporations from the late 1950s, on the basis
of the provisions of the regulations, even before the regulations were final.
On August 15, 1971, President Nixon announced his "New Economic
Policy." This policy involved abrogation of the Bretton Woods Agreement
providing for fixed exchange rates. A new international system of flexible or
floating exchange rates would be established. Also in connection with this
policy, the United States would adopt the "domestic international sales
corporation" (DISC) proposals, deferring 50 percent of United States
income taxes on export transactions.
The abrupt abrogation of the Bretton Woods system was an international
shock, and its merits have been widely debated. But it did resolve the longstanding United States balance of payments problem; the interest
equalization tax and direct investment controls were ended by 1974. The
original motivation for the 1960s transfer pricing reforms were, thus,
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eliminated. But those rules soon developed a life of their own. As detailed
elsewhere, Professor Stanley Surrey, who had been the Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Tax Policy in the Kennedy-Johnson Administration,
spearheaded an "export campaign" to promote the new rules as an
international "arm's length" standard.249 Both United States and foreign
TNEs launched a spirited effort to eliminate the use of formula
apportionment by the states of the United States, arguing that that use
interfered with the power of the United States to conduct foreign policy
with the "one voice" of the Federal Government.250 When three European
states complained that the United States' DISC initiative violated the
GATT, the United States counterclaimed that the failure of those
governments to adhere to the "arm's length" standard in connection with
their territorial tax systems represented such a violation as well. This claim
was dismissed, but only as part of a compromise that resulted in inclusion of
a directive to adhere to the "arm's length" standard in a Subsidies Code
adopted in 1978 in connection with the Tokyo Round of GATT
negotiations.
All of this led to the adoption by the OECD of Transfer Pricing
Guidelines in 1979 which largely followed the principles of the United
States regulations. But in the course of the campaign to establish the 1960s
rules as an "international norm," and particularly in connection with the
attack on the states' use of formulary methods, the advocacy of "arm's
length" acquired the quality that led its adversaries to characterize it as
"theological." The 1979 OECD Report described the strict version of the
ALS that no longer perceived "separate accounting" as merely a primary
method of a hierarchy intended to eventually "result in a fair allocation of
income" among states. Rather, it treated the ALS as an end in itself, not as
one tool to achieve some "underlying" idea that might be categorized as
derivative of the "origin of income" principle established for source taxation.
As such, ideas akin to "value creation" were not used to deduce, introduce,
or even justify new interpretations. Transfer pricing outcomes that
conformed with the arm's length standard were equated to "proper" internation income allocations.
Hence, the 1979 OECD Report discerns as the basic challenge "the need
to adjust the actual price to an arm's length price, in order to arrive at a proper
level of taxable income."251 These prices were to be determined on the basis of
a functional analysis that took the risk structures into consideration252 and
generally recognized the "actual transaction as the starting point" and not, in
other than exceptional cases, disregard or substitute other transactions for
249. Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm's Length, TAX NOTES, 625,
646-51 (1986).
250. Id. at 625-28 (1986).
251. OECD, Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises (1979), at 9 (emphasis added).
252. Id. at 17, dubbing a possibly resulting structure one of a risk-bearing, residual profits
claiming "principal" and an auxiliary, limited-profit "agent," a dichotomy rooted in market
mechanisms but absent within MNEs.
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them,253 meaning, too, that "intra-group contracts" were deemed decisive if
they were not a mere sham.254 And the 1979 Guidelines expressly approved
the use of cost sharing agreements, called "cost contribution arrangements"
by those guidelines,255 notwithstanding the fact that, as the Treasury White
Paper issued in 1988 would acknowledge,256 as of 1979 the United States
alone among the OECD-members had ever authorized the use of such
arrangements.
It was only in response to increasing practical problems with this systemespecially outbound intellectual property transfers in the pharmaceutical
industry to Puerto Rican companies entitled to certain benefits under
United States domestic law-and to increasingly articulate academic
critique, that the United States Treasury had-at least on the surface-to
respond to doctrinal arguments on the reasonableness of equating pricing
under the "arm's length" system with a "proper" international profit
allocation to economic value producing "source" countries.

C.

THE "REFORMS" OF THE 1980S AND 1990s

1.

1988 United States White Paper

The United States Treasury issued its congressionally mandated study in
October 1988.257 This "White Paper" set forth concepts that now seem
rudimentary in light of the further development of the United States
regulations and the OECD Guidelines. Yet, although most of its
recommendations would fall by the wayside in, or be substantially
transmogrified by those Guidelines and regulations, its discussion played a
critical role in the revision of the rules, and is reflected seriously by the postGuidelines development of the OECD's approach, including the BEPS
project. Moreover, it is important to understand that the White Paper
adopted a myopic and mechanical view of the economics of the transfer
pricing problem, a circumstance which has had the serious long-term
consequence of confining both national and international policy discussion
within unduly narrow channels.
The White Paper recognized the issues identified by the critics of the
"arm's length" regime-that "[t]he primary administrative difficulty relating
to transfers of intangible property is the failure of the regulations to specify a
so-called fourth method of income allocation for situations in which
253. Id. at 19.
254. Id. at 20, although a bit opaquely formulated, the report makes clear that "underlying
reality" should only be considered if contractual agreements were altered arbitrarily or
otherwise suspicious ("in such cases").
255. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Report of the Committee on
Fiscal Affairs, Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises, 55-62 (1979).
256. United States Treasury Dep't, A Study ofIntercompany Pricing(1988), issued as Notice 88123, 1988-2 C.B. 458, 182 - 83 [hereinafter cited as White Paper].
257. Id.
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comparable transactions do not exist;"258 that "because an integrated
enterprise is presumably more efficient, it will be able to execute an
integrated economic activity at a lower cost than a series of independent
firms whose joint efforts are necessary to execute the same series of
transactions," which "creates a 'continuum price problem,' a situation in
which the sum of the returns for separate services rendered by independent
parties is less than the actual return of the combined group."259 But the
White Paper stumbled in responding to the problem. It argued that
microeconomic theory posits an "equality between revenue and the sum of
returns to each factor of production," and that "one should measure the
factors of production used by each related party and compute the returns
that each one would earn on its best alternative use in the marketplace."260
This implies that "a competitive firm's gross revenue, which equals price
times quantity of output, will be equal to the returns that the factors it
employs could earn in the marketplace."261 The key to accomplishing this
task was "functional analysis," a procedure "not explicitly mentioned in the
regulations," but rather "outlined in the IRS Manual," which had "been
found to be a useful place to start in transfer pricing situations."262
On the basis of this analysis, the White Paper outlined new pricing
methods, all clearly designed to address the circumstance that comparable
transactions were rarely available. The first innovation was to distinguish
between "exact" and "inexact" comparables, and to provide for the use of the
latter. The second was to devise a system where neither exact nor adjustably
"inexact" comparables could be found. The White Paper said you could still
determine for each of a group's factors or functions an "arm's length return"
and use those returns as a basis for making an allocation. It added that this
method, which the White Paper called the "basic arm's length return
method" (BALRM), might be supplemented by a profit split.263 The Paper
defended this "approach" as "equally consistent with the basic goal of the
arm's length principle, which is to use information about unrelated parties
operating at arm's length to determine the allocation of income in a related
party setting."264 It said the "traditional approach" sought "prices that the
firm's outputs would command in the marketplace," whereas this
"alternative approach" aimed to "determine the returns that the firm's
factors would earn in the marketplace."265
The U.S. White Paper described "the goal of a market-based approach" as
"to ensure that the return to an economic activity is allocated to the party
258. Id. at 3.
259. Id. at 122-23.
260. Id. at 129.
261. United States Treasury Dep't, supra note 256, at 130.

262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 146.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 130.
Id.
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performing the economic activity,"266 and that "transfer prices are supposed to

reflect the contribution of the activity and assets utilized in each location to
economic income."267 But instead of an acknowledgment of the failure of
the contemporaneous arm's length standard fostered in the 1960s, the White
Paper-referencing the "zero profit" thesis-sought to diminish the
significance of the continuum price problem.268
Nevertheless, the White Paper implicitly confirms that "source taxation"
is a function of the "value creation" of the firm and that it should be priced
"correctly" to effectuate the idea of allocating business profits. But, it does so
by employing an exclusively "production cost" logic to measure the
"economic contributions to income." To the Treasury, the "continuum price
problem" was rightly defined as "a situation in which the sum of the returns
for separate services rendered by independent parties is less than the actual
return of the combined group," but wrongly assumed to be exclusively a
consequence of firms utilizing production technology.269 Consistent with this
logic, the White Paper proposed a solution which perceived the integration
savings to organisations solely as a return to intangible capital. Therefore,
the intangible capital owning group entity should be allocated the residual
return, if necessary, through application of the BALRM or the "profit split
method" (PSM). The PSM, which the Paper said should be used if both
parties "owned" significant intangible capital,270 was set to "identify the
intangible income attributable to the relevant line of business and then split
that income according to the relative value that the marketplace would put on
each party's significant intangible assets had they been employed by
independent parties operating at arm's length."271
In brief, Treasury's reaction displayed
(i) that the "continuum price problem" exists and that it is essentially a
"value creation" and a "source" taxation problem, and thereby implicitly
confirmed that internal "value creation" was principally a valid category
of framing the discussion on the goals tax transfer pricing in a sourcebased international tax system should achieve; but
(ii) approached this problem by employing market theories which are
questionable in real-life markets ("zero profit theory") and which
created, through a narrow "production cost logic," a system
inappropriate in a firm value creation context.
This entails two major caveats:
(i) the assumption that intangible capital ownership would attract the
residual profits of a firm effectively re-characterizes an internal
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

United States Treasury Dep't, supra note 207, at 122 (emphasis added).
Id. at 123.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 160-161.
Id. at 164.
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"routine" function (ownership) into the entrepreneurial function it
might be between independent parties; and
(ii) based on this economically artificial assumption, profit allocations
are made possible that are arbitrary (from an internal "value creation"
perspective).
The assumption led to an increased importance of the "developer-assister
rules" to curb manipulative schemes. In fact, the final BEPS reports are to a
considerable extent an elaboration of this logic, as they substantially assume
intangible capital as the "reason" of synergy rents, but try to address the
mechanism by which these assets are allocated among MNE entities.
Capturing value creation, it can be said, was set as the goal of the White
Paper's analysis, but the goal would not, in the ensuing regulatory and
Guidelines development, coherently find its way into the tax transfer pricing
system.
It is in this sense we refer to the implications of the White Paper as
"hybrid/schizophrenic." We call the system introduced by the White Paper
"hybrid/schizophrenic" from the perspective of value creation because it is
an odd amalgam based on an implicit acknowledgment that aligning
outcomes with firm value creation is inherent in the principle of source
taxation of business income and establishes methods, particularly the profit
split, that it presumes to capture "relative value" of contributions to firm
income. But it does so based on market analogies that screw up and
undermine that very goal by characterizing (intangible) property ownership
and conditions and risk-bearing as decisive factors.
2.

The Development of the United States Regulations, 1992-94

The White Paper was followed by a series of proposed regulations in the
United States, leading to final regulations promulgated in 1994.272 The
OECD would issue Guidelines in 1995 revising the 1979 Guidelines.273 As
in 1979, the 1995 Guidelines would largely be shaped by the concepts in
preceding United States regulations. But unlike the 1979 version, the final
Guidelines reflected a public exchange of views between the OECD and the
United States Treasury, and the final Guidelines embodied substantial
departures from the regulations of the United States.
The first concrete "reform" proposal was embodied by proposed Treasury
regulations issued in January 1992.274 These proposals followed the White
Paper in its wrestling with the problems of "comparability." The proposed
regulations introduced new "methods" applicable to intangible property
"transactions," which recognized the attenuated nature of "comparability" in
272. See generally Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.482, 57 Fed. Reg. 3571 (proposedJan. 30, 1992); Temp.
Treas. Reg. §1.482T (1993); Treas. Reg. §1.482, 59 Fed. Reg. 34971-01(1994).
273. See U.S. Firms, IRS to Benefit from OECD Tax Rules, Treasury Says, Treas. RR-483 (July 27,
1995).
274. Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.482, 57 Fed Reg. 3571 (proposed Jan. 30, 1992).
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that context. The methods were the "matching transactions,"275
"comparable adjustable transaction,"276 and "comparable profits" methods.277
The first was preferred, and determined the price based on "uncontrolled"
transactions that resembled the "controlled" transaction as to "contractual
terms" and "economic conditions;"278 the second explicitly contemplated
that comparability would ordinarily be attenuated;279 the third rested on the
BALRM notions of the White Paper.280 The proposed regulations
maintained the three "traditional" methods for transfers of tangible
property, although it eliminated any priority between resale price and costplus,281 and introduced the two new methods suggested by the White Paper,
comparable profits and profit split, also introducing the distinguished
"comparable" and "residual" profit split methods.282
But, these proposed regulations also introduced an idea of a "comparable
profits interval" (CPI), which was to be applied with respect to all of the
"single-component" ("one-sided") methods (resale price, cost-plus, and
comparable profits).283 Under this proposal, the government could construct
an "interval" based on the use of comparable profit levels derived from a
range of enterprises "comparable" to the "tested party" (one component of
the group), and the taxpayer's transfer price would be respected only if it
produced profits at some point on the interval. If that price did not produce
that result, the government could determine a price that generated profits
"at the most appropriate point" on the interval.284
These proposals, with their effort to be faithful to the idea of arm's length
and its attendant notion of "comparability," were unsatisfactory to the critics
of arm's length-including proponents of a move toward fractional
apportionment, who approved the introduction of some profit split methods.
But the CPI feature of these regulations proved to be anathema both to
foreign and OECD officials, and to the affected taxpayer community. To
the former, the regulations elevated the direct measurement of profits to too
high a level of importance. To the latter, the power of the government both
to construct an "interval" and to unilaterally determine a "most appropriate"
275. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(3)(v).
276. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(4).
277. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(5).
278. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(3).
279. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(4).
280. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(5).
281. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(f).
282. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(f)(3).
283. See id. at § 1.482-2(d).
284. Prop. Reg. § 1.482-2(f) (withdrawn). These proposed regulations amplified the
"developer-assister" concept, Prop. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(8) (withdrawn), and set forth articulate
rules governing cost-sharing, which included an explicit requirement that the cost shares be
proportionate to the anticipated benefits of the development involved. Prop. Reg. § 1.4 8 2 - 2 (g)
(withdrawn). The regulations proposed in 1966 pertaining to cost sharing had included such a
requirement, Prop. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(4)(iv), but the requirements were not included in the final
regulations issued in 1968. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2A(d)(4).
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point on the interval285 posed too great a threat of overly aggressive
adjustments.
In June 1992, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD formed a
Task Force to respond to the 1992 proposed regulations.286 The Task Force
did not include representatives of the United States, but the United States
participated as an observer in the Task Force deliberations.287 The Task
Force issued a Report in January 1993, shortly before publication of a
revised set of proposed regulations.288 The Task Force issued a number of
objections to the proposed regulations, but it emphasized the question of the
consistency of periodic adjustments under the statutory "commensurate with
income standard" with the "arm's length standard;" and the role of the
comparable profits method as a mandatory check on the use of all but the
comparable uncontrolled price method.289 The Task Force also manifested
concern with the priority of methods, sought to have the regulations express
a preference for the traditional transactional methods, and discouraged the
use of the comparable profits method.290
Thus, in January 1993, after an election in which the victorious opposition
candidate advocated stricter taxation of foreign companies operating in the
United States,291 the Treasury, much with the co-operation of the incoming
Administration, issued a new set of proposed292 and temporary 293 regulations
with standards quite relaxed from those issued a year earlier. These
regulations completely abandoned the terms "matching," "comparable
adjustable transactions," and any explicit notion of inexact comparables as
discussed in the White Paper.294 They did retain the so-called profit
methods, comparable profits, and profit split (comparable and residual).295
They retained only a skeleton of the CPI rule in the form of the arm's length
range: an interval or "range" could be constructed, but with respect to any
285. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(5), (f)(1), 57 Fed. Reg. 3571-01 (proposed Jan. 30, 1992).
286. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Intercompany Transfer Pricing
Regulations Under U.S. Sec. 482 Temporary and Proposed Regulations, T 1.7 (1992), http://www
.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=OCDE/GD(93)131 &docLangu
age=En [hereinafter 1993 OECD Letter].
287. Id. T 1.2.
288. Id. T 1.7.
289. Id. T 2.5.
290. See id. ¶¶ 2.1-2.4.
291. See John H. Cushman, The 1992 Campaign: Corporate Taxes; Clinton Seeks Taxes on Hidden
Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/24/us/the-1992campaign-corporate-taxes-clinton-seeks-taxes-on-hidden-profits.html.
292. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.482-1, 58 Fed. Reg. 5310 (proposed Jan. 21, 1993).
293. See Temp. Treas. Reg. §1.482-1, 58 Fed. Reg. 5263 (proposed Jan. 21, 1993).
294. Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.482-1, 58 Fed. Reg. 5310 (proposed Jan. 21, 1993); Temp. Treas.
Reg. §1.482-1, 58 Fed. Reg. 5263 (proposed Jan. 21, 1993).
295. The regulations governing the profit split method were reserved in the Temporary
Regulations, but set forth in the Proposed Regulations. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5T
(1993) (comparable profits method; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6T (1993) (profit split method).
The provisions set forth are substantially carried forward to the regulations currently in force.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-5, 6 (comparable profits method and profit split method).
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method (including comparable uncontrolled transactions) so long as only a
single method was used (and a single profit indicator if the comparable
profits method was used).296 Thus, the range could be constructed with
measures other than comparable profits. The range could be constructed by
the taxpayer in defence of its allocation; a price would be upheld if it
generated results anywhere along the range. 297 Gone was the authority of
the government to place the price at any "most appropriate" point.
But most importantly, instead of the notion of inexact comparables and in
continuing recognition of the problem of comparability, the 1993 temporary
regulations introduced an elaborate set of rules for determining when an
uncontrolled transaction was comparable to the controlled situation under
examination. 298 Comparability was to be determined with respect to five sets
of circumstances: functions, risks, contractual terms, economic conditions,
and additional factors.299
In 1993, the OECD issued a second Report of its Task Force with respect
to the revised 1993 regulations.300 This Report expressed satisfaction with
changes made by the revised proposals, particularly with respect to the
introduction of the "best method" rule, and the elimination of the use of the
CPM as a mandatory check on all other methods.301 But the second Report
also set forth a series of concerns set forth in the first 1993 Report, which it
said were continuing with respect to the revisions, as well as a set of new
concerns prompted by the revisions.302 Most of the continuing concerns
focused upon the CPM, with the Task Force arguing that its relaxed
standards of comparability be clarified, if not narrowed, that a clearer
preference for the transactional methods be expressed, and that the CPM be
confined to abusive cases. 303 The Report continued to express concern that
periodic adjustments might not be compatible with the arm's length
standard and voiced reservations about the use of information not available
to the parties ex ante in making adjustments.304 The Report also expressed
the view that, especially in constructing an arm's length range, the
296. Temp. Reg. § 1.482-1T(d)(2). The provision is carried forward in the final regulations, in
force today, Treas. Regs. § 1.482-1T(e).
297. Temp. Treas. Reg. §1.482, 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, 5267 (1993).
298. Id. at 5266.
299. Temp. Reg. § 1.482-1T(c)(3)(i)-(v). These are carried forward in the final regulations, in
force today, which describe them as "functional analysis;" "contractual terms;" "risks;"
"economic conditions;" and the character of the "property or services" subject to the examined
transactions. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(d)(3)(i)-(v). The 1993 proposed regulations set forth no
provisions concerning cost-sharing arrangements. The Treasury withdrew all provisions of the
1992 proposed regulations except those governing cost-sharing. The simultaneously issued
temporary regulations, however, did not include the provisions of the 1992 proposed
regulations governing cost-sharing, but instead simply included, as Temp. Reg. § 1.482-7T, the
text of the provisions of the 1968 regulations (Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2A(d)(4)).
300. 1993 OECD Letter, supra note 286.
301. Id.T 2.7, 2.11.
302. Id. T 2.4
303. Id.T 2.19-2.22.
304. Id. TT 2.23-2.33.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
20181

THE OECD/G20-BEPS-PROJECT

325

regulations should "allow the evidence of all methods to be used in
conjunction to determine transfer pricing adjustments."305
Among the concerns expressed specifically in relation to the revisions, the
Task Force found the tightened standards of comparability applied to the
primary transactional methods, comparable uncontrolled price for tangible
property transactions, and "comparable uncontrolled transaction" for
intangible property transactions problematic.306 The Task Force also
objected to the lessened standards of comparability for CPM, expressing
concern that this would lead examiners to resort too quickly to that
method.307 And the Task Force Report, despite its stress on a preference for
transactional methods, objected to certain restrictions the 1993 proposals
had imposed on the profit split method.308
The 1993 regulations were largely made final in 1994.309 The final
regulations made concessions in the direction of the OECD Task Force
Report principally by restoring the role of inexact comparables with respect
to all methods, and by removing "elective and other procedural barriers to
the use of profit split and 'other' (i.e., unspecified) methods," as well as
certain limitations on both the profit split and CPM methods.310 It did not
make changes in relation to the comparability standards for any of the
methods, retaining the strict standards for CUP and CUT, the relaxed
standards for CPM, and did not establish any priority of methods. Instead
the final regulations placed greater stress on the best method rule; the
preamble to the final regulations said it was "critically important" this
method be properly applied.3"
The preamble stressed not only that the essential structure of the 1993
proposals was kept intact, but that its essential conceptions of comparability
and the use of a single best method lay at the core of a new regime.312 The
preamble stated that "both the format and the substance of the final
regulations are generally consistent with the 1993 regulations;" and that
"[t]he most noteworthy feature of the 1993 regulations in comparison to
earlier versions of the regulations under section 482 was the emphasis on
comparability," which "feature of the 1993 regulations was generally well
received by taxpayers and foreign governments."313 It said that "[t]he final
305. 1993 OECD Letter, supra note 286, at T 2.16. See also id. TT 2.14-15.
306. Id. TT 3.1-3.13.
307. Id. TT 2.19-2.20.
308. Id. TT 3.21-25.
309. Treas. Reg. §1.482, 59 Fed. Reg. 34971-01(1994). The Treasury did not at the time
finalize regulations governing cost-sharing. Those were made final in 1995. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.482, 60 Fed. Reg. 65553-01 (Dec. 19, 1995) (promulgating what is now Treas. Reg. § 1.4827A). That version of the regulation was superseded by the current version of the cost sharing
regulation, Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7, at the end of 2011. TD 9568, 76 Fed. Reg. 80,882 (Dec. 22,
2011).
310. Treas. Reg. §1.482, 59 Fed. Reg. 34971-01, 34975-34976 (1994).
311. Id. at 34976.
312. See id. at 34975.
313. Id.
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regulations adhere to this emphasis, and in some cases increase it. "314 The
removal of restrictions on profit splits, CPM, and other methods meant "the
emphasis on comparability and the importance of the best method rule are
increased."315

These conceptions would come to dominate the administration of this
new regime in the ensuing two-plus decades.
3.

Implications of the United States Regulatory Innovations

Before proceeding, it is worth noting four features of the 1994 revision of
arm's length. The first is that while the official materials, proposed
regulations, and their accompanying preambles carefully avoid any reference
to the prevailing, outstanding critique of the arm's length idea-and rely on
or refute this critique even less-the regulatory texts evince an almost
studied tendency to incorporate the language of that critique and to obscure
the difference between the regulatory use of terms and the function of
parallel terms in the literature criticizing arm's length. For instance,
internalization theory speaks frequently of firm organisation as an alternative
to contracting among firms that otherwise constitute components of an
organisation. The 1994 regulations make contractual terms a key element of
comparability,316 but the contractual terms spelled out by a controlled
organisation really have nothing to do with any contract between enterprises
that are conceived as the (displaced) alternative to internal organisation.
Similarly, internalization theory posits in part that internal organisation
forestalls risks to the enterprise that might arise in the absence of
organisation; the comparability rules are concerned with localizing (by
component, and hence by taxing jurisdiction) risks that pertain to the
business enterprise irrespective of the form it takes (what we might call
"external risks").3'7 Internalization theory posits that the choice
(substitution process) between hierarchy and market organisation is
determined by external economic conditions. The comparability rules use a
much more general notion of external conditions (and a similar point might
be made with respect to the "property and services" characteristic).318
Perhaps most saliently, the CPI notion of the 1992 proposals, the arm's
length range of the 1993 temporary regulations, and the final 1994
regulations appear to be an effort to deflect the continuum price indictment
of the entire arm's length system, at least as embodied in the 1960s
regulations.319 But the interval of the CPI, and much more the range, are
radically different from the "continuum" the price problem depicts. The
continuum price envisioned by the critique has ends defined by the differing
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Treas. Reg. § 1.482, supra note 309, at 34991.
317. Glenn R. Carroll & David J. Teece, Firms, Markets, and Hierarchies:The Transaction Cost
Economics Perspective, 18-20 (1975).
318. See Treas. Reg. §1.482, 59 Fed. Reg. 34971-01, 35022 (1994).
319. See TD 6952, 33 Fed. Reg. 5848; TD 6998, 34 Fed. Reg 933 (Jan. 17, 1969).
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methods (and hence, under the 1960s regulations, the differing tested
parties) that might be used. In effect, that continuum defined what later
came to be called the "residual": the entirety of the profits not definitively
allocated by applying marginal methods serially to the whole collection of
components of the group. 320 By contrast, the CPI and the arm's length
range conceptually measure only whatever inexactitude there is in applying
different measures given a previously (and, in truth, more or less arbitrarily)
identified tested party. 321 Thus, allowing the use of ranges does not blunt or
even address the larger problem identified with the conception of arm's
length itself, although on a thoroughly casual and superficial glance it might
appear to.
Interestingly, the 1993 OECD Task Force Report contemplated a
broadened conception of the arm's length range which could have
corresponded to the conception of a continuum defined by the residual, but
one which would largely have taken the pre-existing regime, with its
identified defects, as a starting point.322 As noted above, that Report
advocated to permit more than one method to be used in constructing an
arm's length range. 323 The 1986 Myth paper suggested that if one applied
the resale price method to the distribution component, and cost-plus to the
producer component, one would get different prices, which formed the
limits of a continuum along which any price could be defended as an arm's
length price.324 It suggested further that when this occurred, examiners and
courts sought a reasonable resolution somewhere between the ends of the
continuum, but that the situation did not work well because of an absence of
guidance concerning precisely where to locate the price.325 The OECD
Task Force Report suggests a system like this, perhaps quietly understanding
that some species of profit split would be used to reach a final result:
Where there are fundamental contradictions between the results of
applying two or more methods, the Task Force took the view that an
attempt should be made to reach a conclusion that was satisfactory from
a practical viewpoint, taking into account the facts and circumstances of
the case and also the mix of evidence available provided the results were
consistent with the arm's length principle. For example, this would not
rule out the possibility of a range of arm's length results, the upper end
of which being determined by one method and the lower end of it being
determined by another method.326
320. See The White Paper at 164.
321. UNICES Major Concerns with Regard to the IRS Draft Regulations on IRS Section 482, 20
INTERTAX

419, 420 (1992).

322. See 1993 OECD Letter T 2.21.
323. Id. T 2.16.
324. Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth ofArm's Length, 30 TAx NOTEs 625
(Feb. 17, 1986).
325. Id. at 658.
326. 1993 OECD Letter, T 2.15.
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The second feature of the extensive comparability idea of the 1993-94
regulations worth noting is that the five conditions listed all but invariably
represent matters not measured by any conventional accounting standard or
practice.327 This is especially true of functional analysis, and risk, both of
which pertain to internal matters to which a company's financial statements
are pertinent, if not crucial.328 But, as noted above, functional analysis in its
origin constituted a set of instructions to middle level agency field personnel
about the institution of examinations, which, "by a set of curious chances,"
to borrow W. S. Gilbert's phrase, evolved into a major principle embodied
in the policy prescriptions of major international organisations, to say
nothing of the internal law of numerous nations. But what exactly is a
"function?" How do you know if functions are distinctly associated with
particular entities in a multiple level overall organisation? If so, how does
one determine the association? And if not, how does one break any function
apart among the various components? Similar observations can be made
with respect to "risk," "economic conditions", and "property and services."
None of these have an exact correspondence to accounting measures or
categories. Contractual terms have fewer indeterminacies if written
contracts exist. Absent these terms, and even with them, there are
ambiguities; there is an ever-present issue of the possible incompleteness of
those contracts, and again, no accounting measures to assist in resolving
them.
The third feature of the comparability rules is to understand that, while
they may have been conceived or designed as an effort to revive the
comparability idea and rescue that idea from the realm of pure fiction, it was
simultaneously foreseeable that their operation would have the exact
opposite effect. To demonstrate this point, one can resort to the original
idea of comparability in a context where it works perfectly. Take a domestic
context, a shareholder of a wholly owned corporation, sells a used
automobile with a "Blue Book" value of $20,000, to her wholly owned
corporation, for $100,000. The Blue Book value is a measure of a
comparable uncontrolled sale. It takes no genius to determine that the
shareholder has sold the car for $20,000 and paid a very poorly disguised
dividend of $80,000. In this case, the comparable price (the Blue Book
value) is the starting point of analysis: once you know it, you know the result.
You do not need to know anything more about the car that was sold.
But under the 1993-94 regulations, the process is reversed: you begin with
an analysis of what is to be compared.329 And it is a detailed analysis.
Moreover, once you are done with this analysis, the notion of comparability
is attenuated: there are no Blue Book values; you find something as similar as
you can find, and defend your price that way. But because the five criteria
are applied under complex rules and the degree of comparability demanded
327. SeeTemp.Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1T(c)(3)(i)-(v) (1993).

328. See id. §§ (i)-(ii).
329. See Temp. Treas. Reg. §1.482, 58 Fed. Reg. 5263, (1993); Treas. Reg. §1.482,59 Fed. Reg.
34971-01 (1994).
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is slight, it is foreseeable that the initial analysis, though framed as criteria of
comparability, becomes virtually the whole basis for the allocation itself.
That is, you see that the intercompany contracts assign this profit here and
that there, that the risks are located some here, some there, that the loose
conceptions of "functional analysis" and "economic conditions" justify this
or that assignment of the rewards, and together that becomes the allocation.
Finding an uncontrolled transaction that both matches the controlled
transaction with respect to the five criteria and has a parallel allocation of
profits (comparable price, markup, margin) becomes rather auxiliary in
character, despite presumably being the dominant step in the analysis. This
becomes truer and truer as the degree of comparability demands is lessened,
or one says that one or more of the five criteria do not have to be matched,
and so on. Thus, the five criteria become not really indicia by which
comparability is determined, but direct determinants of the final allocation
of profits. This has obvious and acute dangers for the system adopted,
especially when, as, and to the extent that the "contractual terms" criteria is
elevated in significance.
This leads to the fourth and final point, which grows directly from the
other three, especially the third. This system is a radically new one-not an
outgrowth of the arm's length idea or the embodiment of that idea in the
1960s regulations. The arm's length idea, in its simplest form, is embodied
in the simple automobile example given above, which uses a readily
established "comparable uncontrolled transaction." This is not only
unexceptionable, but an important arsenal in the enforcement of any income
tax system. Conceded by all is that not every or even most or even many
situations are as straightforward. The 1960s rules had a logical solution: if
no direct evidence like that is available, construct a price that would bring
both parties "to the table," so to speak, and that is a market price or arm's
length price.330 That approach is logical, but empirically proven and
theoretically confirmed to be flawed: that a whole range of prices would do
this, so that the price was not determinate.
But the solution of the 1993-94 regulations was radical and objectionable
in that it did not have any real logical defence corresponding to the simple
logic that originally underlay the resale price and cost-plus methods. It was
no logical or theoretically defensible response to the problems that the
original logic had encountered, and was not otherwise coherently related to
the notion of employing anything that could be characterized as related to
market prices.
D.
1.

THE

1995 OECD

TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES

Le Ct{iEtats-Unis et le Ct OCDE

As of the mid-1990s, there was perhaps a general impression among
interested professionals that the United States' position-moving away from
330. See TD 6952, 33 Fed. Reg. 5848; TD 6998, 34 Fed. Reg 933 (Jan. 17, 1969).
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arm's length and possibly in the direction of formula apportionment-was a
more advanced position than that of the international community, including
the United States' major trading partners and particularly the OECD. Such
an impression was understandable. In the first place, the reconsideration of
the rules had clearly been instigated by the United States Congress,
particularly by the 1986 Conference Report, with its derogation of the
existing rules.33' Furthermore, the Congress enacted the "super royalty
provision," which obviously posed a question as to its compliance with arm's
length. Moreover, the White Paper's tone was somewhat sheepish
throughout in its claim that the novel approaches it detailed were fully
consistent with the arm's length standard. By contrast, the OECD's
pronouncements unceasingly and pointedly claimed fealty to the
international standard, in tones conventionally and repeatedly described
with words like "ringing endorsement."
But a closer inspection of the actual content of the proposed rules and the
comments they elicited, together with an inspection of the directions which
the academic and professional critics of arm's length were then advocating,
lends fairly convincing evidence that any such general impression was
wrong. Indeed, the critics had the situation backward. By the mid-1990s,
the critics of arm's length were not advocating any full-fledged international
formula method along the lines used by the states of the United States.
Rather, they advocated using traditional methods to make marginal
allocations to the various components of a transnational integrated group
with the residual profit allocated according to fixed and determined criteria,
which would not vary taxpayer to taxpayer. 332 The final United States
regulations undermined any such general approach with the "best method"
rule, which confined any allocation to the use of a single, best method.333
Even when a residual profit split method was employed, the regulations tied
up its use with vague standards as to the manner of allocating the residual
and cautionary rules about demonstrating the superior reliability of the data
employed.334 By contrast, the OECD's express views exhibited a much
greater openness to the structure of the approach which the critics of arm's
length supported, particularly by accepting the use of different methods to
construct an arm's length range, and by more realistic views both of the
utility of the profit split method and of the manner in which various species
of profit splits had been employed as "fourth" or "other" methods under the
1968 United States and 1979 OECD rules.335
331. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 841. 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-638 (1986).
332. Stanley I. Langbein, A Modified FractionalApportionment Proposalfor Tax Transfer Pricing,"
TAX NOTES, 719 (Feb. 10, 1992); Cf Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C.
Durst, Allocating Business Profitsfor Tax Purposes: A Proposalto Adopt a FormularyProfit Split, FLA.

TAX

REV.,

497 (2009).

333. Treas. Reg. §1.482, 59 Fed. Reg. 34971-01, 34973 (1994).
334. Id. at 34974.
335. 1993 OECD Letter, supra note 286, at 5, 8.
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Even procedurally, the OECD as an institution exhibited a significantly
greater degree of flexibility and openness than did the United States
Treasury. In July 1993, the OECD arranged an informal and largely
confidential conference which brought together academic and professional
experts from the private sector with OECD officials, and representatives of
certain major governments, including the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Japan.336 But the private sector experts, though not all vocal

critics of arm's length, were clearly selected as and confined to individuals
known to be skeptical of accepted techniques, and open to consideration of
significant reform. The conference rejected any immediate move to
fractional apportionment but recommended a sort of truce, by expressing a
view that (radical) arm's length and (full-fledged) fractional apportionment
should be seen as extremes on a continuum, rather than as polar opposites
wholly incompatible with each other337-a position reflected in the
contemporaneous recommendations for expansion of profit splits,338 and
indeed one which, as noted above, was reflected even from the early history
of the methods of allocation.
Again, in contrast, the United States Treasury held a hearing on fractional
apportionment in 1996.339 It did not do so of its own volition: it only agreed
to do so because one Senator had threatened to place a hold on a nominee
for a senior Treasury position if it did not hold such a hearing.340 But the
hearing was lackadaisically organized and publicized; it was prefaced by a
statement from the Deputy Secretary voicing full-throated commitment to
arm's length34' and, in contrast to the OECD's conference, it failed to invite
the best recognized spokesmen for the critique of the arm's length system.
These circumstances foreshadowed aspects of the document which came
to be the central statement of the new regime of the mid-1990s, and, as such,
of the arm's length standard as that standard has existed since, the 1995
OECD Guidelines.342 Although the Guidelines were styled as only a
revision of the 1979 document, they were in fact almost entirely new, much
as the United States regulations of 1993-94 were. 343 And, as the 1979

document followed the structure and the concepts of the 1968 United States
regulations, so the 1995 Guidelines were revised largely along the lines of
336. BrianJ. Arnold & Thomas E. McDonnell, Report on the InvitationalConference and Transfer
Pricing; the Allocation of Income and Expenses Among Countries, TAx NOTES, 900 (Dec. 13, 1993).
337. Id. at 907.
338. Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 332, at 3.
339. Treasury's Summers Speaks On Formula Apportionment, 96 TNT 242-23 (Dec. 13,
1996).
340. See id.
341. The Deputy Secretary's remarks are reproduced at 96 TNT 242-23 (Dec. 13, 1996).
342. OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises (1995) [hereinafter 1995
OECD Guidelines]. The Guidelines are a revision of the 1979 Report OECD, TransferPricing
and MultinationalEnterprises (1979), discussed above. The 1995 Report was revised in 2010.
OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelinesfor MultinationalEnterprises(2010) [hereinafter 2010 OECD
Guidelines].
343. See generally 1995 OECD Guidelines.
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the new United States rules. But the 1995 OECD Guidelines were nowhere
near as exactly faithful to their United States progenitor as the 1979 version
had been to theirs.
As noted above, the OECD Task Force had expressed differences to the
first proposed regulations of the United States. The United States changed
the regulations substantially, moving quite far in the directions the OECD
advised, especially by the abandonment of the mandatory use of the
comparable profits method as a check on all transfer prices.344 But the
changes the OECD sought were largely supported, indeed advanced
independently, by the affected taxpayer communities, both domestic to the
United States and foreign. The OECD then expressed continuing
reservations and new reservations on the second set of proposals.345 The
United States did not issue a third set of proposals in response, but finalized
the second proposals with a few changes in the directions suggested by the
OECD. For the most part, the final regulations ignored most of the
OECD's major criticisms.346
When it finalized the Guidelines, the OECD responded in kind: it made
some concessions with respect to the issues raised in the later 1993 OECD
Report but for the most part adhered to the positions there expressed,
notwithstanding that those views had been largely ignored by the United
States final regulations.347 The result is that the OECD and United States
positions are at odds with each other in important ways-the OECD view
exhibits considerably greater understanding of, and even sympathy for, the
problems critics have identified with arm's length. Despite their differences,
these positions are widely (and to a limited extend validly) viewed as a
phalanx defending arm's length against formula apportionment, or any
serious move in that direction.348
It is certainly true, however, that the OECD Guidelines on a quick
inspection appear a determined link in the phalanx. For one thing, an entire
subchapter is devoted to a discussion of formula apportionment as a nonarm's length method.349 That discussion debunks formula apportionment in
rather stentorian terms-formula apportionment would "require substantial
international cooperation and consensus," which "would present enormous
political and administrative complexity and require a level of international
cooperation that is unrealistic to expect;"350 it could permit "tax avoidance to
the extent that the components of the relevant formula can be
manipulated;"351

"predetermined

formulae

are

arbitrary and disregard

344. See generally 1995 OECD Guidelines.
345. See 1993 OECD letter.
346. See generally Treas. Reg. §1.482, 59 Fed. Reg. 34971-01 (1994).
347. See id.; see also 1995 OECD Guidelines.
348. See 1995 OECD Guidelines.
349. 2010 OECD Guidelines at 37.
350. 1995 OECD Guidelines TT 3.64, 3.66. These provisions are carried forward at 2010
OECD Guidelines TT 1.22, 1.24.
351. Id. T 3.65. These provisions are carried forward at 2010 OECD Guidelines T 1.23.
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market conditions;"352 formula apportionment "may in fact present
intolerable compliance costs and data requirements;"353 it would present
difficulties "compounded by the existence across taxing jurisdictions of
different accounting standards and multiple currencies;"34 it "would raise
questions about the relevance of imposing withholding taxes on cross-border
payments between group members and would involve rejection of a number
of rules incorporated in bilateral tax treaties."3
The Guidelines paid no heed to the theoretical objections to arm's length
and the corresponding advantages of fractional methods. And for all the
cited objections to formula apportionment, the core objection was the
difficulty of achieving international consensus. 356 The Guidelines exhibited
a corresponding attitude toward the objections to arm's length generally:
although the "arm's length principle is viewed by some as inherently flawed,
because the separate entity approach may not always account for the
economies of scale and interrelation of diverse activities created by
integrated businesses," there is "no widely accepted objective criteria for
allocating the economies of scale or benefits of integration between
associated enterprises."357 But the difficulty of achieving consensus and the
lack of widely accepted objective criteria were and are, at least in principle,
remediable circumstances; the Guidelines gave no reason for rejecting outof-hand an approach that at least began to seek solutions to them.
At the same time, too, the Guidelines did not abandon the skepticism
previously expressed by the OECD Task Force about the CPM in its various
manifestations, although the Guidelines in the end accepted that method as
an acceptable or at least permissible method under the arm's length system.
The Guidelines gave the method an entity-specific frame and a different
name, the "transactional net margin method," (TNAM) and said that "socalled 'comparable profits methods' or 'modified cost plus/resale price
methods' are acceptable only to the extent that they are consistent with these
Guidelines."358 The Guidelines' TNMM expressed a preference for using a
comparable that involved the same group (and an uncontrolled
counterparty) as the intra-group tested transaction;359 the U.S. regulations at
a minimum express no such preference, and may even be read to preclude
using a transaction of the same group as the comparable uncontrolled
transaction. And the Guidelines emphasized repeatedly that the TNMM was
to be used as a last resort, which required observing traditional safeguards
352. Id. T 3.67. These provisions are carried forward at 2010 OECD Guidelines T 1.25.
353. Id. T 3.69. These provisions are carried forward at 2010 OECD Guidelines T 1.27.
354. Id. T 3.70. These provisions are carried forward at 2010 OECD Guidelines T 1.28.
355. 1995 OECD Guidelines T 3.72. These provisions are carried forward at 2010 OECD
Guidelines T 1.30.
356. 2010 OECD Guidelines at 36.
357. 1995 OECD Guidelines T 1.9. These provisions are carried forward at 2010 OECD
Guidelines T 1.10.
358. Id. T 3.1. These provisions are carried forward at 2010 OECD Guidelines T 2.56.
359. Id. TT 3.26, 3.34.
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and that very few countries had experience with the method and most
considered it "experimental."360
In the context of its discussion of the TNMM, the OECD cautioned that
the method was one-sided, meaning that it focused, as did cost-plus and
resale price, on only a single component of the enterprise.361 The
Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) would return to this phrase in the future,
ordinarily with a caution that one-sided methods had a tendency to produce
skewed results (a tendency emphasized in the literature critical of arm's
length generally).362 In light of these caveats, the OECD promised "an
intensive period of monitoring the application of both traditional transaction
methods and transactional profit methods over the coming years, with a view
to revising this Report periodically, as necessary, to take into account the
result of this monitoring."363 But the 1995 Guidelines retained many of the
stances taken in the 1993 Task Force Reports, which exhibited continuity
with some of the directions supported by the critics of arm's length.364 As
between the two transactional profit methods, the Guidelines exhibited a
preference for the profit split, which it described as having a greater balance
of strength over weaknesses than the balance ascribed to the TNJM;365 as a
method with which some members had some familiarity, in contrast to the
experimental TNMM;66 and which it identified as compatible with a
method that identified a residual.367 The placement of discussion is not
necessarily significant, but the OECD, in discussing the profit method,
addressed the profit split first and TNMM second in contrast to the U.S.
regulations, which set forth the CPM first (in the "-5" regulation) and the
profit split later (the "-6" regulation).368
Moreover, the Guidelines persisted in suggesting that the arm's length
range could be established using different methods as well as different
comparables within the same method, thus, at least permitting an analysis
which realistically could associate the scope of a range with the residual
income as conceived by economic analysis.369
The most significant move by the OECD in the direction of the structure
of the final U.S. regulations was the Guidelines' full acceptance of the
regulations' intricate description of the idea of comparability.370 The
Guidelines accepted a five-pronged approach to comparability, with some
360. Id. ¶¶ 3.52, 3.53, 3.55; see also Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD],
Transactional Profit Methods: Discussion Draftfor Public Comment, 8, 16 (Jan. 25, 2008).
361. Id. T 3.31. These provisions are carried forward at 2010 OECD Guidelines T 2.26.
362. Id.
363. 1995 OECD Guidelines T 3.55.
364. See generally 1995 OECD Guidelines.
365. 1995 OECD Guidelines ¶¶ 3.5-3.10.
366. Id. T 3.52.
367. 1995 OECD Guidelines T 3.19.
368. Treas. Reg. §§1.482-5, -6, 59 Fed. Reg. 34971-01, 34973 (1994).
369. 1995 OECD Guidelines ¶¶ 1.46-1.47. The same principle is implicit in 2010 OECD
Guidelines ¶¶ 2.11, 3.59.
370. See generally 1995 OECD Guidelines.
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difference in the definition of the prongs. 371 The Guidelines included risk,
the third prong of the U.S. definition, as part of the second prong,
functional analysis.372 Most likely, the Guidelines did this because of the
difference in the Task Force reports expressing concerns, taking into account
information or objectives identified ex post, which the regulations suggest
may be taken into account but which the Task Force Report and Guidelines
excluded from consideration in determining the comparability of risks. The
Guidelines too, to an extent, cured some of the defects in the notion of
functional analysis suggested above, because the Guidelines at least
identified what it conceived of functions-"design, manufacturing,
assembling, research and development, servicing, purchasing, distribution,
marketing, advertising, transportation, financing, and management"373although the delineations of those categories could hardly be described as
crisp, or the process of analyzing them as compact. And in its description of
functional analysis, the OECD for the first time articulated a tripartite
breakdown of the process of analyzing "functions, assets used, and risks
assumed"-which would be a touchstone of much of the CFA's future
work.374
In place of "risk" as a criterion, the Guidelines included the fifth criterion
of "business strategies," the principal objective of the inclusion of which
appeared to be to permit taxpayers to take into account startup or other
market-making losses.375 But the inclusion of the five-part comparability
schema in the regulations made the Guidelines vulnerable to the same
tendency as the regulations-that the criteria set forth as aspects of
comparability would instead become a kind of checklist for making
allocations directly with external comparables used perfunctorily and to
some extent after the fact, creating serious questions whether the
determination had any meaningful connection to the supposedly underlying
(or overarching) arm's length principle. In a limited way, the Guidelines
aggravated this circumstance, by refusing to follow the U.S. regulations in
imposing a stricter standard of comparability in the context of the CUP
method. Instead, the Guidelines carried forward the Task Force's position by
favoring a comparability standard consistent among all methods.
Thus, by 1995 the Guidelines and regulations were both in place. The
commonplace view was that the Guidelines hewed more closely to the
traditional or historic arm's length approach than did the regulations, and
the regulations constituted a greater advance toward a modification of the
system that made it friendlier to formulary apportionment. As noted here,
that perception was probably misguided, if not diametrically incorrect, but
that is not the important point here. The major point is that the
discrepancies between the two set the stage for two different paths, two
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

See 1995 OECD Guidelines.
1995 OECD Guidelines T 1.23.
Id. T 1.21.
Id. ¶1.20.
Id. TT 1.32, 1.34.
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different and almost opposite Proustian c6tes, blazed in the ensuing decade
and a half, which in turn partially set the stage for the differences which
became palpable during the BEPS-negotiations.
The first was the course of practice under the regulations/Guidelines,
which increasingly fell victim to the main vulnerability of both structures,
viz., the tendency of the comparability factors to degenerate into criteria for
making allocations directly, and the tendency for the comparability
examination to degenerate further into giving primary effect to the
contractual terms criterion, rendering a system based very heavily on initial
taxpayer determinations. The second path was the evolution of the ideas of
the OECD, which increasingly tended, in visible contrast to the direction of
practice, to seek ways to de-emphasize taxpayer discretion and control of the
allocation process, and at the same time to elevate considerations which
could have facilitated an effort to address the kind of conflicts the Guidelines
perceived as rendering formulary apportionment unacceptable. This latter
evolution was accompanied, paradoxically, by an ongoing pattern of OECD
expressions to rule out not only any move toward fractional apportionment,
but also to eliminate vestigial fractional methods that the OECD Model
Conventions, and their predecessors, had historically retained. Thus, both
the conceptual discrepancies and the misleading appearances manifested in
the Task Force Reports and the Guidelines of the mid-1990s became ever
more exaggerated.
2.

Value Creation and the Hybrid/Schizophrenia of the 1995 Guidelines

As the hybrid/schizophrenic approach376 to transfer pricing found entry
into the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in 1995, these Guidelines,
hence, worked with the idea of "aligning outcomes with value creation" in
various degrees but incoherently. Firstly, they start as a general matter
being concerned with pricing transfers of value, which is not necessarily the
same as allocating profits/income to the original/functional value creator.
References to the value of contributions to transactions are, therefore,
mostly employed as meaning "fair market value"377 of transferred assets or

services rendered, often, but not always,378 regardless of the actual economic
376. As noted above, we call the system introduced by the White Paper "hybrid/schizophrenic"
from the perspective of value creation because it is an odd amalgam based on an implicit
acknowledgment that aligning outcomes with firm value creation is inherent in source taxation
of business income and establishes methods, esp. the profit split, that assume to capture
"relative value" of contributions to firm income. But, it does so based upon market-analogies
that screw that very goal by characterizing IP-ownership and risk-bearing as decisive factors.
377. See 2010 OECD Guidelines T6.27.
378. 2010 OECD Guidelines T 6.38 considers a royalty rate reduction in case where the
licencee creates part of the value of an intangible asset. Still, value creation is understood as
"cost-bearing."
6.38: "In some cases, a distributor may bear extraordinary marketing expenditures beyond what
an independent distributor with similar rights might incur for the benefit of its own distribution
activities. An independent distributor in such a case might obtain an additional return from the
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act of creating the transferred value. In that sense, the Report ties all
methods that apply the arm's length principle to the concept of "options
available" as a means to determine the value of transactions.379 Secondly, if
reference is made to the actual act of value creation by group entities in
creating the (transferred) assets, it is, akin to the "developer-assister rule" of
the U.S. Regulations, equated to cost-bearing in pertinent development/
protection stages of intangible assets by individual entities, regardless of how
they re-finance themselves within the group.
The 1995 Guidelines at the outset echo the critique on the arm's length
system and thereby implicitly confirm, because they do not attack on a
general front, the basic correctness of its findings and that the profit
allocation in principle should capture the full economic return to activities
performed within a jurisdiction. The 1995 Guidelines introduced the
defence line that although the arm's length principle is "viewed by some as
inherently flawed because the separate entity approach may not always
account for the economies of scale and interrelation of diverse activities
created by integrated businesses," that "[t]here are .

.

. no widely accepted

objective criteria for allocating the economies of scale or benefits of
integration between associated enterprises."380 And in that vein, the
Guidelines do undertake to take value creation-in the sense sketched
above-into account when performing the functional analysis38' or in
selecting and applying the transfer pricing methods. Take for instance a
problem that is still not fully solved, the tax treatment of economic
contributions to the value of intangible assets by distribution entities. The
1995 report, in searching for an appropriate resale price margin, displays its
schizophrenia. While it first reasons in purely economic terms correctly that
"an appropriate resale price margin is easiest to determine where the reseller
does not add substantially to the value of the product," but that
the resale price margin requires particular care is where the reseller
contributes substantially to the creation or maintenance of intangible
property associated with the product (e.g. trademarks or tradenames)
which are owned by an associated enterprise. In such cases, the
owner of the trademark, perhaps through a decrease in the purchase price of the product or a
reduction in royalty rate."
379. Id. T 1.16.
380. 1995 OECD Guidelines T 1.9; 2010 OECD Guidelines T 1.10.
381. 1995 OECD Guidelines T 1.21 reads: "The functions that taxpayers and tax
administrations might need to identify and compare include, e.g., design, manufacturing,
assembling, research and development, servicing, purchasing, distribution, marketing,
advertising, transportation, financing, and management. The principal functions performed by
the party under examination should be identified. Adjustments should be made for any material
differences from the functions undertaken by any independent enterprises with which that party
is being compared. While one party may provide a large number of functions relative to that of the
other party to the transaction,it is the economic significance of those functions in terms of theirfrequency,
nature, and value to the respective parties to the transactions that is important."

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
338

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 51, NO. 2

contribution of the goods originally transferred to the value of the final
product cannot be easily evaluate,382
it searches for a solution by-still reasonably-assuming that it "should be
expected that the amount of the resale price margin will be influenced by the
level of activities performed by the reseller."83 Also, the "resale price margin
could be higher where it can be demonstrated that the reseller has some
special expertise in the marketing of such goods, in effect bears special risks,
or contributes substantially to the creation or maintenance of intangible property
associatedwith the product."384 But in discerning "contributions to the creation

of intangible value," it resorts to its odd amalgam of market-analogies based
on contractual assignments of cost/risk-bearers and owners of intangibles by
stating that "the level of activity performed by the reseller, whether minimal
or substantial, would need to be well supported by relevant evidence," and
that "[t]his would include justification for marketing expenditures that might
be considered unreasonably high; for example, when part or most of the
promotionalexpenditure was clearly incurred as a service performed in favour of the
legal owner of the trademark."385 On the other hand, quite like the White

Paper, the 1995 Guidelines see ownership of intangibles in the process of
creating value as rendering the situation "non-routine."386 On this (skewed)
basis, the Report finds comfort in the-by itself reasonable soundingconclusion, that
If it cannot be demonstrated that the intermediate company either bears
a real risk or performs an economic function in the chain that has
increased the value of the goods, then any element in the price that is
claimed to be attributable to the activities of the intermediate company
would reasonably be attributed elsewhere in the MNE group, because
independent enterprises would not normally have allowed such a
company to share in the profits of the transaction.387
Another example of the schizophrenic logic in terms of value creation that
bears no theoretical novelty compared to the White Paper, nor to the 1994
382. 1995 OECD Guidelines T 2.22 (emphasis added).
383. 1995 OECD Guidelines T 2.24.
384. Id.
385. Id; This idea of treating "expenditures" as the "value creating activity" is further explained
in Chapter VI. There the pertinent paragraphs tell:
6.39 The other question is how the return attributable to marketing activities can be identified. A
marketing intangible may obtain value as a consequence of advertising and other promotional
expenditures, which can be important to maintain the value of the trademark. However, it can be
difficult to determine what these expenditures have contributedto the success of a product. However, it
can be difficult to determine what these expenditures have contributed to the success of a
product. [emphasis added]
386. Cf OECD Guidelines T 2.25: "If the reseller possesses valuable marketing intangibles, the
resale price margin in the uncontrolled transaction may underestimate the profit to which the
reseller in the controlled transaction is entitled, unless the comparable uncontrolled transaction
involves the same reseller or a reseller with similarly valuable marketing intangibles."
387. Id. T 2.26.
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U.S. Treasury Regulations, is found in the OECD's discussion on the
application of the profit split method: The OECD first assumes that the
ownership of intangibles renders a party to the transaction non-routine as
such eligible to book the residual returns from the business activity and,
thus, connects the scope of applicability of the profit split method primarily
to situations were both parties own significant intangible assets and defines
the necessary contribution analysis as a mechanism by which
The total profits from the controlled transactions under examination,
would be divided between the associated enterprises based upon the
relative value of the functions performed by each of the associated
enterprises participating in the controlled transactions, supplemented as
much as possible by external market data that indicate how independent
enterprises would have divided profits in similar circumstances. In cases
where the relative value of the contributions can be measured directly,
it may not be necessary to estimate the actual market value of each
participant's contributions.388
The Report sees the strength of this method in that generally "the twosided approach may also be used to achieve a division of the profits from
economies of scale or other joint efficiencies that satisfies both the taxpayer
and tax administrations,"389 but it does not question that the valuation of the
contributions thereby is not aligned with the weight the firm that produces
the economies of scale has a different internal view on the importance of
ownership and cost-bearing-both are routine functions from an inside
value creation perspective. The method is, thus too, justified on the basis of
economic concerns it eventually fails to address.
E.

SUMVVIMARY:

VALUE CREATION, RESIDUAL PROFITS, AND THE

CONTEMPORARY AmvI's LENGTH STANDARD

PRE-BEPS

Clearly, as detailed above, the developments of the middle period
encompassing the era from the early 1960s to the mid-1990s, dramatically
transformed the content of the arm's length principle, at the same time the
transfer pricing issue was of ever-escalating significance. A review of the
standard's evolution from its inception to the formulation in the 1995
Guidelines, particularly insofar as the treatment of residual profits was
concerned, is in order.
The foundation of any standard is the classification and assignment system
based upon the principle of economic allegiance. The latter principle is
closely analogous to the modern, emergent notion of value creation.390 The
arm's length principle emerged in the early 1930s, largely through a Report
by an author who articulated a view of it that reaffirmed the economic
388. Id. T 3.16.
389. Id. T 3.7.
390. OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments,at 11 (Jul. 10,
2010).
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allegiance principle.391 This reaffirmation involved the assumption that the
residual profit would be assigned in full to a parent controlling entity on
grounds that that entity was responsible to the creation of that value.392 The
principle was adopted as part of the Model Convention system in the 1943
Mexico and 1946 London models, but without any affirmation of the
corollary that the residual should be allocated in full to the parent. 393
Instead, those Models contemplated secondary methods of allocation which
would have spread the residual throughout the integrated group, but clearly
on grounds consistent with the linked ideas of value creation and economic
allegiance. And in all events, the early ideas placed little stress on
contractual allocations, or on any attempt to define inputs, or functions, to
which responsibility for the profit was imputed.
The innovations of the 1962-1995 period interpreted arm's length in ways
that deviated more substantially from the underlying idea of economic
allegiance. The regulations adopted at the outset of this period rested upon
established economic conceptions of substitution at the margin, if not
comparable market price could be found, one asked, with respect to some
component of the group, what was the marginal price that would entice that
component, if independent, to enter the transaction.394 The problem with
this eminently sensible approach was that, if applied serially through onesided methods to all members of the group, it did not definitively assign the
entire group profit. What was left was the residual. The system was
agnostic as to the assignment of the residual, in contrast to either of the
approaches reflected in the 1933-46 developments: unlike the Carroll
Report, the system neither explicitly nor implicitly assumed the residual was
created by central management; unlike the London/Mexico Models, the
system did not expressly or articulately define "backup" methods which
divided the residual among the component enterprises in a manner that at
least roughly approximated identifying the locales responsible for its
creation. 395
This system proved unacceptable, because of its indeterminacy: it
produced ad hoc and inconsistent results, and plainly undermined the
corporate income tax base. But the task of reforming it generated both
controversy and suspicion. In the end, the United States and the world
body, the OECD, formulated a system; the foundation of which was the
contractual allocation made by an agreement among commonly controlled
corporations-and undoubtedly determined by central management itself.396
391. See Hubert Hamaekers, International and Comparative Taxation, Series on International
Taxation, 26 at 30.
392. OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, at 13 (Jul. 10,
2010).
393. See generally London/Mexico Models and Commentary.
394. Lorraine Eden, The Arm's Length Standardin North America, TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL
673, 676 (Feb. 2000).
395. See generally London/Mexico Models and Commentary.
396. See 26 U.S.C. § 482.
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Eventually, this meant that the residual would be assigned wherever senior
management wanted it assigned-and, unsurprisingly, in the end this meant
it would be assigned to a tax haven.
Thus, the arm's length principle proceeded through three stages in terms
of the assignment of the residual. The first, in the 1933-46 period, assigned
the residual according to crude, but defensible conceptions of economic
allegiance/value creation-to central management in Carroll's view,
throughout the group in the view of the London and Mexico models.397 The
second was indeterminate in the assignment of the residual, largely because
it elevated the arm's length idea to the status of an end in itself, rather than a
subsidiary part of a larger principle.398 But the third was probably the worst
of the three, by making the allocation of the residual voluntary with the
taxpayer, meaning that it would be difficult and possibly impossible to ever
subject the residual to tax, meaning it would be virtually tax exempt. 3 9 9

And the third system really made a mockery of the very of idea of arm's
length, as even some of the most serious defenders of the system are
sometimes forced to concede. Where a TNE formed a "central" party in a
tax haven, and allocated the residual to it, it was like saying that two
unrelated parties who controlled a highly valuable profit situation, who had
to arrive at a price which would divide the profits equitably, would resolve
their situation by finding a party unrelated to both, and make the sale
through the third party at such prices that the substantial portion of the high
profit inured to the third party. This was perhaps the one thing independent
parties in such a situation would not do.
IV. The Emerging Formulation: Arm's Length From the
Guidelines to BEPS

A.

PERMANENT ESTABLISHIMENTS AND THE AUTHORIZED

APPROACH

OECD

(AOA)

The 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines apply explicitly only to the question
of allocations among "associated enterprises," governed by Article 9 of the
OECD Model Tax Convention.400 After finalizing those Guidelines in 1995,
the OECD turned its attention to the related, though distinct, question of
allocations of profit between an enterprise and its permanent establishments
abroad.4o1 Throughout the first decade of the new century, the OECD
issued a series of reports setting forth an "Authorised OECD Approach"
397. Michael Kobetsky, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENTs 26
(2011).
398. Ramon Dwarkasing, COMMENTS FROM ACADEMIA ON THE REVISED DIscussIoN DRAFT
ON TRANSFER PRICING ASPECTS OF INTANGIBLES 12 (2013).
399. Deloitte, OECD Releases Additional Implementation Guidance on CbC Reporting, ARM'S
LENGTH STANDARD, Aug. 2017, at 23.
400. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to
PermanentEstablishments, T 3 p. 11 July 22, 2010).
401. Id.
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(AOA) to the question, which culminated in a final Report issued in 2010.402
The AOA appeared to rest on economic premises different from those which
seem to undergird the 1995 Guidelines.403
The OECD began by formulating a "Working Hypothesis" (WH), which
aimed "to examine how far the approach of treating a PE as a hypothetical
distinct and separate enterprise could be taken," and "how the guidance in
the Guidelines could be applied, by analogy, to attribute profits to a PE in
accordance with the arm's length principle."404 The WH was to be
"constrained" by neither "the original intent or by the historical practice and
interpretation of Article 7," but rather "the focus was on formulating the
most preferable approach .
and trade."405

.

. given modern-day multinational operations

The OECD issued a discussion draft for public comment in February
2001, in two parts. 406 Part I tested the WH in general, and Part II its
application to the financial sector, "where trading through a PE is
widespread."407 The OECD issued a draft of a new Part III, applicable to
global trading,408 in March 2003, together with a revision of Part 11.409 It
issued a revision of Part I, renaming the WH as the AOA, in August 2004,
together with revisions of Parts II and 111,410 and issued revised versions of all
three parts in December 2006.411 It issued a draft version of a Part IV,
governing insurance, in August 2007.412 A final Report was issued in July
2008, covering all four parts.413
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Discussion Draft on the Attribution of
Profits to PermanentEstablishments, 2 (2001).
407. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Report on the Attribution of Profits to
PermanentEstablishments, 7 (July 17, 2008).
408. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Discussion Draft On The Attribution Of
Profits To Permanent Establishments:Part III, 23 (Mar. 4, 2003).
409. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Discussion Draft On The Attribution Of
Profits To Permanent Establishments:Part II, 3 (Mar. 4, 2003).
410. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Discussion Draft On The Attribution Of
Profits To Permanent Establishments:Part I, 4 (Aug. 4, 2004).
411. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Discussion Draft of the Report on the
Attribution of Profits to a Permanent Establishment: Part IV. (Aug. 22, 2007).
412. Id.
413. OECD, Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments T 8, p. 8. (2008)
[hereinafter 2008 OECD PE Report]. The 2008 Report stated that Article 7 and its
Commentary would be revised in the next update of the Model Convention, then scheduled,
and ultimately released, in 2010. The final Report also revised the Commentary to Article 7,
effective with the 2008 update on the Model Convention, with respect to matters that did not
conflict with the pre-existing commentary. The Report cautioned "taken care, when
interpreting bilateral treaties that include the current text of Article 7 . . .to use only the part of
the Report that do not conflict with the Article 7 Commentary as so revised."

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2018]

THE OECD/G20-BEPS-PROJECT

343

The AOA picks up from the Guidelines the three-pronged "functional
analysis" of the five-part "comparability analysis" for making allocations
identified, if not emphasized by the Guidelines-functions performed, assets
used, risks assumed. The signal departure of the AOA from the Guidelines
concerns a difference in approach to the "initial" allocation made by the
enterprise. Indeed, the discussion in the AOA papers indicates the extent to
which, by 2008 if not by 2001, the interpretation and application of the
Guidelines had come to be dominated by the tendency described above-of
using the "contractual allocation" not as a facet of "comparability," on the
one hand, but as a presumptive result and starting point, on the other. The
discussion in the AOA virtually assumes this latter technique is the stance of
the Guidelines. And it is clear that this method is not to be imported to the
PE context:
As between unrelated enterprises, the determination of which
enterprise owns assets and which bears risk is determined by legally
binding contracts or other ascertainable legal arrangements. Similar
considerations apply to associated enterprises providing those contracts
or legal arrangements reflect the underlying reality and meet the
criteria in Chapter I of the Guidelines. Similarly, in a separate
enterprise context no issues generally arise over determining which
enterprise possesses the capital. The factual, legal position in a PE
context, on the other hand, is that there is no single part of an
enterprise which legally 'owns' the assets, assume the risks, possesses
the capital or contracts with separate enterprises. The legal position is,
thus, unhelpful in a PE context, since Article 7(2) requires the PE to be
treated as if it were a distinct and separate enterprise, performing its
own functions, assuming its own risk, and owning or using assets on its
own. It is, therefore, necessary under the arm's length principle of
Article 7 to develop a mechanism for attributing risks, economic
ownership of assets [footnote omitted] and capital to the hypothetically
distinct and separate PE, for associating with the hypothetically distinct
and separate PE the rights and obligations arising out of transactions
between separate enterprises and the enterprise of which the PE is a
part and for recognising and determining the nature of the dealings'
(i.e., the intra-enterprise equivalents of separate enterprise transactions)
between the hypothetically distinct and separate PE and other parts of
the enterprise of which the PE is a part.414
To achieve this task, the final 2008 Report, as proposed by the 2001 Report,
devises a novel conception, of "people functions" associated with assets
owned or risks assumed:
As it is not possible to use a legal analysis as the required mechanism,
another solution must be sought. After careful considerations, the
OECD decided that a functional analysis should be used, as this concept
414. 2008 OECD PE Report T 17, pp. 13-14.
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underpins the application of the arm's length principle under Article 9
and there is already considerable guidance on how to conduct this
analysis in the Guidelines. However, in order to address the issues
created by the fact that legally the assets, risks, capital, and rights and
obligations arising out of transactions with separate enterprises belong
to the enterprise as a whole rather than to any one part of the enterprise
and the other there is no legal transaction between different parts of a
single entity, it proved necessary to supplement the functional analysis
of Article 9. Accordingly, the Authorised OECD Approach attributes
to the PE those risks for which the significant functions relevant to the
assumption and/or management (subsequent to the transfer) of risks are
performed by people in the PE and also attributes to the PE economic
ownership of assets for which the significant functions relevant to the
economic ownership of assets [footnote omitted] are performed by
people in the PE. The Authorised OECD Approach also sets forth
approaches to attribute capital, including 'free' capital (i.e. funding that
does not give rise to a tax deductible return in the nature of interest), to
the PE to support the functions it has performed, the risks assumed and
assets attributed to it, as well as criteria for the recognition and
characterisation of dealings between the PE and other parts of the
enterprise to which it belongs.4'5
This analysis of "people functions" is key to step one of the Article 7
analysis-hypothesizing the PE as a distinct and separate enterprise.416 Step
two-determining the profits attributed to the enterprise so hypothesizedwas to be taken by reference to the Guidelines to a considerably greater
extent:
Under the second step of the Authorised OECD Approach the
Guidelines are applied by analogy to the PE'S dealings with other parts
of the enterprise to ensure that the performance of all of its functions in
relation to these dealings is rewarded on an arm's length basis. The
dealings of the hypothesised distinct and separate enterprise will be
compared to transactions of independent enterprises performing the
same or similar functions, using the same or similar assets, assuming the
same or similar risks and posing the same or similar economically
relevant characteristics. The transfer pricing methods set out in the
Guidelines are applied to determine an arm's length price for the
dealings. It should be noted that there is no presumption that functions
other than significant people functions relevant to the assumption of
risk and significant people functions relevant to the economic
ownership of assets are by nature of low value. This will be determined
by the functional and comparability analyses based on the particular
facts and circumstances.417
415. Id. T 18, p. 14 (emphasis added).
416. Id. at 13.
417. Id. T 20, p. 15.
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The first salient point about the AOA's discussion, also relevant to the
BEPS initiative which follows within a relatively short time, concerns the
realism of the contrast that discussion draws between the associated
enterprise and permanent establishment contexts. In the first place, it is not
an altogether controlling circumstance that "the legal position is thus
unhelpful in a PE context," that is, it does not mean that there is no potential
starting point determined by the enterprise itself which could be used in
constructing the "hypothesis" of separateness. 418 Most enterprises keep
some form of separate books for their geographically separate branches;
certainly banks do. These could be used as analogues of the contractual
basis for allocations used by the Guidelines; but the 2008 Report does not so
much as mention the possibility, at least in the discussion in the early parts
of the Report which draw the supposed distinction between the associatedenterprise and permanent establishment contexts.419
In the second place, it is not entirely true that in the context of separately
incorporated entities, "the determination of which enterprise owns assets
and which bears risk is determined by legally binding contracts or other
ascertainable legal arrangements."420 In a limited range of circumstances, in
terms of third party dealings, intercorporate contracts will be determinative
of the outcome, but even this has limitations, as the lack of clarity about such
circumstances as mandatory consolidation in U.S. bankruptcy law
demonstrates. But in a much broader range of circumstances, the
intercorporate "dealings" governed by intercorporate contracts concern only
the related parties, and have little effect on dealings with parties outside the
group. Their principal consequence may be their impact on tax allocations.
In these circumstances, the "legally binding" quality of these contracts is a
virtual fiction, for the consequences dictated by such contracts can and will
be readily waived by the "party" the might insist upon those consequences if
the parent corporation deems it in the interest of the group to do so, or they
might be incomplete from the start as the example of "nonexclusive" licenses
which are nevertheless factually treated as "exclusive" licenses by the group
418. Id.
419. Later in the document, in talking about establishing "dealings" between and PE and home
office, the Report does acknowledge the possibility. Thus, at T 215, the Report notes that "[a]n

analysis of the contractual terms of the transaction is part of the functional and factual analysis
and can be used to examine whether the actual conduct of the parties conforms to the terms of
the contract and is consistent with the economic principles that govern relationships between
independent enterprises," and that "[s]uch an analysis will be even more important in the PE
context where any terms between the various parts of the enterprise are not contractually
binding." The next paragraph (T 216) states that "[tihus, for example an accounting record and
contemporaneous documentation showing a dealing that transfers economically significant
risks, responsibilities, and benefits would be a useful starting point for the purposes of
attributing profits." At T 283, the Report notes that "[a] fixed place of business PE, which is
typically an economically distinct business unit, may have its own set of financial accounting
records that provide a starting port for the attribution of tax profit for tax purposes."
420. Id. at 13.
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may illustrate.421 For these two reasons, the clear line which the 2008
Report suggests to exist between the separate-incorporation and branch
context is seriously overstated by the Report, and economically does not
exist in such stark terms.
The implication of this is that OECD's rejection of an enterprisedetermined starting point or presumption, on the one hand, in favor of a
method initially dependent on examination of material economic
circumstances is much more a matter of choice than of necessity determined by
legal reality. In other words, the AOA is rejecting the notion that the arm's
length method inherently depends upon an initial enterprise-controlled
circumstance, be it internal bookkeeping or contracts, (and its attendant
notion, the "one-sided" methods), and embracing the notion that even the
arm's length standard may depend partly or wholly upon an examination of
concrete aspects of the various components of the enterprise.
The AOA goes beyond this, however, in positing that material economic
circumstances begin the allocation process: the Report also identifies the
circumstances that do so-and this resides in its conception, novel in the
AOA, of "people functions." "Economic" ownership of an asset is
determined by which "part of the enterprise . . . performs the significant

people functions relevant to the determination of economic ownership of
assets."422 The Report rejects an approach of "allow[ing] taxpayers simply to
nominate which part of the enterprise owns the assets," because such an
approach, "though simple and administrable, would potentially provide an
incentive for taxpayers to attribute economic ownership . . . in ways that
would lead to inappropriate allocations."423
But this emphasizes on "people functions" has its own difficulties; first
because the Report is not wholly definitive about what the term means, and
second because it reintroduces some problems of the arm's length idea that
the dominant role of "contractual terms," whatever its faults, does
mitigate.424 With regard to assets, the Report sets forth what one might
takes as rules for three classes of assets:
* For "financial assets of financial enterprises, the creation and
management of such assets (and their attendant risks) is itself the
significant people function relevant to determining the initial
economic ownership of the assets . . .";425
* "[T]he view was expressed that place of use should be the sole
criterion for attributing tangible assets to a PE," and "there was a
broad consensus among the OECD member countries for applying
use as the basis for attributing economic ownership of tangible
42 1.
422.
423.
424.
425.

See also Vann Hard-Boiled WonderWorld at 3 2 1.
2008 OECD PE Report T 21.
Id.
See id. TT 30-33.
2008 OECD PE Report T 23.
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assets in the absence of circumstances in a particular case that
warrant a different view;"426
For intangible assets, "[t]he significant people functions . . . are

those which require active decision-making with regard to the
taking on and management of individual risk and portfolios of risks
associated with the development of intangible property,"427 and "the
key question in determining economic ownership of acquired
intangibles is where within the enterprise the significant people
functions related to active decision-making relating to the taking on
and management of risks are undertaken."428
The first question one might ask about "people functions" is, perhaps,
which is determinative, the "people" or the "function." For instance,
suppose that the home office is in New York and the PE is in Frankfurt.
The senior manager of the PE makes a decision to acquire intangible
property, but does so while working at the home office in New York. Is the
asset then attributable to the home office or the PE? Suppose the decision is
made while s/he is in a third place, whether during the course of the officer's
employment, or perhaps while s/he is on vacation?
Presumably the part of the enterprise with which the "people" are
associated would be the decisive consideration, at least in these
circumstances. This gives rise to a second question, of how one associates
"people" with parts of the enterprise. Personnel may be no more definitively
associated with any given part of the enterprise than are assets, activities,
functions, or risks. A third question concerns "decisions" or "management"
which involve a number of persons, or perhaps a formal committee or board
consisting of persons associated with the PE as well as others associated with
the home office (and perhaps still others associated with another PE). It
should be apparent that even this concept of "people functions" may
frequently require the same sort of allocations as are required by assets,
costs, income, or other concepts-and that the AOA Report does not give
definitive or clear answers to questions posed by the need to make such
allocations.429
Also in relation to "risk" and the attribution of risk, the AOA ventures into
somewhat new territory, but in doing so it devises notions that will influence
430
Its
its later work, in particular under BEPS Actions eight through ten.

cardinal principle is that a PE should be considered as assuming any risks for
which the significant people functions relevant to the assumption of risk are
performed by the personnel of the PE at the PE's location.43' It gives the
example that "the PE should, generally, be treated as assuming the risks
arising from negligence of employees engaged in the function performed by
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.

Id. T 15.
Id. T 116.
Id. T 125.
See id. TT 30-36.
See id.
See supra note 413, T¶ 30-36.
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the PE."432 The Report stresses that "the significant people functions
relevant to the assumption of risks are those which involve active decisionmaking."33 The novel notion, derived on the basis of financial industry
firms internal "key value drivers," i.e., the "key entrepreneurial risk-taking

functions," made explicit in the AOA Report and different from earlier

conceptions of the situs of "risk," including, seemingly, those reflected in the
OECD's Guidelines and the United States regulations, is that risk resides
where it is managed, and not where it poses a threat of loss.434 The Report
corroborates this with the corresponding notion that "capital follows risk,"
and not vice versa: "the part of the enterprise that performs the significant
people functions relevant to the assumption of risks .

.

. would be attributed

the capital necessary to support these risks."435
This concept has all the difficulties cited above with respect to the
problem of attributing "assets" to components of the enterprise, and has
some additional problems. Descriptive literature often enumerates different
types of risk which attend business activities. The Report itself does this,
listing "inventory risk, credit risk, currency risk, interest rate risk, market
risks, product liability and warranty risks, regulatory risk, etc."436 Lists of

this kind are almost always suggested to be non-exhaustive. Moreover, the
categories are loosely defined and ordinarily employed principally for
analytical purposes.437 This is true even in the banking area where
quantitative rules are prescribed for some (credit risk, market risk,
operational risk) but not all types of identifiable risk. With the AOA, it is
not clear how far one is supposed to go in identifying risks and assigning
them to component parts of an enterprise, or how seriously to take a defined
category of risk.
Another problem concerns quantification, which arises in connection with
AOA Report's provisions concerning the allocation of "free capital," which
in turn affects the allocation of interest deductions.438 The default approach
under the Report is a "capital allocation approach."439 Under this approach,
an enterprise's "free capital" is allocated "in accordance with the attribution
of assets owned and risks assumed," so that "if the PE has 10% of the
enterprise's assets and/or risks it will have attributed to it 10% of the
enterprise's 'free' capital."440 This requires some degree of quantification.
In the banking area, credit risk is determined in relation to the amount of a
credit exposure, so quantification, though based on sometimes crude
assumption, proceeds according to a recognized methodology. Noncredit
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

2008 OECD PE Report
2008 OECD PE Report
Id. T 77.
2008 OECD PE Report
Id. at 31.
See id.
See id. at 52.
See id. at 44, 98-99.
2008 OECD PE Report

T 97.
T 28.
T 29.

T 155.
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risks taken into account under capital adequacy rules (operational risk and
market risk) are translated into equivalents of assets, and thus, generate an
increment in required capital, according to specified methods. But other
risks, even of a financial institution, are subject to no such ready rules. And
there are no parallel rules for any kind of risk in any other kind of business.
This leaves open the question of how risk would be quantified for the
purposes of the AOA Report's capital allocation method.44'
The AOA Report, thus, deviates from previous OECD pronouncements
on the arm's length method in three critical respects: in departing from the
use of enterprise-determined allocations as starting points; in identifying
economic criteria for making allocations in a group (the situs of assets and
risks, as determined by "people functions;" and in making a group wide
allocation of free capital (and determining interest deductions on that basis).
At the same time, however, the AOA Report on other, more visible and
simpler, issues retrenches, and expands the reach of arm's length at the
expense of historical practice not consistent with the more rigid and extreme
conceptions born in the 1990s reform. Three issues reflect this tendency.
First, the Report contrasts a "relevant business activity" and a
"functionally separate entity" approach to the attribution of profits to PE.442
The former represents a form of no-creation-of-income approach, under
which the profits attributed to a PE from a particular business activity
cannot exceed the total profits of the group from that activity-in other
words, that the PE may not be allocated any profit not actually realized by
the group; i.e., under this approach there could be, for instance, no
attribution/deduction of "notional royalties."443 The AOA Report rejects
such an approach in favor of the "functionally separate entity" approach,
which would allow the "creation of income" of this kind in a PE.444 The

"creation of income" approach is historically, as detailed elsewhere, a facet of
the regime created by the United States in the 1960s, viz. a feature of the
modern and radical version of "arm's length."
Second, the Report addresses former article 7(3) of the OECD Model Tax
Convention, which could be interpreted as authorizing the remuneration to
the home office for services performed for the PE on a pure "cost" basis,
without a profit element.445 The Report rejects such interpretations, and the
OECD Model Tax Convention was amended in 2010 to revise the provision
and eliminate this possible inference; it concludes that "[a]ll member
countries, including those that interpret Article 7(3) as requiring the abovenamed modifications to the arm's length principle, believe that it would be
preferable if Article 7(3) did not result in modifications to the arm's length
principle."446
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.

See id.
See id. at 23-27.
See id. at 34.
See id. at 25-27.
See id. at 57.
2008 OECD PE Report T 290.
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Third, the Report addresses former article 7(4) of the OECD Model
Convention, which permitted contracting states "to determine the profits to
be attributed to a permanent establishment on the basis of an apportionment
of the total profits of the enterprise to its various parts" to continue to do so
to the extent it had been "customary" to do so. 447 The AOA Report

concluded that
there was a broad consensus among the member countries that such an
apportionment method is not consistent with the guidance on the arm's
length principle in the Guidelines, or that it is extremely difficult to
ensure that the result of applying that method is in accordance with the
arm's length principle and thus that "there was a broad consensus
among the member countries that under the Authorised OECD
Approach only paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 7 are needed to
determine the attribution of profits to a PE."448 Article 7(4) was
accordingly eliminated by the 2010 amendments to the OECD Model
Tax Convention.
These tendencies notwithstanding, the AOA is fundamentally based on
rather explicit expressions of the underlying idea of the profit allocation
system, i.e., that "significant people functions" or "key entrepreneurial risktaking functions"-measured from an inside perspective of the firm-are the
determinative factors for analyzing internal dealings and the resulting
allocation of profits to jurisdictions.
B.

VALUE CREATION IN THE

2010

REVISION OF GUIDELINES

(RESTRUCTURING)

While the AOA took shape, the OECD initiated a parallel project with
respect to the related enterprise, as opposed to the permanent establishment,
context. The project reflected concerns about the response of business to
the structure of the 1995 Guidelines, with their emphasis on contractual
allocation of risk, and the contemplation of a central party or "developer"
within the group. The concern was that businesses were "restructuring"
operations to centralize the FAR characteristics in a single entity, and
changing what had been full-fledged distributorships into "limited function"
distributorships, primarily for transfer pricing, or tax avoidance purposes.
The restructuring project was instituted in 2005 by a Roundtable with
business representatives, and the issue was quite controversial.449 The
conclusion of the Roundtable entailed the formation of a Joint Working
Group (JWG) of delegates from Working Party No. 1 and Working Party
447. Id.
448. 2008 OECD PE Report T 296.
449. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], 2nd Annual Centrefor Tax Policy and
Administration Roundtable: Business Restructuring, (Jan. 26-27, 2005), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/
transfer-pricing/2ndannualcentrefortaxpolicyandadministrationroundtablebusinessrestructuring
.htm [hereinafter 2005 Roundtable].
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and a

final Report in 2010.41, The final Report was largely incorporated into the

revision of the Guidelines in 2010 as a new chapter of the Guidelines.452
Although the OECD tried to avoid the impression of transferring the
AOA to the related party context,453 it was a widely held perception that the
OECD was experimenting with precisely that after the business community
fathomed the possibilities offered by the 1995 Guidelines' emphasis on
contractual terms and ownership of intangibles to divorce tax liabilities from
the internal value of active business functions. As the OECD put it, it had
discerned that "since the mid-90s" the "common pattern" of international
business organization regardless of their products or industry sectors was
becoming "more centralized" with intangible assets and risks which were
"previously integrated in local operations" being transferred to "more
centralized and specialized regional or global units" with tax administrations
"seeing reduced profits being generated in their jurisdictions as a result."54
Thus, in 2005, at the "2nd CTPA Roundtable," four years after the basic
structure of the AOA was internally agreed upon, the OECD started to
prepare the heart surgery operation the 1995 Guidelines' "functional
analysis" required.455
A variety of questions arose as to how to proceed with respect to such
"business restructurings." The first was whether or not asserted business
restructurings indeed resulted in "any changes in the functions or activities
of the local operations which justify the different tax treatment" taxpayers
claimed to result from it, an issue treated by the Roundtable initially as a
factual problem, stressing the importance of ascertaining whether the
purported changes in risk and/or ownership structures had been actually
"agreed on and carried out," which might be difficult to determine.456
The second question involved the tax implications of the business
restructuring itself, especially the determination if the conversion of a local
entity resulted in a transfer of intangible assets and how to measure an
"appropriate remuneration" for any such transfer.57 In particular, the
theoretically difficult first part of that question could not be resolved ad hoc.
But the Roundtable realized that the conversion of a "full fledged distributor
450. See OECD, Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings: Discussion Draft for Public
Comment, at 17, (Sept. 19, 2008-Feb 19, 2009), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/
41346644.pdf [hereinafter 2008 OECD Discussion Draft].
451. See OECD, Report on the Transfer PricingAspects of Business Restructurings: Chapter1C of the
Transfer PricingGuidelines, (uly 22, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/45690216
.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Transfer Pricing Guidelines].
452. See OECD, Revision of the Recommendation of the Council on the Determination of Transfer
Pricing Between Associated Enterprises [C(95)126/FINAL], (une 29, 2010).
453. 2008 OECD Discussion Draft, supra note 450, at 9.
454. 2005 Roundtable, supra note 449, at 1.
455. See id.; OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations, para. 1.28 (uly 1995) [hereinafter 1995 OECD Guidelines].
456. 2005 Roundtable, supra note 449.
457. Id.
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to a commissionaire" may entail the transfer of "marketing intangibles,
goodwill, clientele, and the like" and that the restructuring "from full
fledged to contract or toll manufacturing" may entail a transfer of "process
intangibles developed locally."458 Based on the developer-assister logic of
the 1995 Guidelines, it was also stressed that "initial costs" of intangible
development "may have been incurred which have not yet been fully
recovered," complicating the question of "economic ownership" of any
intangibles which might have been transferred.459 Apparent became the lack
of a consensus on what constitutes an "intangible" for tax transfer pricing
purposes, and the Roundtable saw "not one single view on this issue."460
The third question pertained to the transfer pricing structure goingforward, especially the determination of the correct transfer price for the
"new, more limited functions" performed by the local entities, if there has
been an "effective change in the profile of the local operations."461 The
Roundtable recognized a "spectrum of possibilities" in measuring the degree
to which the local activities had been actually changed, but retreated to
deeming each situation "fact specific."462
But the OECD fully
comprehended that the stripping out of functions, intangible assets and risks
usually resulted in greater proportions of profits "previously earned by the
full-fledged entity" being siphoned to "centralized" entities, depriving the
active local entities of "some kind of sharing in the economic rent generated
by the prior participation in the overall activities of the group."63 How to

account for this "loss" in sharing in the "economic rent" was seen as a
"difficult conceptual issue" but left unresolved.464
Fourth and lastly, the immemorial question of treating subsidiaries as PEs
reemerged. Some tax administrations sought salvation in again asking the
crunch question of "whether and in what circumstances the activities of a
limited function entity can deem a permanent establishment to exist for the
foreign related party for which the entity is acting."465
The Joint Working Group (JWG) of delegates from Working Party No. 1
and Working Party No. 6 was formed to lead the follow-up work on these
issues.466 The 2008 Discussion Draft on the Transfer Pricing Aspects of
Business Restructurings467 was structured into four "Issues Notes."468 With a
458. Id.
459. Id.

460. Id.
461. Id.
462. See 2005 Roundtable, supra note 449.

463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. See 2008 OECD Discussion Draft, supra note 450.
467. The 2008 Discussion Draft defined "business restructuring" as follows:
There is no legal or universally accepted definition of business restructuring. For
the purpose of determining the scope of the project, the CFA proposed that
business restructuring be defined as the cross-border redeployment by a
multinational enterprise of functions, assets and / or risks. A business restructuring
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slightly changed the scope of the project after the PE threshold issues were
referred to Working Party 1 by the CFA, these four Issues Notes addressed:
* the allocation of risks between related parties in an Article 9 context
and in particular the interpretation and application of paragraphs
1.26 to 1.29 of the 1995 Guidelines;
* the application of the arm's length principle and the Guidelines to
the restructuring itself;
* the "application of the arm's length principle and the Guidelines to
post-restructuring arrangements"; and
* "important notions in relation to the 'exceptional circumstances'
where a tax administration may consider not recognising a
transaction or structure adopted by a taxpayer."469
All four Issues Notes have a theoretical core grounded in "value creation"
and "transfer of value" arguments, and all were ultimately translated into the
four parts of the 2010 final Report and, thus, to Chapter IX of the 2010
revised Guidelines.470 Nevertheless, we see Issues Note No. one (Part one of
Chapter IX) as conceptually-n the most important and progressive
redefinition of how the "arm's length standard" generally operates. 472
This Part 1 is based on the premise that an increase in risk-bearing in
general open market situations should be compensated by an increase in
the returns derived from a particular transaction by the party bearing
the risk. This premise is related to the provisions of Chapter I of the
Guidelines that the "contractual terms" "generally define explicitly or
implicitly how the responsibilities, risks and benefits are to be divided
between the parties."473
may involve cross-border transfers of valuable intangibles. Business restructurings
that are within the scope of the OECD's project primarily consist of internal
reallocation of functions, assets and risks within an MNE, although relationships
with third parties (e.g. suppliers, sub-contractors, customers) may also be a reason
for the restructuring and/or be affected by it. Id. at 6.
468. See id. at 3.
469. Id.
470. See id.
471. Equally contested by the business community was Issues Note No. 2 that introduced the
"profits potential approach" to measure the transferred value of combined assets pertaining to
relocated functions. The Federal Republic of Germany had unilaterally enacted such an
approach to business restructurings as Sec. 1 T 3, sentences 9-12 German Foreign Tax Act
(Auflensteuergesetz, AStG) through Article 7 of the Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz2008, August
14, 2007, BGBl. I 2007, 1912.
472. While Chapter IX is only applicable to "business restructurings," the OECD saw its
analysis and conclusion as being "based on the existing transfer pricing rules." See 2008
Discussion Draft, at 8-9. Additionally, the 2008 Draft stated that "[r]isk allocation and risk
transfers can also be significant outside business restructurings and, although this first Issues
Note was drafted in the context of the business restructurings project and is included in this
discussion draft, its scope and significance go beyond business restructurings." Id. at 9.
473. OECD, Transfer PricingGuidelinesfor MultinationalEnterprisesand Tax Administrationsand
Transfer Pricing Features of Selected Countries, at 47 (2010 ed.) [hereinafter 2010 OECD
Guidelines]; 1995 OECD Guidelines, supra note 455, at T 1.28.
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Issues Note No. 1/Part 1 challenges and circumscribes the deference paid
to contractual assignments of risks and the consequential profit attributionand as such the quasi-elective profit assignment permitted by the
Guidelines'-by reference to the notion, set forth in the 2010 revision of
Chapter I, that any "contractual allocation of risk between associated
enterprises" will be respected only to the extent that it has economic
substance.474 In testing the necessary "substance" of the contractual
assignments to be respected, Chapter IX directs attention to three factors
collateral to the taxpayers' intracorporate contracts-whether the parties'
conduct conforms to the contract; whether the contractual allocation is
"arm's length"; and the consequences of the allocation.475 Of central
significance is the second. This means that contractual allocations have
necessary "substance" to be respected "where data evidence a similar
allocation of risk in" contracts between comparably situated independent
parties.476 But absent such comparables, it becomes necessary to hypothesize
"whether that allocation of risk is one that might be expected to have been
agreed between independent parties in similar circumstances."477 Part 1
describes factors that "can assist" in this hypothetical determination to be
(i) the "control over the risk" contractually allocated; and
(ii) the anticipated "financial capacity to assume that risk."478
Chapter IX elaborates a conception of "control over risk" which greatly
resembles the parallel concept in the AOA, although Chapter IX never
explicitly uses the term "significant people functions":
"[C]ontrol" should be understood as the capacity to make decisions to
take on the risk (decision to put the capital at risk) and decisions on
whether and how to manage the risk, internally or using an external
provider. This would require the company to have people-employees
or directors-who have the authority to, and effectively do, perform
these control functions. Thus, when one party bears a risk, the fact that
it hires another party to administer and monitor the risk on a day-today basis is not sufficient to transfer the risk to that other party.479
While it is not necessary to perform the day-to-day monitoring and
administration functions in order to control a risk (as it is possible to
outsource these functions), in order to control a risk one has to be able
to assess the outcome of the day-to-day monitoring and administration
functions by the service provider (the level of control needed and the
type of performance assessment would depend on the nature of the
risk).480
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.

2010 OECD Guidelines, supra note 473, at 240.
Id.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 242.
Id.
2010 OECD Guidelines, supra note 424, at 243.
Id.
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Chapter IX accompanies these provisions with significant disclaimers
aimed at quelling protests. It says first that "[j]ust because an arrangement
between associated enterprises is one not seen between independent parties
should not of itself mean the arrangement is non-arm's length."481 And
Chapter IX includes a provision-not set forth in the 2008 Discussion
Draft-to calm fears that it is "importing" AOA standards into the Article 9
context:
The reference to the notions of 'control over risk' and of 'financial
capacity to assume the risk' is not intended to set a standard under
Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention whereby risks would
always follow capital or people functions. The analytical framework
under Article 9 is different from the AOA that was developed under
Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention.482
But, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that by elevating the notion of
"control over risks" to a general principle for testing all contractual
allocations of risks that cannot be verified by actual open market
comparables-i.e., all transaction that are firm specific in nature and not
readily found between independent parties-it is transforming the "arm's
length principle" from a tool to pricing the transactions "as structured by the
associated enterprises"483 into something of a behavioral standard based on
hypothetical behavior. This leads to the paradoxical situation that additional
(if hypothetical) market analogies are employed to implicitly retreat from a
mere "pricing tool" and to establish a profit allocation system cognizant of
circumstances in which a business restructuring economically did not change
the internal "value creation." In such circumstances, tax administrations
would be able to treat the risks contractually relocated as remaining vested in the
local entities' 'unctional" profile for transferpricing purposes.

On balance, much as suggested in the AOA, in Issues Note No. 1/Part 1
the OECD establishes that (entrepreneurial) risks of business operations and
the associated "residual profit"484 cannot be shifted within the MNE group

by contract alone but only by shifting underlying active (people) functions
pertinent to risk management.48 5 Put differently, internal processes of value
creation were to trump legal forms even if the contracts would rule market
allocations of profits. As such, Issues Note No. 1/Part I of Chapter IX
disperses "entrepreneurship" within the firm according to managerial people
486

functions.

Issues Note No. 2/Part 2 addresses the transfer pricing consequences of
the business restructuring itself, and although deprived of its core problem
identified by the 2005 Roundtable-the definition and allocation of
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.

2010 OECD Guidelines, supra note 424, at 242.
Id.
1995 OECD Guidelines, supra note 455, at 1 1.36.
2008 OECD Discussion Draft, supra note 450, at 14.
See id. at 6.
See id. at 14-20.
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economic ownership of "intangibles" for transfer pricing-the Note
contained some noteworthy conceptually new features.487
Most decisively, in considering the appropriate, if any, compensation for
the restructuring itself, the OECD put emphasis on internalintangiblefactors to
the firm's economic value generation regardless of their qualification as

"property" or treatment for accounting purposes. Any "transfer of
something of value,"488 the OECD posited, would give rise to a
compensation between independent parties. Hence, the precise economic
content of the restructuring transaction must be understood on the basis of
the "economic principles that generally govern relationships between
independent enterprises."489 Thereby, the first intangible factor to take into
account may be "local synergy losses" of the restructured entity, regardless
of the potential overall synergy increase of the group as a whole, as a
consequence of the restructuring;490 the second, derived from the "options
realistically available" (ORA) concept, might be an indemnification payment
for the termination of contracts, again regardless of overall increases in
group-wide synergies;491 the third might be the transfer of a "profit
potential" which was defined as "not an asset, but a potential which is carried
by some rights or other assets,"492 if relinquishing it would call for an
"appropriate remuneration" on open market terms; 493 the fourth might be a
straightforward transfer of "intangibles" previously "owned" by the
restructured entity;494 the fifth intangible factor might be a transfer of

"goodwill" associated with bundle of (tangible or intangible) assets used in
an activity transferred in the restructuring transaction (i.e., transfer of a
going concern).495
This set of Guidelines aims to prevent an MNE from voiding higher-tax,
satellite jurisdiction of "assets, risks, and functions," transferring them to a,
central "cash box," organized in a tax haven or other lower-tax jurisdiction.
It achieves this aim by providing that there will be a deemed capital-like
transaction to which an "arm's length" charge will be imputed. What is
487. See id. at 21-37.
488. See id. at 21.
489. Id. at 22.
490. See 2008 OECD Discussion Draft, supra note 450, at 23.
491. See id.
492. Id. at 24.
493. See id. at 25. The practical difficulty of this approach is to determine the difference in net
present value of riskier, yet potentially more profitable, and less-risky, yet more stable flows of
anticipate profits, necessary to measure the "appropriateness" of any compensation.
494. Issues Note No. 2 did not elaborate the crucial questions how to determine transfer
pricing "ownership" and how to determine if there was an actual "transfer" (i.e. a change in
"ownership") of intangibles. See id. at 28-29. The Issues Note at T 84 only plays with the ORA
concept to provide hints how to determine appropriate remuneration if a transfer could be
assumed to have taken place. But one noteworthy, yet poorly elaborated, idea pertains to socalled "local intangibles," i.e. "intangible assets that cannot be transferredbecause they are inherent
to the local operation." Id. at 3 1.
495. See id. at 32.
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deemed to occur is a "capital-like," not a capital transaction. By virtue of the
use of this "FAR jargon," Part 2 requires allocations in a range of
circumstances that, like the Chapter IX definition of "restructuring" itself,
are not easy to define, apply, or understand.
Thereby Issues Note No. 2/Part 2 provides that a "comparability analysis"
of a restructuring itself has to be performed based upon an examination of
the "functions, assets, risks" (FAR) of each party to the restructuring both
before and after the restructuring.496 When a "comparable" restructuring
can be found, the price charged in that restructuring may be used.497 When
no comparable can be found, one is to look at three things:
* "The restructuring transactions and the FAR of each party before
and after the restructuring;"
* "The business reasons for and the expected benefits from the
restructuring, including the role of synergies;"
* "The options realistically available (ORA) to the parties."498
The rules then contemplate that a charge will be reflected in any of three
circumstances:
* Where there is a significant transfer of profit potential from one of
the parties to another;499
* When there has been a transfer of "something of value" from one
party to another, which "something" might be (x) tangible assets;500
(y) intangible assets; 50' or (z) going concern value;502 and
* When there has been a "termination or substantial renegotiation of
existing arrangements."503
The final two Issues Notes/Parts show much more substantial differences
between the 2008 Discussion Draft and the final Chapter IX than do the
first two Issues Notes/Parts.
Issues Note No. 3, in search for how to treat the local entities postrestructuring, referenced the "tentative" OECD proposal "to remove the
exceptionality and put a greater emphasis on the relative strengths and
weaknesses of each method"504 and stressed the factual implications for the
comparability and functional analysis that might derive from the previous
economic performance of the restructured local entity in selecting a transfer
pricing method for the "more limited" functions entity.505 This clarified that
a low-risk profile of the local entity cannot be derived from the application
of a "one-sided" method but that the economic low-risk profile on the basis
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.

Id. at 16.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 19-2 1.
See 2010 Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 451, at 21-23.
See id. at 23-26.
See id. at 26-27.
Id. at 27-31.
See 2008 OECD Discussion Draft, supra note 450, at 39.
See id.
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of the comparability analysis taking into account Issues Note No. 1 has to be
prevalent in order to apply a "one-sided" method going forward.506 Neither,
the OECD started to stress, can a "one-sided" method be applied on the
basis of a "one-sided analysis" without having some regard to "some
qualitative, non-financial information" of both parties to the transaction.o7
The application of the two-sided profit split was seen as hinging on the "the
nature and extent of the risks and intangibles" that remain with the
restructured entity,5o8 but because the elaboration of the definition and
assignment of "intangibles" in transfer pricing analysis was outsourced this
statement ran rather empty. Still, the Issues Note made a tentative step,
arguing the profit split method could be appropriate in a wider range of
"non-benchmarkable (e.g. strategic) functions" performed by the
restructured enterprises and not found in market comparables.509
These provisions were greatly shortened and softened by the 2010 Report,
to the point where they are barely noticeable in one paragraph of the final
Chapter IX.510 Instead, Chapter IX sets forth relatively neutral provisions to
the effect that restructured entities should not be treated differently than
"limited function" entities which are newly formed as such,511 subject to
qualifications concerning differences in FAR that might be occasioned by the
prior existence of a full-fledged entity;512 and cautioning against comparing
profitability pre- and post-restructuring in examining the pricing of postrestructuring transactions. 5
Lastly, and conceptually significant, Issues Note No. 3/Part III contains a
discussion of the allocation or attribution of extra profits due to "location
savings," in other words of economic externalities, a question the OECD
perceives as "obviously dependent" on what independent parties at arm's
length would do.5'4 Nonetheless, the Issues Note No. 3/Part III fail to
deliver a concrete answer because the question again hinges on whether the
"more limited" entity being employed to capture the "location savings"
rendered routine or unique service, i.e. whether "the subsidiary . . . has

developed a valuable intangible corresponding to its technical know-how"
because such "an intangible would need to be taken into account in the
determination of the arm's length remuneration." '1
506. See id. at 40, 43.
507. See id. at 43.
508. See id. at 45.
509. See id. at 45-46.
510. 2010 OECD Guidelines, supra note 424, at 280.
511. See id. at 280-281.
512. See id. at 278-80.
513. See id. at 283-84.
514. See 2008 OECD Discussion Draft, supra note 450, at 51.
515. See id. at 52. The scope of such difficulties may be underscored by certain differences
among the two of us concerning the issue of location savings. One author considers the OECD
position on location savings a more or less blatant political move to deter developing countries
from seeking to tax the extra profit deriving from the low wage levels in their countries, and
seems to insinuate, irrespective of what he may actually think, that the other author is a political
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Finally, Issues Note No. 4/Part IV contains an elaboration of the "asstructured" principle of the 1995 Guidelines and the "exceptional
circumstances" for non-recognition, i.e. when a transaction structure can be
re-characterized by tax authorities for transfer pricing purposes. 516 This may
be necessary "where there is a dispute about the fundamental nature of the
transaction being examined."517 In such cases, according to the 1995
Guidelines, non-recognition may be necessary to "allow an adjustment of
conditions to reflect those which the parties would have attained had the
transaction been structured in accordance with the economic and
commercial reality of parties dealing at arm's length."5is The 2008
correct coward not to admit as much. But this very other author understands that the
negotiations about location savings stem from this very desire (on the part of emerging
economies) and its abrogation by the OECD, but thinks that capturing economic externalities
through application of a transactional contribution system that looks at the internal value of the
entities' contributions to value creation requires a more convincing theoretical underpinning
and operationalization within the structure of the transactional system (i) because the location
saving seems to adroitly considered a comparability factor that could "destroy" comparability
but could not-since it is not an intangible-itself create a basis for a profit split; (ii) because the
locational aspects of the OLI paradigm are even more difficult to fathom than the entities'
respective contributions through functions performed, and open the door to deem every aspect
of any locale-such as the rule of law, network effects or educational levels or opportunitiesan "economic location saving" that needs to be evaluated.
516. See 1995 Guidelines, at ¶1.36:
ii)

Recognition of the actual transactions undertaken
1.36 A tax administration's examination of a controlled transaction ordinarily
should be based on the transaction actually undertaken by the associated
enterprises as it has been structured by them, using the applied by the taxpayer
insofar as these are consistent with the methods described in Chapters II and ill.
In other than exceptional cases, the tax administration should not disregard the
actual transactions or substitute other transactions for them. Restructuring of
legitimate business transactions would be a wholly arbitrary exercise the
inequity of which could be compounded by double taxation created where the
other tax administration does not share the same views as to how the
transaction should be structured. (Emphasis added).

517. See 2008 OECD Discussion Draft, at T 201.
518. See 2008 OECD Discussion Draft, supra note 450, at 54.
1.37 However, there are two particular circumstances in which it may,
exceptionally, be both appropriate and legitimate for a tax administration to
consider disregarding the structure adopted by a taxpayer in entering into a
controlled transaction. The first circumstance arises where the economic substance
of a transaction differs from its form. In such a case the tax administration may
disregard the parties' characterisation of the transaction and re-characterise it in
accordance with its substance. [. . .] The second circumstance arises where, while
the form and substance of the transaction are the same, the arrangements made in
relation to the transaction, viewed in their totality, differ from those which would
have been adopted by independent enterprises behaving in a commercially rational
manner and the actual structure practically impedes the tax administration from
determining an appropriate transfer price. [. . .]
1.38 In both sets of circumstances described above, the character of the
transaction may derive from the relationship between the parties rather than be
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Discussion Draft included two provisions that appeared to expand the
authority of administrations. The first would have permitted tax authorities
to "adjust the price or other conditions" of a controlled transaction, even
where there was no "dispute about the fundamental nature of the transaction
being examined," and thus, "no recognition issue" within the meaning of
Chapter I, "where such price or conditions are not arm's length according to
guidance provided in other parts of the TP Guidelines."519 The second
provided that where the provisions of Chapter I did apply, "Article 9 would
allow an adjustment of conditions to reflect those which the parties would
have attained had the transaction been structured in accordance with the
economic and commercial reality of parties dealing at arm's length," with
"the objective . . . to arrive at a characterisation or structure that comports as

closely as possible with the facts of the case."520 Both provisions were
omitted by the 2010 final Report and not included in Chapter IX.
As a conceptual matter, both Issues Note No. 4 and Part 4 emphasize the
"exceptional" character of such an exercise and the general rule to base any
transfer pricing analysis on the transaction "as structured" by the taxpayer. 521
Additionally, the Note stresses that non-recognition is appropriate only if the
actual transaction cannot be priced appropriately,522 and argues that a
transaction structure lacks "economic rationality" only in a narrow class of
cases. 523 Thus, while Issues Note No. 1/Part 1 is quite progressive on
assessing the "substance" of a contractual allocation, the OECD did not
endorse using the cruder tool of non-recognition in other than "exceptional"
cases, yet the precise delineation of the two concepts is not always
straightforward.524

The four Issues Notes were incorporated into a new Chapter IX and
existing Chapter I of the OECD Guidelines, respectively, in 2010.525 Left
determined by normal commercial conditions and may have been structured by the
taxpayer to avoid or minimise tax. In such cases, the totality of its terms would be
the result of a condition that would not have been made if the parties had been
engaged in arm's length dealings. Article 9 would thus allow an adjustment of
conditions to reflect those which the parties would have attained had the transaction
been structured in accordance with the economic and commercial reality of parties
dealing at arm's length. [. . ]

1995 OECD Guidelines, supra note 3455a, at TT 1.37-1.38; see 2008 OECD
Discussion Draft, supra note 450, at 54.
519. See 2008 OECD Discussion Draft, supra note 450, at 54.
520. See 2008 OECD Discussion Draft, at T 202.
521. See 2010 OECD Guidelines, supra note 424, at 280.
522. See OECD, Chapter 1C of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, T 9.180 (July 22, 2010)
[hereinafter OECD Chapter IX of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines].
523. See id. T 9.171.
524. See also OECD, Transfer PricingAspects of Business Restructurings: Discussion Draft for Public
Comment, T 217 (Sept. 19, 2008-Feb. 19, 2009) (The example pertains to a transfer of a nonroutine intangible asset to an entity not having the people to actively manage the intangible
going forward for a lump-sum; a transaction structure, the Issues Note states, most OECD
countries "indicate they would not recognize.").
525. OECD Chapter IX of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 522.
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unresolved was the problem of defining and assigning economic ownership
of "intangibles" for transfer pricing purposes, one major problem initially
identified by the 2005 Roundtable as part of the question how to apply the
arm's-length standard to the restructuring itself (Issues Note 2),526 but the
OECD continued its work on this critically important issue.

C.

THE 2012 INTANGIBLEs REPORT

In 2010, with the publication of the revisions of the OECD Model
Convention and the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the OECD announced
that it would study the question of identifying the "economic owner" of
"intangible property" within an integrated corporate group. 527 The problem
had been identified as a significant one in the discussions at the 2005
Roundtable with which the studies leading to the restructuring report and
Chapter IX had been instituted, but the OECD working parties had agreed
to excise the issue from the restructuring project.528
The question derived from the concept of the "developer/assister" rule,
which was descended from the original United States 1968 regulations.529
Under this rule, in the absence of a "bona fide" cost-sharing agreement, one
entity within a group was identified as the "developer" of an intangible,
ordinarily the party that bore the greatest share of the costs and risks of
development. Other components of the group participating in the
development were "assisters."530 The key to the rule was that no allocations

were made with respect to the development activity at the time of that
activity, but rather were deferred until the time the development of any
intangible was completed, and the intangible was put into service.531 If there
were a bona fide cost sharing agreement in place, then costs would be
allocated under that agreement, and the benefits conferred by that
agreement would govern the allocation of income derived from the
completed intangibles.532
These concepts or rules played an obvious role in facilitating the "cash
box" practice because the TNE entity could concentrate charges incurred in
the development of the intangible in the cash-box entity, rendering it the
"developer." This could then justify allocation of the lion's share of the
526. Id. T 78 (Issues Note No. 2 only contained the statement that an "essential part of the
analysis of a business restructuring is to identify what intangible assets if any were owned by the
restructured entity, what intangible assets if any were actually transferred, and what their value
is.").
527. See also OECD, Transfer Pricingand Intangibles: Scope of the OECD Project (Jan. 25, 2011),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/46987988.pdf.
528. Id. 1.
529. 33 Fed. Reg. 5848 (Apr. 15, 1968).
530. Id.
531. Id.
532. Id.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
362

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 51, NO. 2

"residual" income to this entity, whether under a bona fide cost sharing
agreement or otherwise533
The OECD issued a public Discussion Draft with respect to the
intangibles issue in 2012.534 In a prefatory note, Working Party No. 6 made

clear its principal objective was reform of this "developer/assister" idea,
saying that its "delegates are uniformly of the view that transfer pricing
outcomes in cases involving intangibles should reflect the functions
performed, assets used, and risks assumed by the parties," and that that
"neither legal ownership, nor the bearing of costs related to intangible
development, taken separately or together, entitles an entity within an MNE
group to retain the benefits or returns with respect to intangibles without
more."535 The Discussion Draft was to accomplish this by "identiffying] a

concept of intangible related returns and suggest[ing] that such returns
should follow the contributions to the value of the intangibles."536

The Draft sketches an allocation system for "intangible related returns"
(IRR) that asks which "member or members of an MNE group . . . are

entitled to intangible related returns in arm's length transactions."537 The
IRR attributable to a particular intangible is defined as the net "economic
return from business operations involving the use of that intangible after
deducting (i) the costs and expenses related to the relevant business
operations; and (ii) returns to business functions, assets other than the
particular intangible in question, and risks, taking into account appropriate
comparability

adjustments." 53

This demoted

traditional

arm's length

pricing by "delineation" of an internal, intra-group transaction, and elevated
an approach based on directly reaching results.539
The Discussion Draft indicated that the determination which member/s
of the groups is/are "entitled" to IRR was not to be controlled by "formal"
consideration.540 The terms and conditions of legal arrangements including
relevant registrations, license agreements, and other relevant contracts
would form the starting point of the analysis, but it is necessary to ascertain
"whether the functions performed, the assets used, the risks assumed, and
the costs incurred by members of the MNE group .. . are in alignment with
533. See also James R. Mogle, The Future of Transfer Pricing: Practical and Policy Opportunities
Unique to Intellectual Property, Economic Substance, and EntrepreneurialRisk in the Allocation of
Intangible Income, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 925 (2002).
534. OECD, Revision of the Special Considerations for Intangibles in Chapter VI of the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelinesand Related Provisions (June 6, 2012-Sept. 14, 2012), https://www.oecd
.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/50526258.pdf.
535. Id. at 12.
536. Id.
537. Id. T 27.
538. Id. T 28.
539. See also Joint Comm. on Taxation, 111th Cong., Present Law and Background Related to
Possible Income Shifting and Transfer Pricing, JCX-37-10, at 13-14, 105 (2010).
540. OECD, Discussion Draft, Revision of the Special Considerationsfor Intangiblesin Chapter VI of
the OECD Transfer PricingGuidelinesand Related Provisions (June 6, 2012-Sept. 14, 2012), https:/
/www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/5052625 8.pdf.
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the allocation of entitlement to intangible related returns in the relevant
registrations and contracts;"141 such member/s would be called the
"developer/s" in the nomenclature of the 1994 U.S. Regulations, but in the
2012 Draft there can be more than one "developer," and that the Draft did
not assign "economic ownership" of the intangible but the right to
participate in the IRR, which would generally follow from economic transfer
pricing ownership.542 The analysis under the 2012 Draft would further ask
"whether services rendered ... by other members of the MNE group to the
member/s of the MNE group entitled to intangible related returns under the
relevant registrations and contracts, are compensated on an arm's length
basis."543 The 2012 Discussion Draft framed the test whether contractual
agreements evince the necessary economic "substance" to be respected,
stating that:
When evaluating the alignment between a contractualclaim to entitlement to

all or part of the intangible related returns attributable to an intangible,
and the conduct of the parties, examination of functions, risks, and costs

related to the development, enhancement, maintenance and protection
of the intangibles is necessary. Where the conduct of the parties is not
aligned with the terms of legal registrations and contracts, it may be
appropriate to allocate all or part of the intangible related returns to the

entity or entities that, as a matter of substance, perform the functions,
bear the risks, and bear the costs that relate to development,
enhancement, maintenance and protection of the intangibles.544
The OECD did not develop these concepts further under this Discussion
Draft, but its essential approach was carried forward by the work done in
connection with the base erosion and profit shifting initiative, as discussed
below.
D.

SUMMARY

OF FINDINGS ON VALIDITY OF THE PARADIGM

The foregoing review of the evolution of transfer pricing rules
demonstrates that the concept of value creation has, since the founding of
the international tax system in the 1920s, been the implicit, and at times the
explicit, principle governing the assignment of the right to tax business
profits.
The system has undergone three major transformations, all assumed
under the rubric of the "arm's length principle," which have obscured, but
not eviscerated, the role played by value creation, and all of which have
varied the treatment of the "residual" income of a TNE group by the
541. See id. T 29.
542. OECD, Discussion Draft, Revision of the Special Considerationsfor Intangibles in Chapter VI of
the OECD Transfer PricingGuidelinesand Related Provisions (June 6, 2012-Sept. 14, 2012), http://
www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/46987988.pdf.

543. See id. T 29.
544. See id. T 37.
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international rules. The first was the original articulation of the "arm's
length" idea by Mitchell Carroll on behalf of the League of Nations in the
1930s, which assigned the right to tax the residual to the home country.
Although this limited source taxation of business profits, it did so in the
name of an idea that embodied value creation-that the central management
of the enterprise, headquartered in the parent's home country was the
primary generative source of the value the residual represented.
The second was the articulation of the "method" system, describing the
"one-sided" methods, by the United States in the 1960s, adopted by the
OECD in 1979. This system took the residual away from any necessary
assignment to the home enterprise, but left it indefinitely assigned. This
created difficulties for tax administrations in determining outcomes, creating
the need for ad hoc resolutions embodied in the various informal "profit
split" methods used under this second regime, and further diminished any
emphasis on "value creation."
The third phase was the system adopted by the United States in the early
1990s, and accepted by the OECD, with modifications, in the mid-1990s.
This system depended upon "comparability factors," of which the most
prominent were the taxpayer's own "contractual allocations." This system
left the residual to be assigned to whichever jurisdiction the taxpayer chose;
predictably, the taxpayers devised ways of placing the residual in low-tax
jurisdictions, often through separate corporate entities created largely to be
repositories of the residuals as determined under unilaterally designed
intercompany contracts. But even as it permitted this result, the system
restored the notion of "value creation," with its supposed emphasis on the
locus of "functions," "assets," and "risks," however nebulously those notions
were defined. Moreover, the system of taxpayer control quickly proved
problematic, if acceptable, at least to the OECD, which in short order began
searching for ways to limit taxpayer discretion. That search led ultimately to
BEPS, and Action 8-10, but even then, as noted below, there was a reaction
demanding at least some restoration of the taxpayer-determined "contractual
allocation" regime.
These shifts in the rules reflect the political pressures of the day-the
dominance of imperial powers and "capital exporters" in the 1920s and
1930s; the balancing of exchange stabilization against policies promoting
economic growth in the 1960s; the dawning of the age of "globalization" in
the 1990s. In these developments, value creation has been used in a strictly
"transactional" approach that regularly recharacterises the value of
contributions to transactions by applying market analogies to measure the
value of internalized functions, although this was not and is not foreordained
by the basic premise of taxing business income at source. Thus, while
arguing that "value creation" represents the true norm implicit in the basic
foundation of taxing businesses "at source," we are aware that in practical
negotiations on the surface political instincts and interests prevail.
Nevertheless, these instincts and concerns are manifestations of the "true"
norm. Although its interpretation has changed over time according to
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political pressures and the contemporaneous state-of-the-art, the underlying
principle has been consistently value creation. Income allocation might,
thus, be seen as an attempt to capture value creation, and "aligning transfer
pricing outcomes" might be seen as an appropriate formulation of the "true
international norm." As such, we see "value creation" grounded in Article 9
of the OECD Model Convention, and attempts to capture the true value
creation as covered by treaty provisions based on it.
At the same time, it is demonstrable that conceptions of how to localize
"value creation" have proven very difficult to formulate, and what serve now
as such conceptions are still in a primitive state. This has proven the
Achille's heel of proposals, for instance, for formula apportionment, as
proponents of such a system have consistently been unable to provide
convincing answers to what should be the "allocation keys" of such a system.
Even the more limited "transactional" profit split methods authorized by
OECD materials at the present time suffer this flaw, and the answers given
by the BEPS initiative are hardly wholly satisfactory either. Nevertheless,
even if "value creation" is not fully theoretically understood, there is a rather
solid basis regarding the parameters that contribute to it and thus should be
appropriately captured. This should be done not only to create coherence
and global acceptability of the system (which contributes to international
stability), but also to strengthen the attempts to curtail "artificial" schemes
that exploit misalignments between the internal economic value creation and
the international tax system; i.e., in the notion of "value creation" theoretical
coherence and policy considerations seem to merge.
But this does counsel against extreme statements either way in respect of
the BEPS project. It is not fair to argue that "the desired outcome of better
'align[ing] rights to tax with economic activity' constitutes a departure from
the current regime," or that "[p]ut simply, the international tax system does
not currently allocate taxing rights to countries according to where
'economic activity' takes place;" still less that the BEPS project "overlays a
new and completely different principle onto the existing structure."545 The
fact is that the system, with respect to business profits, essays consistently to
do this, and employs the touchstone of source as a proxy of "economic
activity." Neither, however, is it realistic to assert that "the principle of
ensuring that the transfer-pricing outcome be 'in line with value creation' is
"clear and it should be widely perceived as fair, and thus, legitimate."546
Clarity and legitimacy depend upon considerable further work on the
definition of the link of value creation to the economic activities within
several jurisdictions involved in the commercial undertakings at issue.

545. Michael Devereux & John Vella, Are We Heading Towards a Corporate Tax System Fitfor the
21st Century?, 35 FiscAL STUD. 449, 464 (2014).
546. Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS, 16 FLA. TAX REv. 55, 99 (2014).
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BEPS: Hybrids and Schizophrenia

A.

THE DELIVERABLES AND DisCUSSION

[VOL. 51, NO. 2

DRAFTs

The OECD issued two principal and five secondary preliminary reports
under Action 8 through 10. The OECD issued the "2014 deliverable" under
Action 8, the first of the two principal Reports, in September 2014.547 This
was followed by the first of the secondary Reports, on low value-adding
intra-group services, in November 2014.548 In December 2014, the OECD
released the second principal preliminary Report, concerning risk, recharacterisation,

and

special

measures

under

Action

10;549

and

simultaneously released two of the subsidiary Reports, concerning profit
splitssso and cross-border commodity transactions.5'1 It released the two
other secondary Reports, concerning cost contributions agreements
(CCAs)552 and hard-to-value intangibless- in April and June of 2016,
respectively. It revised the preliminary guidance on profit splits in July
2016.554 The final Reports, covering all six topics except the final guidance
on profit splits, were issued in September 2015.555
As noted above, the OECD in these documents approached its task as
confined by two constraints: the first, to strengthen the existing transfer
pricing rules to circumscribe tax avoidance; the second, to preserve the
"arm's length" system. The OECD resolved the dilemma posed by
547. OECD, Guidance on Transfer PricingAspectsofIntangibles (2014), http://www.keepeek.com/
Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/guidance-on-transfer-pricing-aspects-of-intangibles
9789264219212-en#.WQOiXoWcGUk.
548. OECD, BEPS Action 10: Proposed Modifications to Chapter VII of the Transfer Pricing
Guidelines Relating to Low Value-Adding Intra-GroupServices (Nov. 3 2014-Jan. 14, 2015), https:/
/www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/discussion-draft-action-10-low-value-adding-intra-groupservices.pdf.
549. OECD, BEPS Action 8, 9, 10: DiscussionDraft on Revisions to ChapterI of the Transfer Pricing
Guidelines (Dec. 1, 2014-Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/discussiondraft-actions-8-9-10-chapter-i -TP-Guidelines-risk-recharacterisation-special-measures.pdf
[hereinafter OECD BEPS Action 8, 9, 10].
550. OECD, BEPS Action, 10: Discussion Draft on the Use of Profit Splits in the Context of Global
Value Chains (Dec. 16, 2014-Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/
discussion-draft-action-10-profit-splits-global-value-chains.pdf.
551. OECD, BEPS Action 10: Transfer Pricing Aspects of Cross-Border Commodity Transactions
(Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/public-comments-action-10-crossborder-commodity-transactions.pdf.
552. OECD, Preliminary Discussion Draft, BEPSAction 8: Revisions to Chapter VIIIof the Transfer
Pricing Guidelines on Cost Contributions Agreements (CCAs), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transferpricing/discussion-draft-BEPS-action-8-cost-contribution-arrangements.pdf.
553. OECD, BEPS Action 8: Hard-to-ValueIntangibles (une 4-18, 2016), https://www.oecd.org/
ctp/transfer-pricing/discussion-draft-beps-action-8-hard-to-value-intangibles.pdf.
554. OECD, BEPS Action 8-10: Revised Guidance on Profit Splits (uly 4, 2016-Sept. 5, 2016),
https://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/BEPS-discussion-draft-on-the-revised-guidance-onprofit-splits.pdf.
555. OECD, Aligning Transfer PricingOutcomes with Value Creation (2015), http://www.keepeek
.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/guidance-on-transfer-pricing-aspects-of-intan
gibles_9789264219212-en#.WQOiXoWcGUk.
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focusing, as to the first objective, all but exclusively on what had preoccupied
it throughout the previous decade, viz., the problem of TNEs' accumulation
of profits in tax haven subsidiaries on the basis of "contractual allocations" or
"risks" and placement of legal ownership of intangibles in such subsidiaries.
1.

Intangibles

Action 8 directed the OECD to "[d]evelop rules to prevent BEPS by
moving intangibles among group members," which it said would involve
four things:
* adopting a broad and clearly delineated definition of intangibles;
* ensuring that profits associated with the transfer and use of
intangibles are appropriately allocated in accordance with (rather
than divorced from) value creation;
* developing transfer pricing rules or special measures for transfers of
hard-to-value intangibles; and
* updating the guidance on cost contribution arrangements.556
The focus of the 2014 intangibles deliverable was upon the first and
second items. The 2014 intangibles deliverable sets forth a distinct idea for
reformulating pre-existing rules. The focus of the effort was to contrast
rules based upon the locus of "value creation" with older (putative) rules that
emphasized the situs of "legal ownership." The deliverable's restatement of
Chapter VI begins with an extensive description of the task of "identifying"
intangible property for purposes of any "transfer pricing analysis," in
keeping with the first matter to which Action 8 directs attention.557 The
deliverable sets forth a relatively broad identification of what constitute
"intangibles," which the deliverables gives as "something which is not a
physical asset or a financial asset, which is capable of being owned or
controlled for use in commercial activities, and whose use or transfer would
be compensated had it occurred in a transaction between independent
parties in comparable circumstances."55 The deliverable rejects focus upon
legal or accounting conceptions, rejects any requirement that the property
enjoy legal protection, and, while it requires that the item susceptible of
being "owned or controlled," and implicitly subject to "use or transfer," it
rejects any requirement that the "something" be separately transferable, thus
including items that may be transferable "only in combination with other
business assets."559 The deliverable specifically rejects any notion that
"market conditions" constitute any kind of intangible.560 The Report
stresses that the process of identifying an intangible is distinct from the
556. OECD, Guidance on Transfer PricingAspects of Intangibles, at 9 (2014), http://www.keepeek
.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/guidance-on-transfer-pricing-aspects-of-intan
gibles_9789264219212-en#.We-H5denE2w [hereinafter OECD Guidance on Transfer Pricing
Aspects of Intangibles].
557. Id. T 6.5.
558. Id. T 6.06.
559. Id. ¶¶ 6.06-09.
560. Id. ¶¶ 6.9, 6.30[viii].
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process of determining a price for its transfer; and emphasizes that
intangibles must be identified "with specificity."61

The 2014 intangibles deliverable represented a tightening of the "arm's
length" rules, particularly with respect to the "cash box" practices, in two
principal respects. The key device by which the deliverable proposes to
align allocations with "value creation" involves, in essence, the OECD
doubling down on "comminution of income." This involves the distinction
it draws between two categories of what it characterizes as "transactions":
transactions "involving the development, enhancement, maintenance,
protection and exploitation of intangibles," on the one hand; and
"transactions involving the use or transfer of intangibles," on the other.562
Both categories are of intercompany "transactions." The second category is
further subdivided into two categories: transactions "involving transfers of
intangibles or rights in intangiblesl;"563 and transactions "involving the use of
intangibles in connection with sales of goods or performance of services."564
It is by means of the first category-of (hypothetical or constructed)
transactions "involving the development, enhancement, maintenance,
protection and exploitation of intangibles"-that the deliverable diminishes
the significance of the criterion of "legal ownership" of the intangible. The
deliverable says that "the determination of the entity or entities within an
MNE group which are ultimately entitled to share in the returns derived by
the group from exploiting intangibles is crucial," but that "[a]lthough the
legal owner of an intangible may receive the proceeds from exploitation of
the intangible, other members of the legal owner's MNE group may have
performed functions, used assets, or assumed risks that are expected to
contribute to the value of the intangible," and that such members "must be
compensated for their contributions under the arm's length principle."565
The Report lists (familiar) reasons why the determination of what
contributions have been made and how to compensate them may be "highly
challenging,"566 and outlines the "steps" to be taken in making such
determinations. The fourth and fifth steps listed are new in "arm's length"
lexicology, not reflected either in the existing OECD Guidelines or the
United States regulations; and these are the essential elements of the
deliverable's double down on "comminution":
(iv) identifying the controlled transactions related to the development,
enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles
in light of the legal ownership of the intangibles under relevant
registrations and contracts, and the conduct of the parties, including
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.

Id. TT 6.10.
OECD Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, supra note 556, T 6.84.
Id. T 6.85.
Id. T 6.101.
Id. T 6.32.
Id. T 6.33.
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their relevant contributions of functions, assets, risks and other factors
contributing to the creation of value;
(v) where possible, determining arm's-length prices for these
transactions consistent with each party's contributions of functions
performed, assets used, and risks assumed.567
The Report, thus, implies a definition of the "creation of value" as
attributable "functions performed," "assets used," or "risks assumed" in
connection with "the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection
and exploitation of' the intangible. Thus, it mandates a second level of
construction of transactions in connection with intangible property: one
must not only construct an intercompany transfer for the use in imputing a
price to the intercompany transfer of the completed intangible, one must
also construct prior intercompany transactions where functions are
performed, assets used, or risks assumed by various components of the
group, in the process of developing, protecting, or exploiting the intangible.
This is bound to be a complex process, at the least, heaped on top of
already complex and indeterminate processes mandated by existing
regulations and Guidelines. But apart from its sheer Ptolemaic complexity,
the effort to move from emphasis on "formal" ownership to "substantive"
value creation fails for three reasons.
The 2014 intangibles deliverable is itself somewhat ambivalent about the
move. Its ambivalence is expressed principally with respect to what it defines
as the "6.56 functions," the importance of which the deliverable stresses
throughout:
6.56
In considering the arm's length compensation for functional
contributions of various members of the MNE group, certain important
functions will have special significance. The nature of these important
functions in any specific case will depend on the facts and
circumstances. For self-developed intangibles, or for self-developed or
acquired intangibles that serve as a platform for further development
activities, these more important functions may include, among others,
design and control of research and marketing programs, direction of
and establishing priorities for creative undertakings including
determining the course of 'blue-sky' research, control over strategic
decisions regarding intangible development programs, and management
and control of budgets. For any intangible (i.e. for either self-developed
or acquired intangibles), other important functions may also include
important decisions regarding defence and protection of intangibles,
and ongoing quality control over functions performed by independent
or associated enterprises that may have a material effect on the value of
the intangible. Those important functions usually make a significant
contribution to intangible value, and if those important functions are
outsourced by the legal owner in transactions between associated
567. Id. T 6.34.
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enterprises, the performance of those functions should be compensated
with an appropriate share of the returns derived by the MNE group
from the exploitation of intangibles.568
The second broad manner in which the 2014 intangibles deliverable
suggests some retreat from the perceived abuses of the 1990s system was by
suggesting both a limitation on the use of "one-sided" methods where
unique intangibles are involved, and at the same time, a broadened use of the
profit split method. Its disfavor of the "one-sided methods" is somewhat
buried in the text, but occurs at a number of points in the discussion of the
transfer pricing methods applicable in determining the price on an
intercompany transfer or license of a defined intangible. These passages are
as follows:
6.108.
In applying the principles of the Guidelines related to the
content and process of a comparability analysis to a transaction
involving intangibles, a transfer pricing analysis must consider the
options realistically available to each of the parties to the transaction.
In considering the realistically available options of the parties to a
transaction, the principles of paragraphs 9.59-9.64 should be applied.569
6.109
In considering the options realistically available to the parties,
the perspectives of each of the parties to the transaction must be
considered. A comparability analysis focusing only on one side of a
transaction generally does not provide a sufficient basis for evaluating a
transaction involving intangibles (including in those situations for
which a one-sided transfer pricing method is ultimately determined).570
This Chapter makes it clear that in matters involving the
6.130
transfer of intangibles or rights in intangibles it is important not to
simply assume that all residual profit, after a limited return to those
providing functions, should necessarily be allocated to the owner of
intangibles. The selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing
method should be based on a functional analysis that provides a clear
understanding of the MNE's global business processes and how the
transferred intangibles interact with other functions, assets and risks
that comprise the global business. The functional analysis should
identify all factors that contribute to value creation, which may include
risks borne, specific market characteristics, location, business strategies,
and MNE group synergies among others. The transfer pricing method
selected, and any adjustments incorporated in that method based on the
comparability analysis, should take into account all of the relevant

568. Id. T 6.56.
569. OECD Guidance on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles, supra note 556,
570. Id. T 6.109.
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factors materially contributing to the creation of value, not only
intangibles and routine functions.sn'
6.138
Care should be used, in applying certain of the OECD
transfer pricing methods in a matter involving the transfer of
intangibles or rights in intangibles. One-sided methods, including the
resale price method and the TNVJM, are generally not reliable methods
for directly valuing intangibles. In some circumstances such
mechanisms can be utilized to indirectly value intangibles by
determining values for some functions using those methods and
deriving a residual value for intangibles. But, the principles of
paragraph 6.130 are important when following such approaches and
care should be exercised to ensure that all functions, risks, assets, and
other factors contributing to the generation of income are properly
identified and evaluated.
6.139
The use of transfer pricing methods that seek to estimate the
value of intangibles based on the cost of intangible development is
generally discouraged. There rarely is any correlation between the cost
of developing intangibles and their value or transfer price once
developed. Hence, transfer-pricing methods based on the cost of
intangible development should usually be avoided.572
The 2014 intangibles deliverable at the same time suggest a greater role
for the profit split method. It does so in a bracketed portion of the reportmeaning it was subject to further consideration, particularly in connection
with later deliverables on Actions 9 and 10-which covers the use of profit
split methods both in connection with transfers and licenses of intangible
property by one group member to another573 as well as in its observation
(noted more fully below) that so-called "one-sided" methods should not be
used in transactions involving unique intangibles57 and its direction that the
presence of value in "embedded" intangibles should be taken into account as
a comparability factor, rather than a separate transaction.
2.

Re-characterisation

The 2014 deliverable on "re-characterisation" and "special measures"575
made inroads on the transfer pricing analysis underlying the "Dutch
sandwich"/cash box practices in three principal ways. The deliverable
completely restated Section D of Part I of the Guidelines, the section that
had detailed the "comparability factors." The revision retained the notion
that "a 'comparability analysis' is at the heart of the application of the arm's
571.
572.
573.
574.
575.

Id. T 6.130.
Id. ¶¶ 6.138-139.
Id. ¶¶ 6.145-6.149.
Id. T 6.109.
OECD BEPS Action 8, 9, 10, supra note 549.
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length principle,"76 but identified two "key aspects" of such an analysis: "to

identify the commercial or financial relations between the associated
enterprises and the conditions attaching to those relations in order that the
controlled transaction is accurately delineated;" and then "to compare the
conditions of the controlled transactions with the conditions of comparable
transactions between independent enterprises."577 The revised section was
to be dedicated to "accurate delineation" of the controlled transaction; and
that actually was to replace a simple delineation of "comparability factors."
It is noted above that the notion of "comparability factors," first
introduced in the 1993 U.S. proposed regulations, was critical to the
development of the "cash box" practice, because of the emphasis on
"contractual allocations," and the tendency of analysis to degenerate into
taking the contractual allocation as the final allocation for transfer pricing
purposes. The hard definition of a two-aspect or two-step process seemed
designed in part to counteract this degeneration. The 2014 recharacterisation deliverable did not abolish the use of "contractual
allocation" as a starting point, but it seeked to curtail it by strengthening, to
a considerable extent, language authorizing or directing tax administrations
to displace or override the taxpayers' allocations. Thus, the deliverable
stated that the "process of identifying the commercial or financial relations
between associated enterprises follows from examining contractual terms
governing those relations together with the conduct of the parties."578 But
the written terms of the contract could be overridden by examining:
* "All of the facts and circumstances surrounding how those
enterprises interact with one another in their economic and
commercial context to generate potential commercial value, how
that interactions contributes to the rest of the value chain, and what
the interaction involves in terms of the precise identification of the"
functions, assets, and risks of the parties, in which case the "written
contractual terms" could be "clarified and supplemented" by "the
actual commercial and financial relations";579
* "[W]hether the arrangements reflected in the actual conduct of the
parties conform to the terms of any written contract, or whether the
parties' actual conduct indicates that the contractual terms have not
been followed, do not reflect a complete picture of the transactions,
have been incorrectly characterised or labelled by the taxpayer, or
are a sham," in which case "the actual conduct of the parties
delineates the transaction";580
* Where "the actual outcome of commercial or financial relations
may not have been identified as a transaction by the taxpayer, but
nevertheless may result in a transfer of value," in which case the
576.
577.
578.
579.
580.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

T 1 (quoting TPG T 1.6).
T 2.
TT 2-4.
TT 5-6.
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terms of the transactions "would need to be deduced from the
conduct of the parties."s8'

This emphasis on examining "actual conduct" to review "contractual
terms," together with the emphasis on a two-step process as a counter to the
degeneration of the system into one wholly defined by the taxpayer's
unilaterally determined contracts, represents the first way in which the
recharacterisation deliverable retreated from the severity of the 1990s
system. Also, the deliverable listed the old "comparability factors," but
various called them "economically relevant characteristics" as well as
"comparability factors."
The second manner in which the deliverable tightened the rules
governing the "comminution" of income was to expand the provisions of the
second governing "risk." In the 2008/2010 business restructuring reports,
the OECD had elaborated notions of "risk" and "control of risk" as the
elements that were transferred from "complex" distributor entities to a "cash
box" entity, as defining the "restructurings" that were the targets of that
report. 582 The 2014 recharacterisation directive imports these concepts of
"risk" and "control" into the general Transfer Pricing Guidelines,
emphasizing the locus of "risk" in the MNE group as a determinant of
allocations of income.583
The third manner in which the deliverable tightens the transfer pricing
rules was its provisions on "non-recognition" of intercorporate transactions.
Non-recognition depends upon "[t]he concept of the fundamental economic
attributes of arrangements between unrelated parties," and "the test of
commercial rationality," which "requires consideration of whether the actual
arrangements differ from those which would have been adopted by
independent parties behaving in a commercially rational manner."584 If an
"actual arrangement, viewed in its entirety, would not afford such an
opportunity to each of the parties, or would afford it to only one of them,"
the transaction is not recognized.585 If the transaction is not recognized,
then the taxpayer's "structure" should be "replaced" by a structure
"determined by the alternative transaction that affords the parties the
opportunity to enhance or protect their commercial or financial position,"
which should be "guided by the fundamental economic attributes of
arrangements between unrelated parties," and should "comport as closely as
possible with the commercial reality of independent parties in similar
circumstances."586 These provisions are hardly clear, but they do convey the
sense of additional authority for tax administrations.
581. Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
582. See 2008 OECD Discussion Draft, supra note 450; see also 2010 Transfer Pricing
Guidelines, supra note 451.
583. 2014 Intangibles Deliverable, supra note 556.
584. Id. T 88.
585. Id. T 89.
586. Id. T 93.
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Hard-to-ValueIntangibles

3.

The June 2015 deliverable on hard-to-value intangibles set forth a
position that constituted a near complete reversal of the positions the
OECD had expressed in the early 1990s in its communications with the
United States Treasury concerning the "super royalty" provision adopted in
1986. In those earlier documents, the OECD expressed full-throated
opposition to basing any transfer pricing adjustments on the basis of
information not known or knowable to the taxpayer at the time pricing was
set. The 2015 deliverable addressed two related circumstancescircumstances where valuation was highly uncertain at the time of the
(constructed intercompany) transaction and circumstances involving "hardto-value intangibles" (HTVIs).587 In the former case, the deliverable recited
certain ways it surmised "independent enterprises" might take into account
uncertainties in framing a contract-by basing pricing on "anticipated
benefits," by including "price adjustment clauses" in their contracts, or by
providing for periodic renegotiation of the contracts.588 The deliverable
noted that "[t]he general experience of tax administrations in these situations
is that they may not have the specific business insights or access to the
information to be able to examine the taxpayer's claim and to demonstrate
that the difference between the ex ante and ex post value of the intangible is
due to mispricing by the taxpayer,"589 and thus, it provides that "[i]n these
situations ex post profit levels can provide a pointer to tax administrations
about the arm's length nature of the ex ante pricing arrangement agreed
upon by the associated enterprises, and the existence of uncertainties at the
time of the transaction," and that:
[i]f the difference between the anticipated profit levels and the ex post
profit levels is not due to unforeseeable developments or events, the
difference gives an indication that the pricing arrangement agreed upon
by the associated enterprises at the time of the transaction may not have
adequately taken into account the relevant developments or events that
might have been expected to affect the value of the intangible and the
pricing arrangements adopted.590
In the latter case, concerning HTVIs, the deliverable similarly noted that
"information asymmetry between taxpayer and tax administrations may be
acute and may exacerbate the difficulty encountered by tax administrations
in verifying the arm's length basis on which pricing was determined."591 The
deliverable thus provided that "the tax administration may consider ex post
evidence about the actual financial outcomes of the transfer to be necessary
587.
588.
589.
590.
591.

2015 HTVI Discussion Draft, supra note 553.
Id. JJ 2-4.
Id. T 6.
Id. T 7.
Id. T 11.
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in determining the appropriateness of the ex ante pricing arrangements."592
The deliverable set forth certain caveats: it said "the consideration of ex post
evidence should be based on a determination that such evidence is necessary
to be taken into account when and in so far as there is no other information
to assess the reliability of the information on which ex ante pricing has been
based,"593 and it said that "[i]n order to ensure that this approach is applied
only in situations where the difference between ex post outcomes and ex ante
projections is significant, and where such a difference is due to developments
or events that were or should have been foreseeable at the time of the
transaction, its application should be subject to the exceptions set out in the
following paragraph 14."594

The deliverable states four circumstances that might be "exhibited" by
HTVIs:
* Intangibles that are only partially developed at the time of the
transfer;
* Intangibles that are not anticipated to be exploited commercially
until several years following the transaction;
* Intangibles that separately are not HTVI but which are connected
with the development or enhancement of other intangibles which
fall within the category of HTVI;
* Intangibles that are anticipated to be exploited in a manner that is
novel at the time of the transfer.595
The exemption set forth by the deliverable applies where two conditions
are met:
* The taxpayer "provides full details of its ex ante projections used at
the time of the transfer to determine the pricing arrangements,
including how risks were accounted for in calculations to determine
the price (e.g. probability-weighted), and the comprehensiveness of
its consideration of reasonably foreseeable events and other risks;"
and
* "provides satisfactory evidence that any significant difference
between the financial projections and actual outcomes is due to
unforeseeable or extraordinary developments or events occurring
after the determination of the price that could not have been
anticipated by the associated enterprises at the time of the
transaction. "596
4.

Cost ContributionArrangements (CCAs)

In a simple and primitive form of cost-sharing, the parent corporation
might be exclusively responsible for developing intangible property. The
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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agreement among it and its subsidiaries would provide for the subsidiaries to
bear the "costs" of development, including its "risks," in proportion to their
respective "anticipated benefits" of the development. They might bear the
costs simply by "funding." The costs would be proportionately charged to
the subsidiaries and a payment might be made to the parent for the charge,
or the parent might simply forego their shares of the deductions and the
deductions would be claimable by the subsidiaries with some sort of
receivable set up and paid at some point.
By the time of BEPS, cost-sharing agreements had ceased to be so simple.
Provisions had to be made for "buy-in" payments for in-kind contributions
by the participants of property or services produced outside the
arrangements and for current in-kind contributions made in compliance
with the arrangement. Still, however, the prevailing rules permitted
centralization of the research activities with account taken of funding and
other contributions by the non-central parties.
But, the conceptions that preceded BEPS in the OECD's work, as well as
the initial work under BEPS, bore some obvious tensions with this kind of
straightforward and readily manageable CCA structure. The AOA and the
business restructurings Issues Notes included as Chapter IX of the
Guidelines elevated the concept of risk and "control" of risk, and the 2014
recharacterisation deliverable, as indicated above, imported the concept
strongly into Chapter 1 of the Guidelines. It made little sense to leave such
a concept out of the question in CCAs, but incorporating it into the CCA
rules meant that particularized inquiry into questions of "risk" and "control"
would make examination of CCAs considerably more complicated and
considerably more unpredictable. Similarly, the 2012 OECD Discussion
Draft on intangibles and the 2014 Action 8 deliverable reject pretty much
altogether the "developer-assister" idea of deferring returns to "assisters"
until the embodiment of development in identifiable property, and mandate
dividing the return on intangible property in accordance with the
contributions to the "development, maintenance, protection, and
enhancement" (DEMPE) of the intangible.
The early deliverable on CCAs reflected the conceptual changes
foreshadowed by the other deliverables, and by the work of the OECD on
AOA and business restructurings. First, the deliverable changed the
provisions of the Guidelines concerning permissible participants in CCAs.
The 2010 Guidelines had required only that a party have "a reasonable
expectation that it will benefit from the CCA activity (and not just from
performing part or all of that activity)." It required that the participant "be
assigned a beneficial interest in the property or services that are the subject
of the CCA, and have a reasonable expectation of being able directly or
indirectly (e.g., through a licensing arrangements or sales, whether to
associated or independent enterprises) to exploit or use the interest that has
been assigned."597 The 2014 deliverable changed this, requiring that a
597. 2010 OECD Guidelines, supra note 424, T 8.10.
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participant "must be assigned an interest in the intangibles, tangible assets or
services that are the subject of the CCA, and have a reasonable expectation
of being able to benefit from that interest."598 The deliverable then adds:
The general principles set out in Chapter 1 of these guidelines on the
allocation of risks when delineating transactions apply to situations
involving CCAs. Since a CCA is premised on all participants sharing
not only contributions but also risks of the CCA activities, to qualify as
a participant in a CCA an entity must have the capability and authority
to control the risks associated with the risk-bearing opportunity under
the CCA in accordance with the definition of control of risks set out in
Chapter I. In particular, this means that CCA participants should have
the capability to make decisions to take on the risk-bearing opportunity,
to make decisions on how to respond to the risks, and to assess,
monitor, and direct any outsourced measures affecting risk outcomes
under the CCA.599
The scope and meaning of these changes are not terribly clear, but on
some readings they could greatly restrict the permissibility or operation of
CCAs. To take the first set of changes, they seem intended to restrict
disproportionate allocations of interests in intangible to central entities
organized in tax havens, distributing product to shell distributors in outlet
jurisdictions. This is reflected in omissions from the prior text rather than in
the explicit text itself: the elimination of the references to benefiting
"indirectly," and the elimination of references to sales or licenses "whether
to associated enterprises or independent enterprises." But because this
inference is from a comparison to the prior text only, it cannot be asserted
with real confidence. As to the second passage, it seems to impose a rather
high bar for a participant, as it seems to require that all participants have
some degree of control over all "specific risks" associated with the CCA
"opportunity." This would seem to be inconsistent with the general idea of
"sharing" of costs and risks, and might be a standard virtually impossible to
meet.
Second, in determining the quantum of a participant's "contributions" to
the CCA, the 2014 deliverable (i) greatly shifted emphasis from a conception
that such contributions might consist entirely or primarily of cash
contributions to one which emphasized in-kind contributions, and
emphasized in-kind contributions within the CCA over "platform"
contributions of pre-existing services or property, and (ii) made clear that
such contributions should ordinarily be evaluated at market value rather
than on a pure cost basis. It provides:
It is sometimes the case that the value (i.e., the arm's length price) of
services contributed to a CCA corresponds to the costs associated with
providing those services. It may also be the case that the difference
598. 2014 CCA Deliverable, supra note 552, T 12.
599. Id. T 13.
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between the value and costs is relatively modest, such as for low valueadded services described in Chapter VII. In this case it is recommended
for practical reasons to value contributions at cost. However, in all
other circumstances (for example where contributions include a mixture
of low and high value-adding services and/or intangibles or other assets)
costs are unlikely to provide a reliable basis for determining the value of
the relative contributions of participants, and the use of costs may led to
non-arm's length results.600
The widespread use of market value for measuring contributions and
determining the amount of any required "balancing payments" plainly
introduces greater uncertainty and occasion for dispute than the use of a cost
basis. In this manner, the deliverable further undermines the utility and
advantage of using CCAs.
Finally, the deliverable requires that a CCA "require balancing payments
and/or changes in the allocation of contributions prospectively after a
reasonable period of time to reflect changes in proportionate shares of
expected benefits among the participants."601 The 2010 Guidelines
suggested only that the CCA "allow" for such changes in such
circumstances. 602 The change is in line with the OECD's retreat, manifest
principally in the provisions on high-value intangibles, from the stringent
opposition it expressed in the 1990s to basing transfer pricing adjustments
on information not available to the parties at the outset of their transactions.
B.

THE FIAL DOCUMENT ON ACTIONS 8-10

The final document on Actions 8-10 combined the material from all of
the two principal deliverables (concerning intangibles and
recharacterisation), and four of the five minor deliverables (commodity
transactions, hard-to-value intangibles, cost contribution agreements, and
low value-adding services), into a single document. This document also
included material on profit splits, but that matter was left for a final
document to be issued in 2017. There is little mistaking the fact that the
final document represented a retreat from some of the advances suggested in
the deliverables, a retreat in the direction of restoring concepts that favored
taxpayer determination of the outcome of allocations framed/disguised as
"rule of law" arguments, and one more tolerant of the "cash box" practice.
But that retreat was not complete, and left the BEPS project having made
some inroads on the more extreme applications of the system descended
from the 1990s.

600. Id. T 23.
601. Id. T 42(e).
602. 2010 OECD Guidelines, supra note 424, T 8.40(e).
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Recharacterisationand "Control" of "Risk"

By far the most important change wrought by the Final Reports
concerned the provisions of the recharacterisation deliverable, amending
Section D of Chapter I of the 2010 Guidelines, concerning risk as a factor in
the "functional analysis." The revision establishes an elaborate process for
identifying and allocating "risk" among associated enterprises, using
particular conceptions of "risk" and "control over risk" largely imported
from the business restructuring report. This process restores some respect
for contractual allocation as a "starting point" that would have been
diminished by the deliverable.
To begin with, the Final Reports are clear that "risk" means not only the
threat or possibility of loss, but generally relates to any business uncertainty
that has any opportunity for profit. The Report conceded that "[t]here are
many definitions of risk," but says that "in a transfer pricing context it is
appropriate to consider risk as the effect of uncertainty on the objectives of
the business."603 It stresses that "[i]n all of a company's operations, every
step taken to exploit opportunities, every time a company spends money or
generates income, uncertainty exists, and risk is assumed," and that "[r]isk is
associated with opportunities, and does not have downside connotations
alone."604

The Final Reports define the term "risk management" as "used to refer to
the function of assessing and responding to risk associated with commercial
activity." It says "risk management comprises three elements:
(i) the capability to make decisions to take on, lay off, or decline a riskbearing opportunity, together with the actual performance of that
decision-making function;
(ii) the capability to make decisions on whether and how to respond to
the risks associated with the opportunity, together with the actual
performance of that decision-making function; and
(iii) the capability to mitigate risk that is the capability to take measures
that affect risk outcomes, together with the actual performance of such
risk mitigation."605
The Final Reports define "control over risk" as "involv[ing] the first two
elements of risk management."606 It says that "[i]t is not necessary for a party
to perform the day-to-day mitigation . . . in order to have control of the
603. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Aligning Transfer
Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, T 1.71 (2015), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-AssetManagement/oecd/taxation/aligning-transfer-pricing-outcomes-with-value-creation-actions-810-2015 -final-reports_9789264241244-en#.WQOgdYWcGUk [hereinafter Final Actions 8-10
Reports].
604. Id. T 1.71.
605. Id. T 1.61.

606. Id. T 1.65.
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risks," because "[s]uch day-to-day mitigation may be outsourced," but also
notes that:
where these day-to-day mitigation activities are outsourced, control of
the risk would require capability to determine the objectives of the
outsourced activities, to decide to hire the provider of the risk
mitigation functions, to assess whether the objectives are being
adequately met, and, where necessary, to decide to adapt or terminate
the contract with that provider, together with the performance of such
assessment and decision-making. In accordance with this definition of
control, a party requires both capability and functional performance ...
in order to exercise control over a risk.607
The Final Reports define the "financial capacity to assume risk" as "access
to funding to take on the risk or to lay off the risk, to pay for the risk
mitigation functions and to bear the consequence of the risk if the risk
materialises."608 It says that "[a]ccess to funding by the party assuming the
risk takes into account the available assets and the options realistically
available to access additional liquidity, if needed, to cover the costs
anticipated to arise should the risk materialise."609
The Final Reports note that "[r]isk can be categorised in various ways,"
but suggests a "relevant framework" comprising a "non-exclusive list of
sources of risk," which is it says is intended neither to "suggest a hierarchy of
risk," nor "to provide rigid categories of risk," conceding "there is overlap
between categories."61o The Report lists five categories: "strategic" or
"marketplace" risks; "infrastructure" or "operational" risks; financial risks;
transactional risks; and hazard risks.611 It then sets forth a six-step process
for analyzing risk in a transfer pricing context. The first step is to "[i]dentify
economically significant risks with specificity."612 The second is to
determine how these risks are "contractually assumed" by the associated
enterprises "under the terms of the transaction."613 The third is a functional
analysis of how the parties "operation in relation to assumption and
management" of these risk, "in particular which enterprise or enterprises
perform control functions and risk mitigation functions, which enterprise or
enterprises encounter upside or downside consequence of risk outcomes, and
which enterprise or enterprises have the financial capacity to assume the
risk."614 The fourth step is to determine "whether the contractual
assumption of risk is consistent with the conduct of associated enterprises
607.
608.
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.
614.
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and other facts of the case."615 The fifth step is taken only where the
contractual allocation is inconsistent with the parties' conduct or other facts,
and involves allocating the risk in derogation of the contractual allocation.616
The sixth step is the actual pricing, taking into account risks assumptions "as
appropriately allocated," and "appropriately compensating risk management
functions."617

As to the fifth step, the Final Reports are relatively terse, noting that if it is
established by the fourth step that the party contractually allocated the risk
"does not exercise control over the risk or does not have the financial
capacity to assume the risk, then the risk should be allocated to the
associated enterprise or group of associated enterprises exercising the most
control."618 But it concludes, somewhat obscurely, that "[i]n exceptional
circumstances, it may be the case that no associated enterprise can be
identified that both exercises control over the risk and has the financial
capacity to assume the risk," and that "[a]s such a situation is not likely to
occur in transactions between third parties, a rigorous analysis of the facts
and circumstances of the case will need to be performed, in order to identify
the underlying reasons and actions that led to this situation," and that
"[b]ased on that assessment, the tax administrations will determine what
adjustments to the transactions are needed for the transaction to result in an
arm's length outcome," which may entail "[a]n assessment of the commercial
rationality of the transaction" under the rules governing non-recognition.619
These rules on their face restore considerable scope to contractual
allocations, as they are a starting point under step two. In practice and
implementation, they are likely to accord even greater scope to those
allocations for a number of reasons. Although these guidelines call for
identification of "specific" risks that are "economically significant," they
concede that different categories of risk overlap. In discussions of business
theory or business administration, there is often great analytic advantage in
categorizing risk, but in actual practice, the risks so categorized do not exist
or operate in isolation. On top of this, the notion of "control" in the Final
Reports is rather vague, and even the conception of "financial capacity" is
not altogether clear. These considerations mean that in the third and fourth
step there are likely to be serious obstacles in most situations to determining
a "risk allocation" that is different from the "contractual" allocations, and
the contractual allocations are likely to withstand any serious attack in all but
exceptional circumstances.

615.
616.
617.
618.
619.
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Intangibles (Action 8)

The Final Reports carried forward most of the provisions of the 2014
Action 8 deliverable, but with some significant changes, almost all of which
reflected the incorporation of the "risk" and "control" provisions in Chapter
I of the Guidelines, or otherwise restored or elevated the significance of
legal ownership and contractual allocations. In setting forth a "framework
for analysing transactions involving intangibles" at the outset of its section
on "contributions to the development, enhancement, maintenance,
exploitation and protection of intangibles," the 2014 deliverable identified
the following steps, which were elaborations of the approach of the 2012
Discussion Draft on intangibles:

-

(i) identifying the legal owner of intangibles based on the terms and
conditions of legal arrangements, including relevant registrations,
license agreements, other relevant contracts, and other indicia of legal
ownership;
(ii) identifying the parties performing functions (including specifically
the important functions described in paragraph), using assets, and
assuming risks related to developing, enhancing, maintaining and
protecting the intangibles by means of the functional analysis;
(iii) confirming the consistency between the conduct of the parties and
the terms of the relevant legal arrangements regarding intangible
ownership through a detailed functional analysis;
(iv) identifying the controlled transactions related to the development,
enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles
in light of the legal ownership of the intangibles under relevant
registrations and contracts and the relevant contributions of functions,
assets, risks and other factors contributing to value;
(v) where possible, determining arm's length prices for these
transactions consistent with each party's contributions of functions
performed, assets used, and risks assumed; and
(vi) in the exceptional circumstances described in paragraphs 1.64
1.68, recharacterizing transactions as necessary to reflect arm's length
conditions.620

The Final Reports place as a first step to "[i]dentify the intangibles used or
transferred in the transaction with specificity and the specific, economically
significant risks associated with the development, enhancement,
maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangibles," injecting both
the idea of "specificity" and "economically significant risks" from the
changes added in the final Report to Chapter 1.621 As the second step, the
final Report directs:
620. 2014 Action 8 Deliverable, supra note 556, T 6.34.
621. Id. T 6.34.
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"[i]dentify[ing] the full contractual arrangements, with special emphasis
on determining legal ownership of intangibles based on the terms and
conditions of legal arrangements, including relevant registrations,
licence agreements, other relevant contracts, and other indicia of legal
ownership, and the contractual rights and obligations, including
contractual assumption of risks in the relations between the associated
enterprises. "622
Again this elevates the role of contractual assignments, particularly with
respect to risks. The Final Reports inject the importance of the central
paragraph 6.56 functions into the basic framework; emphasizing the
"control" of "risks;" and eliminates specific reference to the authority of the
administration to re-characterize the transaction the 2014 deliverable
proposed part of the regular procedure, and thus, implicitly diminished the
"exceptionality" of such an undertaking.
Later, in stating such authority as the administration has to accurately
delineate the actual transaction, the 2014 deliverable provided:
When no written terms exist, where the contractual terms are
ambiguous or incomplete, or where the factual substance of the
transaction reflected in the conduct of the parties is inconsistent with
the written contracts, the terms of the transaction must be inferred
from the conduct of the parties and the economic principles that
generally govern relationships between independent enterprises.623
The corresponding provision in the Final Reports is distinctly narrower:
Where no written terms exist, or where the facts of the case, including
the conduct of the parties, differ from the written terms of any
agreement between them or supplement these written terms, the actual
transaction must be deduced from the facts as established, including the
conduct of the parties (see Section D.1.1 of Chapter I).624
The Final Reports made extensive changes and additions to the provision
governing the internal allocations with respect to the DEMPE of intangibles
with respect to the provisions on use of assets, particularly in relation to
circumstances where the party funding a transaction is not the party in
control of the associated operational risks.625 These generally confine the
funding party to a return on the funding risk.626 The Report changed the
provisions governing ex post returns to limit adjustments based on such
returns by directing attention to whether the parties "properly took into
account risks and the probability of reasonably foreseeable events occurring
and that the differences between actual and anticipated profitability reflects
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.

Id.
Id. T 6.36.
Final Actions 8-10 Reports, supra note 603, T 6.36.
Id. T 6.59.
Id. ¶¶ 6.60-6.64.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
384

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 51, NO. 2

the playing out of those risks," and noting that "it may happen that financial
projections, on which calculations of ex ante returns and compensation
arrangements are based, did not adequately take into account the risks of
different outcomes occurring and therefore led to an overestimation or an
underestimation of the anticipated profits."627
Similar changes reflecting incorporation of the control of risk ideas, and
giving greater emphasis to contractual allocations, appear throughout the
Final Reports.628 Perhaps the most significant change the Final Reports
make to the earlier deliverable concerns the central functions identified in
paragraph 6.56,629 and the provisions concerning allocations to a "legal
owner" with respect to those functions. The 2014 Deliverable provided:
Because it may be difficult to find comparable transactions involving the
outsourcing of such important functions, it may be necessary to utilise
transfer pricing methods not directly based on comparables, including
profit split methods and valuation techniques, to appropriately reward
the performance of those important functions. Where the legal owner
outsources most or all of such important functions to other group
members, the entitlement of the legal owner to be attributed any
material portion of the return derived from the exploitation of the
intangibles after compensating other group members for their functions
is highly doubtful. In some such circumstances it may also be
determined that the outsourcing of such important functions would not
have been undertaken by independent enterprises behaving in a
commercially rational manner, and that the actual structure adopted
impedes the determination of an appropriate transfer price, thereby
necessitating the disregarding of the actual structure adopted in
accordance with the principles described in [the non-recognition
provisions].630
This is materially softened in the Final Reports, rendering what had been
doubtful merely something that should be carefully considered:
Because it may be difficult to find comparable transactions involving the
outsourcing of such important functions, it may be necessary to utilise
transfer pricing methods not directly based on comparables, including
transactional profit split methods and ex ante valuation techniques, to
appropriately reward the performance of those important functions.
Where the legal owner outsources most or all of such important
functions to other group members, attribution to the legal owner of any
material portion of the return derived from the exploitation of the
intangibles after compensating other group members for their functions
should be carefully considered taking into account the functions it
627.
628.
629.
630.

Id. T 6.69. See also id. T 6.70.
See id. TT 6.40, 6.42, 6.49, 6.77, 6.91, 6.97, 6.104, 6.114, 6.128.
See supra note 368, Part V-A-1 and text accompanying.
2014 Action 8 Deliverable, supra note 556, T 6.57.
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actually performs, the assets it actually uses and the risks it actually
assumes under the guidance in Section D.1.2 of Chapter I. Examples
16 and 17 in the annex to Chapter VI illustrate the principles contained
in this paragraph.631
The provisions of the 2014 deliverable concerning limitations of the onesided methods, and on the utility of profit splits, by contrast, were largely
carried forward in the Final Reports, except that in the 2014 deliverable
there had been references to the "profit split method" without the adjective
"transactional." The Final Reports are careful to insert the adjective, and to
confine its references to the "transactional profit split method."632
3.

Hard-to-Value Intangibles

The provisions of the June 2015 deliverable, in which the OECD cures
itself of its longstanding allergy to retrospective adjustments, largely survive
in the Final Reports, perhaps owing to the short time between the issuance
of the deliverable and the Final Reports.633 The Final Reports did make
some material changes, largely though not entirely in the direction of
narrowing the degree of innovation mandated by the deliverable.634
Thus, the Report appears to narrow both the range of circumstances in
which resort to ex post results may be had and the significance to be attached
to such results.635 Thus, the deliverable distinguishes circumstances where
"the difference between the anticipated profit levels and the ex post profit
levels is not due to unforeseeable developments or events," in which case
"the difference gives an indication that the pricing arrangement agreed upon
by the associated enterprises at the time of the transaction may not have
adequately taken into account the relevant developments or events that
might have been expected to affect the value of the intangible and the
pricing arrangements adopted," in which case ex post profit may be
examined, from "the situation in which hindsight is used inappropriately by
not taking into consideration whether information could or should
reasonably have been known and considered by the associated enterprises at
the time of the transfer."636 It says, therefore, that:
Special considerations are necessary to ensure that tax administrations
can determine in which situations the pricing arrangements as set by the
taxpayers are at arm's length and are based on an appropriate weighting
of the foreseeable developments or events that are relevant for the
valuation of the intangibles involved, and in which situations this is not
the case. 6 37
631.
632.
633.
634.
635.
636.
637.

Final Actions 8-10 Reports, supra note 603, T 6.57.
See 2014 Action 8 Deliverable, supra note 556, TT 6.145, 6.148, 6.149.
See Yariv Brauner, Treaties in the Aftermath ofBeps, 41 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 973, 1030 (2016).
See id. at 1008.
See 2015 HTVI Discussion Draft, supra note 383, T 12.
Id. T 7.
Id. T 8.
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The Final Reports, by contrast, describe a more limited approach to the
use of ex post information:
[T]his section contains an approach consistent with the arm's length
principle that tax administrations can adopt to ensure that tax
administrations can determine in which situations the pricing
arrangements as set by the taxpayers are at arm's length and are based
on an appropriate weighting of the foreseeable developments or events
that are relevant for the valuation of certain hard-to-value intangibles,
and in which situations this is not the case. Under this approach, ex post
evidence provides presumptive evidence as to the existence of
uncertainties at the time of the transaction, whether the taxpayer
appropriately took into account reasonably foreseeable developments or
events at the time of the transaction, and the reliability of the
information use ex ante in determining the transfer price for the transfer
of such intangibles or rights in intangibles. Such presumptive evidence
may be subject to rebuttal . . .638
The Report also modifies (and expands) the list of circumstances that may
be exhibited by HTVIs, to the category that the intangible is expected to be
exploited "in a manner that is novel at the time of the transfer," and it adds
the condition that "the absence of a track record of development or
exploitation of similar intangibles makes projections highly uncertain."639
The Final Reports add two other circumstances: (1) that the intangible
meeting the definition have "been transferred to an associated enterprise for
a lump sum payment;" or (2) where the intangible is either used in
connections with or developed under a CCA "or similar arrangements."640
The most significant change wrought in the Final Reports is an expansion
and strengthening of exemptions to circumstances where ex post information
is taken into account. 641 The Final Reports add three exemptions:
* Where the "transfer of the HTVI is covered by a bilateral or
multilateral advance pricing agreement" (APA);
* Where "[a]ny significant difference between the financial
projections and actual outcomes" does not reduce or increase
"compensation for the HTVI by more than 20 per cent of the
compensation determined at the time of the transaction"; and
* Where a "commercialisation period of five years has passed
following the year in which the HTVI first generated unrelated
party revenues for the transferee" and the difference in outcomes is
not greater than 20 percent for that period.642
Also, with respect to the first exemption, the original deliverable stated
that where it obtains, "no adjustment to the ex ante pricing arrangements
638.
639.
640.
641.
642.

Final Actions 8-10 Reports, supra note 603, T 6.188.
Id. T 6.190.
Id.
See 2015 HTVI Discussion Draft, supra note 553, T 12.
Final Actions 8-10 Reports, supra note 603, T 6.193.
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based on these special considerations would be justified."643 The final
Report states that in such circumstances, "tax administrations will not be
entitled to make adjustments to the ex ante pricing arrangements based on ex
post outcomes."644
4.

Cost ContributionArrangements (CCAs)

In contrast to the provisions concerning HTVIs, those restricting CCAs
were virtually all relaxed by the Final Report.645 The Final Report did not
restore any provisions that contemplated indirect benefits could be taken
into account in determining anticipated benefits,646 but the other innovations
suggested by the deliverable were almost all moderated by the final report.
With respect to the determination of what entities could be participants,
the Final Report clouded the requirement that participants have control of
the risks associated with the DEMPE of an intangible, and made clear that
the only risks any participant would be required to control were the specific
risks assumed by the participant:
A party would also not be a participant in a CCA if it does not exercise
control over the specific risks it assumes under the CCA and does not
have the financial capacity to assume these risks, as this party would not
be entitled to a share in the output that is the objective of the CCA
based on the functions it actually performs. The general principles set
out in Chapter I of these guidelines on the assumption of risks apply to
situations involving CCAs. Each participant makes particular
contributions to the CCA objectives, and contractually assumes certain
risks. Guidance under Section D.1 of Chapter on delineating the actual
transaction will apply to the transfer pricing analysis in relation to these
risks. This also means that a party assuming risks under a CCA based
on analysis under step 4(i) of the framework for analysing risks in
paragraph 1.60 ("assumes the risk under the CCA") must control the
specific risks it assumes under the CCA and must have the financial
capacity to assume these risks.647
In connection with the valuation of contributions, the Final Reports retain
some preference for valuation based on market value rather than cost, but
states the preference in considerably more muted tones. 648 It also
distinguishes more sharply than had the original deliverable between current
contributions (i.e., those made "within" the CCA), on the one hand, and
contributions of pre-existing value, on the other:
643. 2015 HTVI Discussion Draft, supra note 553, T 15.
644. Final Actions 8-10 Reports T 6.194.
645. Aligning Transfer PricingOutcomes with Value Creation Revised ChaptersI, II, VI, and VII of
the Transfer PricingGuidelines, Oct. 16, 2015, http://pwc.blogs.com/files/pwc-aligning-transferpricing-outcomes-with-value-creation.pdf.
646. See Final Actions 8-10 Reports, supra note 603, TT 8.13, 8.14.
647. Id. T 8.15.
648. See id. T 8.25.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
388

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 51, NO. 2

In valuing contributions, distinctions should be drawn between
contributions of pre-existing value and current contributions. For
example, in a CCA for the development of an intangible, the
contribution of patented technology by one of the participants reflects a
contribution of pre-existing value which is useful towards the
development of the intangible that is the objective of the CCA. The
value of that technology should be determined under the arm's length
principle using the guidance in Chapter I-III and Chapter VI,
including, where appropriate, the use of valuation techniques as set out
in that Chapter. The current R&D activity under the development
CCA performed by one or more associated enterprises would constitute
a current contribution. The value of current functional contributions is
not based on the potential value of the resulting further application of
the technology, but on the value of the functions performed. The
potential value of the resulting further application of the technology is
taken into account through the value of pre-existing contributions and
through the sharing of the development risk in proportion to the
expected share of benefits by the CCA participants. The value of the
current contributions should be determined under the guidance in
Chapters I-III, V, and VII. As noted in paragraph 6.79, compensation
based on a reimbursement of cost plus a modest mark-up will not reflect
that anticipated value of, or the arm's length price for, the contributions
of the research team in all cases. 649
The Final Reports are lenient on the use of costs in connection particularly
with "current" contributions:
Whereas it cannot be assumed that the value of pre-existing
contributions corresponds to costs, it is sometimes the case that cost
could be used as a practical means to measure relative value of current
contributions. Where the difference between the value and costs is
relatively insignificant, for practical reasons, current contributions of a
similar nature may be measured at cost in such cases for services CCA.
However, in other circumstances (for example where contributions
provided by the participants vary in nature and include a mixture of
services types and/or intangibles or other assets) measuring current
contributions at cost is unlikely to provide a reliable basis for
determining the value of the relative contributions of participants, and
may lead to non-arm's length results. For development CCAs, the
measurement of current contributions at cost . . . will genially not

provide a reliable basis for the application of the arm's length
principle.650

649. Id. T 8.26.
650. Id. T 8.28.
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And the Final Reports stress this preference for costs even where a
demonstration could be made that "comparable" uncontrolled parties
entered a CCA with contributions valued at cost:
Where uncontrolled arrangements are claimed to be comparable to the
arrangements between associated enterprises in the CCA, and those
uncontrolled arrangements provide for contributions to be made at
cost, it is important to consider the comparability of all of the
economically relevant characteristics of the transactions in the boarder
context of the arrangement, including the impact of any broader
arrangement of economically related transactions which may exist
between the parties to the uncontrolled transaction, and the sharing of
risks. Particular attention should be paid to whether other payments
are made in the uncontrolled arrangements; for example, stage payment
or compensating contributions may be made in addition to the
reimbursement of costs. 6 51

Finally, the Final Reports retreated from the requirement that CCAs
provide for periodic adjustments. The Final Reports state that: "[t]he
arrangement may specify provision for balancing payments and/or changes
in the allocation of contributions prospectively after a reasonable period of
time to reflect material changes in proportionate shares of expected benefits
among the participants."652
VI.

"Positive" Implications of the Value Creation Paradigm

We noted above the double "negative" motivations for the BEPS
initiative's emphasis on "value creation": addressing the problem of tax
avoidance/evasion through the use of tax haven subsidiaries to which
substantial shares of "residual" profits are allocated "contractually" in ways
apparently authorized by the current Guidelines (and United States
regulations), on the one hand, and foreclosing moves toward fractional
apportionment/unitary taxation, on the other.653 But a review of the long
development of transfer pricing concepts reveals an intimate connection
between longstanding principles underlying international co-ordination of
direct tax systems, and the seemingly recent idea of aligning outcomes with
"value creation" under the rubric of "arm's length."654 This connection
suggests a "positive" case for the initiative's notion of value creation.655
To begin with, the supervening twin objective of "Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion" of double taxing conventions
implies a principle of definitively assigning rights to tax among jurisdictions
65 1. Id.
652. Id. T 8.50(e).
653. See Gregory Pun, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: How Corporations Use Transfer Pricingto
Avoid Taxation, 40 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 287, 289 (2017).
654. See id. at 292.
655. See id. at 313.
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in such a way that the tax base is comprehensively assigned to some tax
jurisdiction, and that any part of the base is assigned to one and only one
jurisdiction.656 This principle has been prominently impeached in United
States commentary in recent years on either of two grounds: (1) it should not
deny the right of taxpayers to plan their affairs to shield some part or even all
of their "tax base" from taxation by any jurisdiction,657 and (2) the principle
does not deny to jurisdictions the right to forego taxation of part or all of the
tax base to stimulate their economy or for other reasons of economic
management, including particularly the promotion of the international
competitive position of their economy or their taxpayers. 658 But neither of
these concerns really impeaches the notion of a comprehensive assignment
of taxing rights: they address, rather, how nations assigned certain rights
may exercise the rights assigned, and that is a matter the governance of
which the international coordinating system has always explicitly
eschewed.659

The notion of value creation implicitly reaffirms the conception of a
comprehensive but single assignment of taxing rights as envisioned in the
Academic Experts' ideal solution to the double taxation problem.660
Moreover, it does so in a way that emphasizes that the assignment is of
jurisdictional authority, without commitment to the manner of exercise of
that authority, and which reaffirms that the latter is an internal matter not
regulated by international consensus. 661 This point may be obscured first by
the fact that presently the content of the notion of value creation is
understood, or at least agreed, in only a primitive manner, 662 and second, by
that fact that under almost any conceivable understanding of value creation,
some room will remain for identifying sources of value which are irreducibly
joint results of operations or organisational integration, conceived either
with respect to geographic location or organisational identity.663 But the
directive to align the outcome of transfer pricing determinations with value
656. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for
Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1303-04 (1996).
657. H. David Rosenbloom, The David R. TillinghastLecture InternationalTax Arbitrage and the
'InternationalTax System,' 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 153 (2000).
658. Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on InternationalTax Competition, 89
GEO. L. J. 543, 546-49, 554-68 (2001).
659. See id. at 548-49.
660. See 1923 Academic Experts Report, at 20:
The ideal solution [to the double taxation problem] is that the individual's whole
faculty should be taxed, but that it should be taxed only once, and that the liability should
be divided among the tax districts according to his relative interests in each. The
individual has certain economic interests in the place of his permanent residence or
domicile, as well as in the place or places where his property is situated or from
which his income is derived." (Emphasis added).
661. Orly Mazur, Transfer Pricing Challenges in the Cloud, 57 B.C. L. REV. 643, 663 (2016).
662. Richard Collier et. al., OECD Discussion Drafts in Six BEPS-Related Areas Raise More
Concerns for MNES, 26 J. INT'L TAx'N 39, 48 (2015).
663. Yariv Brauner, What the Beps?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 75 (2014).
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creation necessarily implies that concepts of value creation should be
developed or crystallized in a manner that makes determinate geographic
assignment of the totality of business profit (theoretically preferably
measured ex post), and does so with respect to any defined portion to one and
only one jurisdiction.664
Beyond that, however, value creation implements the classification and
assignment method of assigning primary right to tax business profits to the
source jurisdiction by promising, and indeed demanding, a general and
widely accepted definition of the source of income, something that, despite
an abiding reliance by multijurisdictional systems on the concept of source,
has never been accomplished.665 There has been some tendency in the
recent commentary divining an order in the extant collection of
international tax rules or norms to associate "classification and assignment"
with general theories of taxation, which theories were current and emergent
at the time of the League work and have remained influential since.666 In
particular, it has been argued that the assignment of the priority right to tax
passive income to the state of domicile reflects the principle of predicating
tax responsibility on the taxpayer's ability to pay, while the assignment of a
priority right to tax active business income to the source state reflects the
principle of basing responsibility on the benefit derived by the taxpayer from
government operations.667
This construction is objectionable on numerous grounds: it is after the
fact, and projects theories back on the period of the 1920s without
foundation in the documents surviving the effort involved; it is simpliste in
the extreme; but most important, it occludes the nature of the task facing the
international community in ways that distract it from the most fruitful
avenues of inquiry. It is true that the original League documents, the work
of the "Academic Experts," extolled the ability-to-pay principle, related it to
taxation on the basis of domicile, and incorporated it into its
recommendations concerning the allocation principles the experts
espoused.668 But even at the outset, those experts were not prescribing tax
policy, either for individual states or for an international order, but rather
envisioning a jurisdictional system. 6 6 9 The course of the League's work
throughout the first decade exhibited this distinction even more clearly as it
developed.670 Thus, in the end, the League carved out different classes of
income not on the basis of how the different classes should be taxed, but
664. See also Lebowitz, TransferPricingand the End ofInternationalTaxation, 1999 WTD 186-17
(Sept. 27, 1999).
665. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The StructureofInternationalTaxation: A ProposalforSimplification, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1307, 1311 (1996).
666. Hugh J. Ault, CorporateIntegration, Tax Treaties and the Division of the InternationalTax Base:
Principles and Practices, 47 TAX L. REV. 565, 568-69 (1992).
667. Avi-Yonah,supra note 2, at 1305, 1310-11.
668. Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 1, at 1035.
669. See id. at 1079.
670. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The StructureofInternationalTaxation: A Proposalfor Simplification, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1304 (1996).
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rather on the basis that the different classes constituted distinct spheres of
economic activity within each of which concerns of equity and efficiency
could be intelligibly managed by the individual states involved.671 This did
not involve considerations of tax theory or economic justice, which matters
were left to the various states within their spheres so assigned, but rather
were theories about the relationship of state power and economic activity.672
It should be remembered that in its early years, the League of Nations was
conceived as something of a super-sovereign, to an extent to which no
international organisation in the time since has ever been regarded. This
was true notwithstanding the rejection of the League by the United States
Congress and the United States' non-membership in the League.673 It
should be remembered that sovereignty in the conception of the League was
accorded primarily to European states, and that the League charter accepted
colonial empires in a way and to an extent that later organisational charters,
especially the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter, never did.674

This conception of the League waned quickly in the 1930s with the
withdrawal by Germany and the rapid escalation of international tensions,
but the keen sense of jurisdictional definition and control that prevailed
during the 1920s survives in the international tax system devised
contemporaneously, and has indeed contributed to the durability and
stability of that system. 675
The concept of value creation offers a foundation for amplifying the idea
of the sphere within which states may operate to tax business profits. It
should be remembered that the purer statement of the assignment of
business profits is in Article 7 of the Model Convention, not Article 9,
although the incorporation of the separate enterprise approach in both ties
the two conceptually.676 And it should also be remembered that the
statements of the international rules, in the 1979 and 1995 OECD
Guidelines were both derivative from revisions of the United States
regulations, and that the United States regulations on both occasions were
driven by considerations of fiscal and economic policy largely endemic if not
unique to the United States.677 The OECD's 2001-2010 AOA, which
pertained only to Article 7, was thus the first truly international nonderivative interpretation, after eight decades, of the jurisdictional definition
of state authority delineated by the League's original work and carried
671. See id. at 1306.
672. See id.
673. See Louis B. Sohn, Expulsion or Forced Withdrawalfrom an International Organisation, 77
HARv. L. REV. 1381, 1397 (1964).
674. See Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty,
Economy, and the Mandate System ofthe League ofNations, 34N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.. 513, 514
(2002).
675. See Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 1, at 1022, 1066.
676. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et. al., Allocating Business Profitsfor Tax Purposes:A Proposalto Adopt A
Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 497, 523-524 (2009); see also Sheppard, supra note 158
and accompanying text.
677. See Mogle, supra note 533, at 928.
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forward in the model conventions and actual double taxation conventions
ever since. 678 And the AOA, recognizing it had antecedents in the
preliminary OECD studies of the mid-1990s, is the genuine original source
of the value creation idea as conceived and embodied, although again
trimmed and obscured, in final BEPS-Report on transfer pricing.679
The inevitable objection to such a suggestion is the undeniable
circumstance that at present the idea of value creation is ill-formed, and
thus, it is impossible to demonstrate that the concept can serve as a
meaningful definition of the scope of state authority.680 That objection is
unsustainable for two reasons. The first concerns the present state and
recent trends in the taxation of corporate profit globally. There is a
substantial economic argument for not taxing corporate profits at all, for the
abolition of the corporate income tax. 681 That argument is rarely made these
days. Corporate profit as a share of national income in the United States is
near an all-time high, and the same is true in many if not most nations across
the globe.682 The argument for exempting profits is always difficult to
explain to heavily taxed national populations, and is all the more so in this
milieu. But the impulse to minimize or eliminate business taxes animates a
number of contemporary proposals, many advanced quite seriously. These
include measures to substantially reduce the rates of tax on corporate profits,
to enact tax holidays of greatly reduced (or zero) taxation for the distribution
of untaxed accumulated profits of foreign subsidiaries, and for the exemption
of foreign source income under a "territorial" tax system. 683 They also may
influence more far-reaching proposals, like the current United States
initiative for a "border adjustment" tax, which may have the effect of shifting
the actual incidence of what appears as a corporate tax from profits to some
other base, like consumption or payroll or a combination of the two. 6 84 And

they clearly animate the defence of le c6t Plats-Unis in transfer pricing, with
its emphasis on contractual allocations and developer-assister rules, which
may represent little more than disguised efforts to provide exemption or very
low-rate taxation on the residual profit, especially when coupled with socalled repatriation initiatives.

678. See Sheppard, supra note 158.
679. See supra Part II-B.
680. David Stewart, 'Value Creation' Understanding Key to Transfer Pricing's Future, 79 TAX
NOTES INT'L 322, 322 (2015) (discussing how value is created concerning the issue of transfer
pricing policy).
68 1. See Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational
Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 18, 86 (1993).
682. Kirk J. Stark, State Tax Shelters and U.S. Fiscal Federalism, 26 VA. TAX. REv. 789, 793
(2007).
683. See Green, supra note 681, at 21, 23, 30.
684. See Mark K. Neville, Jr., The
TO Status of the Proposed U.S. Destination-BasedCash-Flow
Tax, 28 J. INT'L TAx'N 25, 25-26 (2017).
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But for the most part there remains consensus in most nations that some
kind of tax on corporate profits is appropriate.685 But in the modern context,
whether animated by underlying hostility to the taxation of profits or
otherwise, there is emphasis in almost all theoretical works on concentrating
such taxation at the "source" of income.686 This stance is reflected in
proposals for the adoption, universally, of territorial systems, to some extent
in the proposals for a Border-Adjustment Tax (BAT);687 and in what a
number of theorists view as a "second best" alternative to a BAT: a formula
apportionment system with a single factor sales criterion.688 The reason that
the poor definition of value creation, at the present time, does not vitiate the
validity of its use in a traditional transfer pricing system under the
classification and assignment method is that in any of these source-centric
systems, if pursued with rigor and integrity, the identical problem obtains. A
territorial system is little more than a system for restricting corporate
taxation (or exempting the residual from taxation altogether) unless there is a
better definition than obtains at present of both source and transfer pricing
rules-of answering the question of precisely what is the income associated
with the identified territory.689
A second answer to the difficulty of the primitive state of the value
creation idea is that, all things considered, and on closer examination, that
state is not altogether entirely primitive. The vision set forth in the Final
Reports is limited, but details a concrete, though rudimentary, idea of value
685. Work in the area of international business taxation tends to be of two main kinds. The
first involves tax administrators and tax practitioners and seeks on the one hand (the
administrators) to formulate rules to allocate business profits among countries based on a
market analogy and on the other hand (the practitioners) to argue that the international rules
may appropriately lead to profits of multinational corporate groups ending up in low-tax
jurisdictions-the hard-boiled wonderland in the title. The other body of work by economists
tends to suggest that the income tax for international business income is doomed and that other
forms of taxation should be applied to international businesses-the end of the world in the
title.
Each of these strikes the author as fantastic in the original sense of the word-much like the
novel of Haruki Murakami form which the title of the article is derived. Both seem to ignore
the real world. The inside of a multinational firm is not like a market, though it is possible to
use some market analogies to sensibly allocate profits among countries. Nor has the corporate
tax shown any signs of coming to an end, though subject to strong economic pressures; on the
contrary, the tax has remained remarkably buoyant.
Vann Hard-BoiledWonderWorld at 292.
686. Gary C. Hufbauer, U.S. Taxation of InternationalIncome: Blueprintfor Reform, 8-17, 77-94,
131-70 (1992); see also Lawrence Lokken, TerritorialTaxation: Why Some U.S. MultiatinonalsMay
be Less Than Enthusiasticabout the Idea (and Some Ideas They Really Dislike), 59 SMU L. REV. 751,
769 (2006); see also Peter Merill et. al., RestructingForeign-SourceIncome Taxation: U.S. Territorial
Tax Proposalsand the InternationalExperience, 111 TAX NOTEs 799, 799 (2006).
687. Alan Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux, Michael Keen, & John Vella, A Destination-Based
Cash Flow Tax, OXFORD UNIVERISTY CENTRE FOR BUSINESS TAXATION 17 (2017), https://
eml.berkeley.edu/-auerbach/CBTWP1701.pdf.
688. See Alan Auerbach & Michael P. Devereux, Cash Flow Taxes in an International Setting
33-34 (2017), https://eml.berkeley.edu/-auerbach/Auerbach%20Devereux%202-25-17.pdf.
689. Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99, 138 (2011).
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creation that is two-part. The first part is that set forth in the revision of
Chapter VI of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, governing intangible
property, and involves allocations away from the owner of an intangible to
the components of the group that make contributions to the "development,
enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation" of the intangible.690
While these allocations may not exhaustively define value creation, it is
difficult to argue that the contributions so described are at a minimum a
substantial element in the generation of the frequently substantial and not
infrequently gargantuan profit associated with the property. The second
part is that set forth in the revisions of Section D of Chapter I of the
Guidelines, concerning recharacterisation, which derive from the rules
governing the delineation of the hypothesized transactions among the
associated parties.691 This has particular focus on the specification of risks,
as defined in the report, and on its concept of control over risk.692 Despite
the circumstance that those provisions, especially of the Final Reports, may
be freighted heavily with objectives that look to reintroducing or reemphasizing the role of contractual specification and allocation of the risks
involved, the concept that risk should be assigned and rewarded has some
realistic association with the ultimate generation of the profit subject to
tax.

69 3

Moreover, these twin concepts exhibit some progress away from more
general underlying conceptions that have undermined the realism of the
arm's length principle in most prior treatments, including those of the
United States 1988 White Paper and the 1995 OECD Guidelines. Those
treatments have been subject to the infirmity, described at length in prior
work, of emphasizing a "production cost" approach in contrast to and
derogation of a "transaction cost" approach.694 A production cost approach
visualizes all profit as associated with what in early economics are conceived
as "factors of production," although the conception of "arm's length" that
emerged in the 1990s describes these as "functions, assets, and risks," the
"FAR jargon," in Professor Vann's phrase.695 A transaction cost approach, by
contrast, sees corporate integration as economizing on, or "internalizing,"
transaction costs, so that the profit generated exceeds the total of what
would be generated by the several "factors."696 The latter approach is a
corollary of what emerged during the debates of the 1980s and 1990s as the
identified, fundamental flaw of the arm's length idea: that integrated
690. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Conforming
Amendments to ChapterlX of the TransferPricing Guidelines, T 9.57 (2016), https://www.oecd.org/
tax/transfer-pricing/conforming-amendments-chapter-ix-transfer-pricing-guidelines.pdf.
691. Id. T 9.13.
692. Id. T 9.21.
693. Id. T 9.89.
694. See Stanley I. Langbein, Transaction Cost, Production Cost, and Tax Transfer Pricing, 44 TAX
NOTES 1391, 1391 (1989).
695. Vann Hard-BoiledWonderWorld at 326.
696. See Langbein, supra note 694.
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enterprises, in economic fact, do not operate as if they were a collection of
separate enterprises. 697
The concepts of the Final Reports correct some of the biases of this
production cost approach, only hesitantly and incompletely, but still
meaningfully. First, a vice of the production cost approach has been to
identify too hastily all the residual profit with intangible property, even in
circumstances in which no asset that could intelligently be characterized as
property is identifiably present. 698 This vice is noticeable, especially in the
United States White Paper.699 The Final Reports do not suffer from this
tendency, at least not to the extent of prior treatments: the Report imposes
concrete, though quite expansive requirements that must be met for what
constitutes intangible property, and limits the elements of a residual return
that can be characterized as a return to intangibles accordingly.700 Its
suggestions concerning the profit split method constitute a limited, but
nevertheless meaningful, guide to a course of action in circumstances when
the residual cannot reasonably be so characterized.701 These provisions do
leave room for a considerable range of dubious results, but at least there are
some limits on what constitutes an intangible asset. 7 0 2

Much more importantly, the terms of the Final Reports introduce some
scope, within the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, for employing or at least
experimenting with transaction cost concepts without further revision of the
Guidelines.703 These opportunities derive from the central role given the
concept of risk in the delineation process, and of the pliable and indefinite
notion of risk the new rules articulate.704 The internalization theory which
represents the synthesis of the modern theory both of the firm generally,705
and the MNE in particular,706 generally conceives of "transaction costs" as
hazards (or risks) avoided by hierarchical organisation. Two kinds of avoided
hazards predominate. With respect to production processes (manufacturing
(U.S.) or trade intangibles (OECD), in transfer pricing lexicon),
internalization avoids appropriation hazards-matters or information cannot
697. Stanley Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm's Length, 30 TAX NOTEs 625,
625 (1986); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the
Evolution of U.S. InternationalTaxation, 15 VA. TAx REv. 89, 147-148 (1995).
698. See Richard J. Vann, supra note 13.
699. See supra Part III-C-1.
700. Final Actions 8-10 Reports, supra note 603.
701. See id. at 4-6, 22.
702. See id. at 8.
703. See id. at 14.
704. See id. at 1.
705. Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 141 (1988);
Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985).
706. Peter J. Buckley & Mark C. Casson, The MultinatiionalEnterprise Revisited (2010); Alan M.
Rugman, Internalizationand Non-equity Froms ofInternationalInvolvement, in NEW THEORIES OF
THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (A. Rugman ed. 1981); Mark C. Casson, Transaction Costs
and the Theory of the Multinational Enterprise, in NEW THEORIES OF THE MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE (A. Rugman ed. 1981).
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be costlessly disclosed to an unrelated party without the risk they will be
appropriated, so joint action requires organisational control.707 With respect
to distribution processes (marketing intangibles, in transfer pricing lexicon),
internalization avoids debasement hazards-the risk that a valuable market
position will be run down by an unrelated party's use of it without incurring
the costs of maintaining and perpetuating it.708 In both cases, while the
economic literature involved tends to speak in terms of costs, it is equally if
not more accurate to discuss what is involved as risks (of appropriation or
debasement or other problems, as the case may be). And these can be
identified as "specific risks" within the terms set forth in the new Section
D.709 So in identifying them, an analysis under that section can be
performed to identify the party or parties which "control" the risks within
the terms of the section, and an allocation of the profit conceived as
associated with transaction cost avoidance, not merely the consequence of a
production cost process, can be made.no The section's heavy emphasis on
the contractual allocation of risk, enforced mainly by the revisions to the
Final Reports, is an obstacle to developing ideas along these lines, but it is
not necessarily an insuperable one.7n
In more general terms, the basic idea of the functional analysis of
identifying the economic contributions made by the group entities to firm
value creation may be an effective instrument to capture the actual value
creation of the firm, if and to the extent that the functional analysis can be
geared to being also receptive to internal firm specificities such as functions
being performed through the specific means provided by the integration,712
asset specificity created within and by means of joint operations, and risks
mitigated through internalizing a transaction (i.e., a transaction costs
approach to FAR).
This is not to say that the Final Reports permit an analysis fully consonant
with contemporary theory. One conspicuous limitation in this regard entails
the report's treatment of location savings. More recent theory of the TNE
synthesizes the theory in an "OLI" framework: ownership, localization, and
internalization.713 The theory recognizes that some of the benefit of
integrated or hierarchical form obtains from the ability to exploit advantages
associated with foreign locale, principally through savings in labor and other
707. Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies:Analysis and AntitrustImplications (1975) 8,18;
Mario Guillen & Adrian E. Schoegl, Building a Global Bank: the Rise of Banco Santander (2008).
708. See Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 107-112 (1985); John H.
Dunning & Matthew McQueen, The Eclectic Theory of the Multinational Enterprise and the
International Hotel Industry, in NEW THEORIES OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (A.
Rugman ed. 1981).
709. See Final Actions 8-10 Reports, supra note 603, T 8.15.
710. Id.
711. Id.
712. See, e.g., David J. Teece, A Dynamic Capabilities-based Entrepreneurial Theory of the
MultinationalEnterprise, 45 J. OF INT'L BUSINESS STUDIES, 8 (2014).
713. John H. Dunning, The Eclectic Paradigmas an Envelope for Economic and Business Theories of
MNE Activity, 9 INT'L BUs. REV. 163 (2000).
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A transfer-pricing framework fully consonant with this theory

would permit an allocation of profit based on location savings.75 The BEPS
Reports, both the recharacterisation deliverable and the Final Reports,
prohibit any direct allocation based on location savings.716 The matter is a
point of disagreement between the developed countries of the OECD and
the emerging economies of the Group of 20.717 The final resolution in the

BEPS Report on this issue places it in tension, if not in conflict, with
modern firm theory.
In summary, notwithstanding this last point, the Final Report is a start
toward a definition of the proper sphere of different jurisdictions of the right
to tax corporate profits under any theory of the source of profit from the
varying jurisdictions. It is far from fully satisfactory. But especially to the
extent it represents agreement among at least the Group of 20, to say
nothing of the states that are observers to the BEPS process, it is a
measurable and laudable improvement over any prior or pre-existing set of
conceptions.718
We noted above that the negative grounds for seeking a definition of value
creation entailed not only reducing the scope for "cash box" and tax haven
abuses, but also avoiding resort to fractional apportionment.719
Correspondingly, the positive grounds also entail a prong expressing doubt
or disfavor of fractional methods, even perhaps in modified form,720 as the
ultimate destination for an international allocation system. The reasons for
this are several. First, the OECD's repeatedly reaffirmed principal ground
for rejecting fractional apportionment is the difficulty of achieving
international consensus on the allocation criteria to be used.721 This is a
serious problem with any move toward fractional apportionment, to be sure,
but it is not insuperable, and certainly does not justify the kind of theological
opposition to the method frequently voiced, especially in business circles.
But the problem, if anything, has become more serious in recent years than
it has been historically. This is on account of the sympathy for the method
that has emerged among the "emerging" economies, notably by China.722 In
the last half decade, China has become the first country in official
pronouncements to express, if not support, at least openness to the use of
fractional apportionment as an officially sanctioned allocation method, and
714. See id. at 164, 168.
715. Brauner, supra note 663, at 1010.
716. See Final Actions 8-10 Reports, supra note 603, T 1.140-1.151.
717. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Aff., United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for
Developing Countries, TT 10.3, 10.3.8, 10.4, http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UN_Manu
alTransferPricing.pdf (2013).
718. See Gregory Pun, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: How Corporations Use Transfer Pricingto
Avoid Taxation, 40 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 287, 287 (2017).
719. See Brauner, supra note 663a, at 1011; see also Part II-C-1.
720. See Stanley I. Langbein, A Modified FractionalApportionment Proposalfor Taxing Pricing, 54

TAX

NOTEs

719, 719 (1992).

721. 2010 OECD Guidelines, supra note 4, TT 1.22-1.25.
722. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Aff., supra note 717, TT 10.3, 8.2.
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China currently seems to seek ways to apply it to the electronic
manufacturing services industry (EMS).723 Thus, the Chinese position
appears, if anything, to have hardened opposition by the United States to the
method. And, while the United States government has maintained firm
support for arm's length, it is among United States state officials and
academics that support for fractional apportionment has grown, and has
come to include some former officials of the Federal Government after their
return to work in the private sector.7 24 With respect to this and other issues,
antagonism between the United States and China, now the world's two
largest economies, appeared to intensify during the course of consideration
of the entire BEPS initiative.725 Potentially polar positions of the world's
two largest economies counsels against any kind of optimism towards
progress in fractional apportionment.726 Moreover, China describes
fractional apportionment as one option for implementing a contribution
analysis, which it contradistinguishes to a risk-based approach, and the
BEPS deliverables/reports and the preceding intangibles study, as well as the
AOA and Chapter IX of the Guidelines, are all centered on a transition from
a risk-based/contractual analysis to some form of contribution analysis, even
if the BEPS Final Reports represent a slowing of such movement. 727
Furthermore, as we have attempted to demonstrate throughout, a
contribution analysis grounded on the idea of value creation implements the
historic classification and assignment method more truly than does the riskbased approach invented in the 1990s. Given that both China and the
United States have accepted the Final Reports, the twins rubrics of value
creation and contribution analysis would appear to present a better prospect
for progress toward genuine international agreement than does the rubric of
formula solutions.728
More fundamentally, the development of ideas about fractional
apportionment in recent scholarship has begun to raise doubt about the
value of the idea,729 notwithstanding its history among the American states,
723. Under this scenario, China takes the view that a risk-based approach may have insufficient
regard for the fact that there are sizeable assets located in China (i.e. the work force and factory
plants). In many cases, the majority of the headcount of the EMS group are based in China,
with only a few management personnel residing outside of China. Rather than a transactional
or profits-based approach, a contribution analysis approach may be more suitable. This means that
remuneration to each party involved would be commensurate with its role and contribution to
the value chain in the group. In this case, the assets and the people should largely dictate where
the group's profits should stay, and a globalformulary approach should be a realisticand appropriate
option.
Id. T 10.3.6.3.
724. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating Business Profits
for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REv. 497 (2009).
725. Yariv Brauner, What the Beps?, 16 FLA. TAx. REv. 55, 63, 94 (2014).
726. Id. at 94.
727. David Spencer, BRICS, BEPS, and the U.N. Transfer PricingManual (PART 2), 24J. INT'L
TAX'N

42, 51 (2013).

728. Brauner, supra note 725, at 973, 982, 990.
729. See Langbein, supra note 694, at 1391, 1410.
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and signal some potential dangers with the approach. A study by a former
OECD official and prominent practitioner ably details some of the
difficulties that would have to be resolved in designing even a "residual"
fractional system:
* It would have to be determined whether to apply apportionment to
the entire income of the corporate group, on the one hand, or
separately to each "unitary" lines of business, on the other; and if
the latter, there would have to agreement on a method for
identifying the separate lines of business;
* There would need to be agreement on the determination of
consolidated income, and contemporary experience of the efforts of
various national/regional accounting standards boards to harmonize
international financial accounting standards, or of the European
Commission to devise a common consolidated corporate tax base
(CCCTB) foretell serious difficulties in doing so;
* There would need to be agreement on the allocation factors (keys in
the OECD's language), and each of the potential allocation factors
30
has difficulties of its own.7

As to the allocation factors, Andrus and Oosterhuis noted that the
CCCTB uses the three factors historically used by the American states
(payroll, property, sales), but briefly explore difficulties with each.73 With
regard to payroll and property, there are both measurement problems and
problems occasioned by opportunities for taxpayer manipulation. As to
measurement, with payroll, there is a question whether to use payroll or
headcount-the CCCTB uses a 50-50 average of each.732 With regard to
property, the question is whether to use only tangible fixed personal
property, with respect to which there are questions concerning how to treat
depreciation, and the further question of the extent to which to include
realty, inventory, accounts receivable, and intangible property. 33 With
respect to both employment and property, there are problems occasioned by
the ability of taxpayers to use independent contractors or to outsource both
through contract manufacturing or other devices.734 These difficulties are
most pronounced in relation to high margin, knowledge-intensive
enterprises, precisely the same as those that present the most pronounced
difficulties under arm's length.35
The sales factor raises difficulties concerning remote direct sales by a
seller with no presence in the buyer's jurisdiction: sales of intermediate
goods and raw materials and the comparable question of sales of capital
730. Joe Andrus & Paul Oosterhuis, Transfer Pricing After BEPS; Where Are We and Where
TAXES THE TAX MAGAZINE 89, 90-91, 96-97, 101 (Mar. 2017), https://
www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2017/03/transfer-pricing-after-beps.
731. Id. at 96.
732. Id. at 98.
733. Id. at 98-99.
734. Id.
735. See id. at 104.

Should We Be Going, 95
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goods, all presenting the problem whether the sales should be counted at the
point of sale, on the one hand, or on a look-through basis on the sale of final
goods, sales through third-party intermediaries, and the treatment of
franchising and licensing arrangements. 736 All present both measurement
problems and opportunities for taxpayer manipulation. Sales of services
pose acute problems, conceptually, of determining whether the "place" of
sale is the place where the services are performed or the place where they are
used, and practically, in determining either the place of performance or the
place of use. 737

Andrus and Oosterhuis note that the problems of measurement and
manipulation with respect to the property and employment factors have led
a number of states to move to using a single-factor sales method, and that
recent proposals for adopting a modified fractional system applicable solely
to "residual" profits have proceeded on the suggestion that sales should be
used as a single factor.73s But, they note that suggestions are bound to
encounter difficulty with nations in which a taxpayer had substantial
production activity, but relatively little sales; they note that the system would
certainly "cause a very large shift in corporate tax revenues among various
countries compared to today's arm's-length pricing regime."739
The design difficulties may not be a sufficient reason to reject fractional
apportionment in favor of further refinement of the BEPS/value creation
conception. The latter has difficulties aplenty of its own: the Final Reports
are a compromise that will surely occasion a welter of interpretive problems,
there are questions about the extent of the legal authority of the OECD
Guidelines in many if not all nations, and indeed there are indications that
taxpayers will challenge the authority of not only the OECD but of Article 9
of the treaties to make the determination of what constitute "commercial or
financial relations" between "associated enterprise" a matter of treaty
(international), as opposed to national law.740

But the abiding difficulty with fractional apportionment, as opposed to
value creation, was identified by one of us in 1989: that the internalization
theory of TNE yields "no reason to use a single formula applicable to all
businesses and all integration settings," but rather "suggests definable
736. Harry Grubert, Destination-BasedIncome Taxes: A Mismatch Made in Heaven?, 69 TAx L.
REv. 43, 47, 51, 54-55, 58, 63, 69 (2015).
737. Id. at 43-44.
738. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating Business Profits
for Tax Purposes:A Proposalto Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REv. 497 (2009); Alan
Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux, Michael Keen & John Vella, A DESTINATION-BASED CASH
FLOW TAx (2017), available at https://eml.berkeley.edu/-auerbach/CBTWP1701.pdf.
739. Joe Andrus & Paul Oosterhuis, Transfer Pricing After BEPS; Where Are We and Where
Should We Be Going, 95 THE TAx MAGAZINE 89, 101 (Mar. 2017), https://www.skadden.com/
insights/publications/2017/03/transfer-pricing-after-beps.
740. Jens Wittendorff, BEPS Actions 8-10: Birth of a Nation of a New Arm's-Length Principle, 81
TAX NOTES INT'L 331, 331 (2016); see alsojens Wittendorff, The Object ofArt. 9(1) ofthe OECD
Model Convention: Commercial or Financial Relations, INT'L TRANSFER PRICING J. 200, 200
(2010).
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differences among different kinds of business integration (lateral, forward,
backward, vertical, multidivisional) and among different types of 'asset
specificity' (human asset specificity, sit specificity, physical asset specificity,
dedicated assets)," and thus, it is "quite likely that it would be possible to
define intelligible differences between different contexts."74' This relates to
the first prong of the positive case for the value creation paradigm: that
according taxing rights to the place of contribution supports national-level
design of a tax system that is efficient and equitable from the standpoint of
the functioning of the economy which is that nation's jurisdiction.742
Indeed, the inflexibility of using global, predetermined formulae is a
secondary facet of the OECD's expressions of concern over the system, 743
albeit that those expressions primarily emphasize taxpayer, rather than tax
system, interests.
By contrast, the value creation paradigm at least attempts to create what
the Chinese call a contribution-based system that can be tailored in
accordance with the scope of various nations' economic spheres of control
and jurisdiction.744 And it does so observing inherited international
agreements and perceived norms, and preserves worldwide acceptance and
use of what prove to be durable business income tax arrangements.
VII.

Conclusion

The G20 and OECD BEPS initiative has been the focus of intense
attention, in the United States and abroad. The extent to which the United
States will accept the standards of the Final BEPS Reports is not clear. The
United States has issued regulations to implement the country-by-country
reporting standards of Action

13,745

but the Final Reports with respect to

other Actions have not yet been implemented in the United States. In
particular, the Final Reports with respect to Actions 8-10 set some standards
that would appear inconsistent with the extant United States regulations, but
the Treasury Department, whether in the Obama or Trump Administration,
has given no indication that it contemplates any changes to those regulations
at any time in the foreseeable future.746 Irrespective of how the United
States resolves the stance of the United States' own regulations in this
regard, even United States practitioners understand they may need better to
understand the output of the BEPS project, as other nations under OECD
guidance implement the program. An understanding of the BEPS transfer
pricing provisions, moreover, requires an understanding of prior work of the
741. Stanley I. Langbein, supra note 694, at 1410.
742. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Aff., supra note 717, T 1.7.14.
743. See 2010 OECD Guidelines, supra note 4, ¶¶ 1.25, 1.29.
744. See Spencer, supra note 727.
745. T.D. 9773, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,489 (June 30, 2016); Qualification Standards for Enlistment,
Appointment, and Induction, 81 Fed. Reg. 64,061 (Sept. 19, 2016). The regulations appear as
Treas. Reg. § 1.6038.4.
746. But see Sara Dillon, Tax Avoidance, Revenue Starvation and the Age of the Multinational
Corporation, 50 INT'L L. 275, 321 (2017).
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OECD, notably the AOA in connection with transactions involving
permanent establishments and the Restructuring Report and Chapter IX of
the 2010 Transfer Pricing Guidelines, as the concepts central to the BEPS
transfer pricing reports evolved through that work, and that work has
previously received little attention, much less understanding, in the United
States.
If practitioners need pay heed to the BEPS rules and to developments in
relation to BEPS, the observation applies with still greater force to
academics and policymakers. It is widely understood that BEPS represents a
beginning much more than an end, and that the future promises a great deal
of both contention and exploration in refining its approach.747
It is also clear that the concept of value creation and identification of the
locus of value creation are central to the entire BEPS project, and especially
its transfer pricing provisions. This paper has been prepared and is offered
in light of these circumstances. There is controversy over whether the
concept is novel, and whether it is consistent with prior norms of
international tax practice, and over whether such consistency is of any
importance, on the one hand, or whether, on the other, the nations of the
world should construct their own, contemporary consensus on international
tax relations.
In this paper, we have taken a position on both prongs of this question.
We believe there is value in continuity with prevailing and long-standing
approaches and conceptions, and some danger in departing from them,
however alluring the notion of a new, contemporary project might seem in
theory. And, at the same time, we believe the value creation ideal, far from
representing any serious departure from extant norms, not only is fully
consistent with long-standing standards, but may actually represent a
perfected manner of expressing those standards-and may promise a
perfected guide to illumining practical methods to implement them.
But in this light, it is important to simultaneously have both a careful
understanding of the precise content of the international standards and of
the manner in which they emerged, and recognition of the contemporary
business and technical circumstances that have triggered the substantial
international effort to perfect the manner in which the standards are
implemented and applied. For this reason, in this document we have
emphasized two matters. The first is an analysis of the historical evolution
of standards for taxing multijurisdictional business income, particularly as it
relates to taxation by a source state, and of the relationship of the value
creation ideal to that evolution. The second is an emphasis on the central
party/stateless income problem, and the manner in which the transfer
pricing rules and practice relate to or indeed generate that problem; and of
the influence a recognition of that problem has had on the formulation and
747. Alex Cobham, Beginning of the Endfor theArm's Length Principle?,TAX JUSTICE NETWORK
(Sept. 22, 2017), http://www.taxjustice.net/2017/09/22/beginning-of-the-end-for-the-armslength-principle/.
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execution of the BEPS project in general and the BEPS transfer pricing rules
in particular.
In relation to the first matter, we have sought to show that the original
idea developed in the 1920s on the taxation of business income at source was
that such income should be taxed by the jurisdiction to which the income
bears the greatest degree of economic allegiance. We demonstrate that the
earliest Academic Report and a largely neglected Addendum to that Report
assimilated the economic allegiance of business income not to autonomous
assets and risk, but to human agency, and that this formulation adumbrates
the emphasis on "people functions" articulated by the OECD first in the
AOA, but then carried forward into the Transfer Pricing Guidelines first
through the Restructuring Report and Chapter IX in 2010, and thence into
the Final Reports on BEPS Actions 8-10. We show that this spirit carried
forward in the 1930s to the work of the League elevating the separate
enterprise standard now embodied in Article 9 of the Model Conventions,
the basis of the arm's length standard, because there the foundational work
of the League justified the arm's length approach, and the reservation of
taxing rights to the residual income to the home country, on grounds that
the agency of the enterprise's central management performed what might be
called people functions to which the residual was attributable.
Still in relation to the first matter, we suggested in the second incarnation
of the arm's length principle-that of the 1968 United States regulations
and 1979 OECD Guidelines-and the third-the 1994 United States
regulations and the 1995 OECD Guidelines-the rules to some extent
loosened the tie between the governing principle of economic allegiance and
implementing arm's length principle, and the newly designed set of
articulate rules elaborated to apply that latter principle. The system of the
1960s established rules rigidly based upon comparables, and more
importantly, upon a marginal analysis of the hypothetical behavior of single
components of the integrated enterprises. In so doing, the system created
ambiguity about, and provided no solutions for allocating, the residual
income not allocated by even a complete series of marginal analyses of all the
components of the enterprises. In the terms of our approach, the second
system displaced the idea of the original arm's-length regime, which had
allocated the residual to the parent company on the theory that the
economic allegiance of the residual was to the home country, because that is
where the central managers were and because the central managers were the
producers of the residual-with one which disavowed responsibility for any
theoretical explanation of the residual. The second system failed when
inevitably this approach gave no convincing answers to practical situations,
leaving taxpayers, administrators, and courts to make apparently arbitrary
decisions.
The third system addressed the surface symptoms of the secondschizophrenic prognoses and indeterminacy-without addressing its
underlying cause, which was the lack of connection to the more general
rubric of economic allegiance. The result was that the reform bore vices
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probably greater than any the reform cured. For in operation, if not in
intent, the linchpin of the third system is emphasis on the contractual
allocations devised, supposedly by agreement among the various
components of the integrated enterprise, but of course in actuality
determined by the central management of the unified entity. This, coupled
with the retention (and indeed the expansion) of the methods by which the
marginal analyses of the second system were accomplished, had an inevitable
result. In loyalty to their kind, to use the Jefferson Starship's phrase,
corporate management in short order figured out that they could form a
largely nonfunctional entity in a low-tax jurisdiction, move the functions,
assets, and risks emphasized by the rigid third system predominantly to that
entity, and contractually allocate the entire residual to that entity. This
disabled the capacity of the jurisdictions where manifestly the most
important economic activity involved in producing the income takes placewhere products and services are made, grown, manufactured, where the
means of producing them are conceived and designed, and where lie the
markets in which goods and services are sold or distributed-to tax the
profits so generated. The profits, in other words, were shifted, and the base
of economically involved states eroded, to the detriment of the fisc in any
such state. This base erosion and profit shifting also operated to the
detriment of any purely domestic enterprises in the economically involved
states, because those enterprises have to endure taxation of any residual
profit their operations generated, while their multijurisdictional competitors
did not.
In other words, the third system displaced a predecessor whose vice was
indeterminacy and uncertainty, with one whose vices were the multiples
ones of inequity, inefficiency, and fiscal stress. And the third system, again
more than the second, strayed from any effort to tie its rules to the concept
of economic allegiance. Indeed, the system all but flouted the larger idea,
because there was no identifiable reason to believe that intercorporate
contracts unilaterally devised by TNE central managements would allocate
income in a way that had anything to do with the larger ideal. Instead, the
new system rapidly degenerated it one whose governing idea could only be
said to be a principle that the residual income should be virtually exempt
from tax. That notion is and would be sufficiently unacceptable and
unpopular that, while partisans stridently defended arm's length as a
fundamental principle in itself and laud the stress on contractual allocations
without regard to the fact that such a device had never been used in the first
two incarnations of arm's length, no one ever articulates or openly advocates
the only real principle than can meaningfully be said to underlie the third
system.
Which brings us to the second matter we have emphasized-the role of
the central party/stateless income problem to both the processes of
substantive policies of BEPS. We have just noted that and how that problem
emerged largely on account of the revisions of the transfer pricing standards
adopted in the mid-1990s. But we have deemed it important to note the
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extent to which there was ambivalence on the part of the OECD even from
an early date about the manner in which the revised rules would function
and were functioning. Thus, we have detailed the OECD's various demurral
and qualifications concerning the United States regulations as they emerged,
and the extent to and manner in which the final 1995 OECD Guidelines
preserved many of these sentiments and perceptions.74s Beyond that, we
have emphasized that the OECD in both the AOA749 and the Restructuring
Report-so frankly repudiated features of the 1995 Guidelines which
undergird central parties and stateless income-in the AOA, by refusing to
permit any analogue of contractual allocations to serve as a starting point for
allocations of income among branches of a singly incorporated enterprise
operating in different jurisdictions, and in the Restructuring Report, by
mandating a transfer pricing adjustment when functions, assets, and risks are
transferred from components of an enterprise which the transfers render
limited function, to an enterprise which becomes or is becoming a central
party. We deem an understanding of the retreats from contractual
allocations embodied in these two studies critical to understanding BEPS.
In addition, comprehension of the controversy surrounding contractual
allocations is essential to understanding the evolution of the BEPS Reports
themselves. We have examined that evolution in detail. We compare in
detail in Part V the various deliverables and discussions drafts with
corresponding provisions of the Final Reports. But really in the evolution of
BEPS there were four stages, the first two of which were brief and are
surveyed by Part I. The first stage was in the original Addressing BEPS
Report of the OECD, issued in February 2013,75, and the second was the

Action Plan issued in mid-2013.752 The deliverables/discussion drafts were
the third, and the Final Reports the fourth. We have shown that through
these four stages there is a steady movement away from approaches that
would have constituted sharp departures from the status quo, and toward
approaches effecting more limited change. This recapitulates movement
that has occurred in relation to prior episodes in the development of
international tax standards. In the original formulation of the system in the
1920s, the process was instituted with the 1923 Report of the Academic
Experts,753 which articulated what might be characterized as more
theoretically pure principles. These were compromised by practical and
political concerns, and by the differing interests of the different nations, as
the process moved through the 1925 and 1927 Reports of the Technical
Experts,75 and the final recommended Models published in 1928.755 So, too,
748. See supra Part III-C-2.
749. OECD PE Report; see supra note 413; see supra the discussion in Part IV-A.
750. 2008 OECD Discussion Draft; see supra note 450; see supra the discussion in Part IV-B.
751. Addressing BEPS. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
752. OECD 2013 Action Plan. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
753. 1923 Academic Experts Report. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
754. 1927 Technical Experts Report; 1925 Report of First Technical Experts Committee. See
supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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the process of transfer pricing "reform" in the late 1980s and early 1990s
began with the United States White Paper,56 which both set forth
substantially theoretical analysis and reflected an expectation of serious
reform. As successive forms of the regulations were published, any serious
theoretical basis for the rules emerging all but vanished, and the ultimate
reforms could really only be characterized, for reasons we suggest above, as
regressive.
Whatever the course by which we have arrived, this is where we are today.
The major controversies now in play with the major economic powers
concern the compatibility of value creation with the extant overall
international tax order, first, and the question of the continuing viability of
emphasis on contractual allocations, second. We recognize that the
discussion in this paper is lengthy and complex, and the materials involved
are difficult. This is inevitable given the financial and economic magnitude
of the subject matter, the sharp difference of views among the different
nations of the world as well as among informed observers in the private
sector, and the long history of crisis in this policy area. While we apologize
for the length and density of the discussion, we also understand that our
views of the matter are sharply defined and potentially controversial, and
thus need to be expounded in detail but with emphasis.
It is also the case, that, as we have said and notwithstanding the extent of
relevant material covered here, the finalization of BEPS leaves the Group of
20 and the international tax community at a beginning more than an end.
While we characterize our views as sharply defined, it is also true that as of
the moment they are largely accepted or prevailing views-we are in the
main defending the outcome of BEPS and the G20's embrace of value
creation, and deem our views to enjoy, at least at the moment, a degree of
international acceptance greater than is now accorded contrary or dissenting
views. Yet there is substantial occasion for further research. In particular,
there is real question whether and the extent to which the particular
phenomena identified in the AOA, Chapter IX, and the BEPS Final Reports
in determining the situs of "value creation" (principally the conceptions of
"people functions" and "control of risk") are exhaustive of the criteria that
might serve that determination, and whether others can be identified that
might supplement or even displace those criteria. These are matters we have
refrained from examining in any detail in this paper, having, as we conceive
ourselves to have had, a prior task of defending (and defining) as progress
what has been achieved thus far.
But those matters form areas for further inquiry and discussion, in which
we look forward to engaging.

755. League of Nations, Double Taxation and Tax Evasion-Report Presented by the General
Meeting of Government Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, Document C,562
M.178 (Oct. 1928), reprinted in Conventions Legislative History 4151.
756. White Paper, see supra note 256 and accompanying text.
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Appendix
OECD Action Items Pertaining Directly to Transfer Pricing (Actions
Items 8-10, 13)
Action 8 titled "Intangibles," directs the initiative to:
Develop rules to prevent BEPS by moving intangibles among group
members. This will involve:
(i)
(ii)

(iii)
(iv)

adopting a broad and clearly delineated definition of
intangibles;
ensuring that profits associated with the transfer and use of
intangibles are appropriately allocated in accordance with
(rather than divorced from) value creation;
developing transfer pricing rules or special measures for
transfers of hard-to-value intangibles; and
updating the guidance on cost contribution arrangements.

Action 9, entitled "Risks and capital," provides that the initiative will:
Develop rules to prevent BEPS by transferring risks among, or
allocating excessive capital to, group members. This will involve
adopting transfer pricing rules or special measures to ensure that
inappropriate returns will not accrue to an entity solely because it has
contractually assumed risks or has provided capital. The rules to be
developed will also require alignment of returns with value creation.
This work will be coordinated with the work on interest expense
deductions and other financial payments.
Action 10, entitled "Other high-risk transactions," provides that the
initiative will:
Develop rules to prevent BEPS by engaging in transactions that would
not, or would only very rarely, occur between third parties. This will
involve adopting transfer pricing rules or special measures to:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

clarify the circumstances in which transactions can be
recharacterised;
clarify the application of transfer pricing methods, in particular
profit splits, in the context of global value chains; and
provide protection against common types of base eroding
payments, such as management fees and head office expenses.

Action 13, entitled "Re-examine
provides the initiative will:

transfer

pricing documentation,"

Develop rules regarding transfer pricing documentation to enhance
transparency for tax administration, taking into consideration the
compliance costs for business. The rules to be developed will include a
requirement that MNE's provide all relevant governments with needed
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information on their global allocation of the income, economic activity
and taxes paid among countries according to a common template.
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